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The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
It is not so often that a university professor gets the chance to write the foreword of a volume put together by Masters’ students. But I have to say that this project is excep-tional in many regards.
First of all, this volume does an exceptional job 
in documenting recent events of environmental 
migration and displacement. Today, there is hardly 
a week that goes by without the media announcing 
significant population displacements due to envi-
ronmental changes. Yet, beyond the press head-
lines, little is known about the complex relationship 
between environmental changes and migration. 
Through an analysis of a variety of case-studies, 
this volume highlights the wide diversity of move-
ments that hide beyond the label of “environmen-
tal migration”. It sheds a new, more complex light 
on many of the crises that marred the year . It 
is the first of an annual series, responding to the 
need to provide a foundation of empirical evidence 
for the cases that attract high media attention, but 
also for those that go unnoticed because they are 
often considered as “not spectacular enough”.
But what is most remarkable about this volume 
is that it is the work of students. When Sciences Po 
created a course on “Environment and Migration”, 
as part of the Master on Environment, Sustainable 
Development and Risks, it was the very first uni-
versity course dedicated to this issue. This volume 
is first and foremost a testimony of the exceptional 
potential of the youth to address this issue: they 
represent the generation that will need to provide 
leadership on what appears to be one of the defin-
ing issues of our time.
Finally, I am very happy that IDDRI has joined ef-
forts with IOM in order to put this volume togeth-
er. IDDRI has actively engaged in research on this 
topic since , and it is one of the areas where 
IDDRI and IOM closely cooperate together, and 
this cooperation should further grow in the years 
to come. This volume reaffirms the importance of 
policy-relevant research – one of IDDRI’s core ob-
jectives, and it is with great pride that I support the 
publication of this special volume. ?
FOREWORD BY LAURENCE TUBIANA
Director, 
Institute for Sustainable Development  
and International Relations (IDDRI)
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FOREWORD BY MD. SHAHIDUL HAQUE
Environmental degradation prompted by increased extreme weather patterns such as floods, severe hurricanes, deser-tification, and melting glaciers have be-come much more frequent. In , ex-
treme weather events displaced  million people 
compared to . million people displaced within 
their own country by conflict and violence. Cli-
mate-related disasters are the main sudden onset 
trigger responsible for displacement in  and 
 causing the displacement of  million people 
in  and  million people in  (IDMC ).
The impact of these major environmental inci-
dents demands a broader policy discourse to de-
vise stronger mitigation and/or adaptation capaci-
ties. The incorporation of all stakeholders of all 
ages is central in learning lessons and developing 
new alternatives. The International Organisation 
for Migration is therefore pleased to support the 
innovative student-led project entitled The State of 
Environmental Migration initiated by the Institute 
for Sustainable Development and International re-
lations (IDDRI).
The IOM and IDDRI have a long history of co-
operation on the topics of environmental degra-
dation and migration, collaborating on knowl-
edge creation and devising field projects to better 
manage the migratory effects of environmental 
change. The link between IDDRI’s experience in 
governance, climate and agriculture, and IOM’s 
expertise as a leader on migration issues is key 
for staying abreast of environmentally-induced 
migration trends. Incorporating student research 
papers within the wider policy discourse on envi-
ronmental and climate change is a novel practice 
which gives our youth a strong voice in the debate.
Migration is a way for people to adjust to a 
changing environment. The consequence of envi-
ronmental degradation on migration presents hu-
manity with unprecedented challenges. The num-
ber of storms, droughts and floods has increased 
threefold over the last  years with devastating 
effects on vulnerable communities. Since the early 
s, the IOM has been particularly committed 
to tackling the emerging issues of environmental 
degradation and migration. The IOM has carried 
out programs to address the challenges in more 
than  countries in the Pacific, Latin America, 
Asia and Africa, and is or has been present in many 
of the areas that are described in case studies in 
this publication, such as Pakistan, Haiti, Nepal 
or Darfur. In line with IOM’s comprehensive ap-
proach to human mobility, interventions cover 
the continuum from emergency preparedness and 
response to disaster risk reduction and climate 
change adaptation, contributing to the sustainable 
development of countries and communities. 
As this collection of student research papers 
and case studies on emerging and ongoing dis-
asters demonstrates, despite the global nature of 
environmental change, the manifestations of the 
phenomenon will be characteristically local. Fail-
ing to incorporate migration within the policy 
discourse could seriously undermine potential al-
ternative livelihood strategies. The papers discuss 
the necessity for states and their partners as well 
as local populations to develop strategies, policies 
and programmes along a continuum ranging from 
emergency preparedness and response to disaster 
risk reduction and climate change adaptation. 
One of the greatest inequities in the shift of glob-
al temperature and the increase in natural disas-
ters is that future generations will most likely wit-
ness the greatest disruption to their livelihoods. 
Incorporating the voices of tomorrow within the 
current policy discourse is an important step in de-
veloping strong future leadership needed to tackle 
these difficult challenges. ? 
“It is the youth of the world who can set the 
agenda for the future and pursue it with dili-
gence. We must do all we can to empower young 
people to take action, because the future be-
longs to them” (Rajenda Pachauri, chairman 
of the intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change at COP /CMP).
Director,  
Department for International Cooperation and Partnerships
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
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INTRODUCTION
François Gemenne, Pauline Brücker and Joshua Glasser
We came upon the idea for this volume as we read student term papers for a course at Sciences Po in Paris. The course, “Envi-ronment and Migration”, which 
is thought to be the first of its kind in the world, 
examines the complex relationship between envi-
ronmental change and migration flows. Created 
by Sciences Po in , the course serves as part of 
the Master’s Degree Program offered by the Paris 
School of International Affairs (PSIA). 
For their final assignment, students were asked 
to select and analyse a case of environmental mi-
gration, be it a sudden and violent natural disas-
ter or a slow-onset environmental degradation. 
As we read, we were struck by the quality of the 
papers, many of which could be mistaken for the 
work of scholars. Second, though the areas of fo-
cus spanned the globe, most of the cases occurred 
(or saw turning points) in . Thus, we set out 
to assemble the best student papers into this com-
pendium, “The State of Environmental Migration 
.” 
The student-authors responded enthusiasti-
cally to the idea, and agreed to continue working 
through the summer months, to transform the 
term papers into full-fledged book chapters. We 
edited and proofread them, and by summer’s end, 
this volume was born.
The student-authors for this volume come from 
a wide variety of backgrounds and countries. 
Some chose to address events that took place 
in their home countries, and made use of local-
language reports to provide a unique vantage 
on these events. Others examined on-going, but 
overlooked, crises, providing new insights and 
frameworks through which to understand these 
intractable problems. All told, while hardly a uni-
versal account of environmental migration events 
in , our volume does capture a diverse array 
of illustrative cases, from decades-long quagmires 
to enormous catastrophes, and from incremental 
migration to massive displacement.
Above all, our objective in assembling this vol-
ume has been to provide empirical evidence on 
the linkages between environmental change and 
migration. While media reports often capture the 
basic facts on the ground, our student-authors 
have dug further and unearthed answers to more 
fundamental questions. Who moved, and under 
what circumstances? What sort of assistance did 
they receive, and from whom? Was return migra-
tion possible, and if not, where are those displaced 
now living? 
Such assessments were needed for a variety of 
reasons. First, they provide a new lens through 
which we might view the most dramatic world 
events of . Most of the papers constitute the 
first detailed analyses of the migration flows that 
were induced by these events, paving the way for 
future scholarly works. 
Second, by using a comparative perspective, we 
see that no two events of are the same, though 
they often carry the same uniform label of “en-
vironmental migration”. As a concept, environ-
mental migration has attracted enormous policy 
and media attention in recent years, by actors as 
diverse as the European Commission, the Asian 
Development Bank, and the government of the 
United Kingdom. Yet too little has been done to 
study and explore the phenomenon comprehen-
sively, leading to oversimplified and deterministic 
narratives in the mass media. A key endeavour of 
this volume is to situate the different cases in their 
historical and socio-economic contexts.
Our volume reveals considerable diversity 
among ‘environmental migrants’. Some were 
forced to flee for their lives, while others made ra-
tional decisions as part of their livelihoods strate-
gies for meeting basic household needs. Some will 
return to their hometowns, while others will need 
to relocate to new communities. Some crossed in-
ternational borders and were exposed by the lack 
of an international human rights regime to protect 
them, while most stayed within national bounda-
ries. Some needed massive international assistance 
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(whether or not it was received is another ques-
tion), while others were able to cope more or less 
independently. Thus, a key takeaway from this vol-
ume should be that policy instruments to address 
environmental migration should be as diverse and 
varied as the migrants themselves: a one-size-fits-
all approach cannot hope to succeed.
On the other hand, while one theme of the book 
is diversity, another is universality. Regardless 
of the context, a few themes emerge that thread 
the cases together. For example, in nearly every 
event, affected persons (migrant and non-migrant 
alike) were forced to deal with incomplete (and 
sometimes inaccurate) information in making key 
decisions. Second, though some countries did bet-
ter than others, the intense social needs of post-
disasters (and the equally intense politics) created 
tension and discord in many cases. There is simply 
no such thing as a “perfect response”. Third, while 
returning to their houses is not always possible, 
many environmental migrants do wish to re-estab-
lish homes and communities as quickly as possi-
ble. Policymakers should consider these common 
themes as they consider the value of early-warning 
systems, the need for disaster management plan-
ning, and the importance of dignity and commu-
nity in responding to environmental migration.
Each chapter in the book has a similar structure. 
Because each case has a specific context, the au-
thor begins by contextualizing the environmental 
change to be analyzed. For example, what were 
the underlying vulnerabilities of the population? 
What mechanisms were in place to prevent the dis-
aster and/or help people cope with environmental 
changes? Each chapter then describes the change 
in the environment and the migration flows that 
ensued. Policy responses from governmental and 
non-governmental actors are assessed, and their 
effectiveness evaluated. Finally, each chapter clos-
es by bringing the case forward to present-day and 
hinting at future developments, including pros-
pects for return migration. 
We have organized our volume into two sections. 
The first section includes the cases of emerging 
catastrophes from . Because of their sudden 
nature, migration typically takes the form of sud-
den, unplanned-for displacement. Though these 
events often elicit widespread media attention, 
the focus is often on the immediate aftermath, and 
thus the complexities and long-term ramifications 
of sudden displacement are not well-understood. 
In this section, we will examine the record-break-
ing floods that wracked Pakistan starting in July, 
displacing more than  million people by year’s 
end. We will study the wildfires of Russia (July 
and August), which singlehanded caused a spike 
in world food prices. The devastating Haiti Earth-
quake of January and the more seismically-severe 
(but less deadly) quake in Chile (March) are each 
addressed. The section will close with an exam-
ple from France: February’s Xynthia storm, which 
demonstrates that environmental migration can 
be an important issue in developed countries as 
much as in the developing world.
In our second section, we turn to on-going cri-
ses, disasters, and problem spots. Though they 
rarely make headlines, these intractable events 
continue to affect the lives of millions who live 
nearby. We will examine the hazards posed by 
glacial melting in Nepal, where thousands of 
families live downhill from major glacial lakes. 
Darfur, where a continuing drought has caused 
intense suffering for millions, will also be ad-
dressed. The volume concludes with a study link-
ing three seemingly-separate cases in Brazil. This 
chapter highlights the fact that ecological pres-
sure (often associated with ‘slow-onset’ disasters) 
can in fact be related to sudden crises, as was the 
case in the tragic Rio landslides that struck in the 
early days of .
This volume will mark the first in an annual 
series, which will aim to provide the reader with 
regularly-updated qualitative assessments on the 
changing nature and dynamics of environmental 
migration. We look forward to developing this se-
ries in the future, and are happy that the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration (IOM) has asso-
ciated itself with this publication.
Finally, we wish to thank those who made this 
publication possible. The student-authors, of 
course, went “beyond the call of duty” in spending 
many weeks of their summers revising their papers 
and transforming them into the following chap-
ters. We hope that this publication does justice to 
their efforts. Pierre Barthélemy, who is in charge 
of IDDRI’s publications, has spent countless hours 
proofreading the chapters and ensuring that every 
last detail is fit to print. Benoît Martimort-Asso, 
Development and Communication Director at ID-
DRI, has encouraged and supported this publica-
tion immensely, while Dina Ionesco, Policy Officer 
at IOM, ensured a smooth liaison between IDDRI 
and her organization. Laurence Tubiana and Sha-
hidul Haque have been supportive of our endeav-
our from the outset, and each has kindly agreed to 
write a foreword. Many thanks to them all. ?
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PART 1 EMERGING 
CATASTROPHES
Fleeing the floods in Pakistan, . © UNHCR.
Emerging disasters are sudden events that catalyse enormous media attention and generally inspire massive response on the part of governmental and non-governmental actors. They often induce large-scale displacement, particularly in the immediate 
aftermath. Though displaced persons often de-
sire to return home as quickly as possible, recent 
cases demonstrate that return is not always pos-
sible and that acute events can lead to long-term 
(or even permanent) displacement. In , more 
than  million people were displaced by disaster, 
more than the global number of refugees and in-
ternally-displaced persons (IDPs) combined. Most 
displacement occurred in Asia, where populations 
are massive, environmental hazards are common, 
and social vulnerability is prevalent. Moreover, in 
an era of climate change, such events are likely to 
become more frequent--and severe.
In this section of the volume, we highlight sev-
eral cases of emerging disasters (and related 
displacement) from around the world. We open 
with two of the most catastrophic events from 
: the floods in Pakistan, and the Haiti earth-
quake. However, middle-income countries are 
not exempt from such events, as the cases of the 
Russian forest fires and Chilean earthquake show. 
However, the significantly lower death toll and 
more robust response to these events highlight the 
virtues of addressing vulnerability, risk reduction, 
and disaster response from a policy perspective, 
before disasters strike. Lastly, the final case, of the 
Xynthia storm in France, underscores the fact that 
even the world’s wealthiest countries can struggle 
with risk reduction, land use, and resettlement 
policy, though they also have substantial more re-
sources with which to respond to the problem.
Taken together, these cases span the globe, geo-
graphically and economically. While each case is 
unique, the challenges posed by emerging disas-
ters are ubiquitous. And while there is no “ideal re-
sponse”, policy and planning do matter. We cannot 
prevent natural hazards, but we can take impor-
tant steps to reduce their human toll. ?
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INTRODUCTION
In late July , Pakistan experienced unusually 
heavy monsoon rains that resulted in the largest 
and most destructive floods in its history (IRIN, 
). The downpour, which went on uninter-
rupted for more than eight weeks, swelled the 
Indus River up to  times its normal volume, 
inundating an area of , square kilometers 
(equivalent to the size of Italy), leaving one-fifth 
of the country under water. The heavy precipita-
tion gathered into waves of floodwater flowing 
down the Indus River basin, spurring UN Secre-
tary General Ban Ki-moon to describe the crisis as 
a “slow-motion tsunami” (The Guardian, ). 
The floods spread chaos and destruction along 
its path, submerging entire villages, sweeping 
roads and bridges away, devastating agricultural 
land and livestock, and damaging many health 
and education facilities. The floods killed ap-
proximately , people, destroyed one million 
homes, and seriously affected more than  mil-
lion people, making it the largest disaster ever 
recorded in terms of affected population, area 
covered, and number of households damaged 
(Solberg, ). A wider area and more people 
were affected by the  floods in Pakistan than 
by the  Indian Ocean tsunami, the  Kash-
mir earthquake, and the  Haiti earthquake 
combined (NDMA, ). The cost of the damage 
was equally colossal, with more than $ billion 
(US) worth of losses, effectively reducing Paki-
stan’s GDP by .% (Asian Development Bank/
World Bank, ). 
This case study addresses population displace-
ments caused by rapid onset disasters, by exam-
ining the particular case of the  floods in 
Pakistan. The consequences of the floods are first 
analyzed as a quadruple crisis: health, shelter, and 
food crises in the midst of a complex emergency 
(Part I) –highlighting how its multi-dimensional 
aspect deepened population vulnerabilities and 
raises questions about their legal rights. The ar-
ticle then explores the emergency response to the 
floods by considering funding, coordination, and 
ground operations (Part II). It ends by assessing 
the effectiveness of the response and evaluates 
the prospects of future flood impacts in Pakistan 
(Part III). The discussion will reveal that while 
the emergency relief phase of the response suc-
cessfully avoided a major humanitarian crisis, 
the early recovery and reconstruction objectives 
are being neglected, leaving affected populations 
more vulnerable than ever in facing the next in-
evitable flood. It is therefore imperative that les-
sons be learned from the  floods and concrete 
measures be taken to strengthen preparedness 
and resilience to floods in Pakistan.
1. THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE FLOODS
Many regions of Pakistan were affected by the 
 floods, which submerged  of the coun-
try’s  districts. The floodwaters ran from the 
northern Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), through the central regions 
of Punjab and Balochistan, and finally reached the 
Southern Sindh area, before finding their way into 
the Indian Ocean (see map ).
Regions were affected differently, nonetheless, 
according to their level of exposure to the flood 
and their topography. Mountainous areas like KPK 
were more affected by flash floods and mudslides, 
while others were more exposed to lasting ripar-
ian floods. Furthermore, while the water receded 
in Balochistan and KPK within days, it took sev-
eral weeks in Punjab, and months in some areas 
of Sindh, for the water to clear, due to their flat 
topography.
1. FLOODS IN PAKISTAN
Shoghi EMERSON
STUDY 07/20111 8 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
.. Floods as a quadruple crisis
Floods are fast-onset disasters caused by prolonged 
heavy precipitation, which can affect populations 
both directly and indirectly (IPCC, a). They 
provoke direct physical damage by causing deaths 
and injuries, damaging crops and destroying 
houses and infrastructure. They also affect people 
indirectly by disrupting agricultural production, 
contaminating water supplies, spreading diseases, 
and putting pressure on public resources and 
services. Floods are multi-dimensional crises, 
therefore, whose factors of impact (direct and indi-
rect) often interact to produce cumulative effects. 
Thus, the consequences of the floods in Pakistan 
can be understood as a quadruple crisis: health, 
shelter, and food crises in the midst of a complex 
emergency.
... The health crisis
Floods are first and foremost a health crisis. 
They cause death through drowning and fatal 
injuries, contaminate clean water supplies, and 
foster vector-borne diseases. According to Paki-
stani government statistics, the floods affected 
,, people, and resulted in , deaths 
and , injuries (Solberg, ). These data indi-
cate that morbidity and mortality rates remained 
relatively low, despite the immense scale of the 
disaster. According to the final IASC report, the 
timely and effective delivery of emergency human-
itarian aid can largely be credited for this success 
(ISAC, :).
By contaminating water supplies, floods pro-
voke dehydration and diarrhoeal diseases such as 
cholera, typhoid, and rotavirus. They often com-
bine with dehydration and undernourishment, 
morevover, to create a vicious cycle of susceptibil-
ity to infections that particularly affects children. 
Floods also favour the spread of infectious diseases 
like malaria, as the pools of stagnant water consti-
tute prolific breeding grounds for disease-carrying 
insects and rodents (Ahern, ). 
In Pakistan, outbreaks of acute respiratory in-
fections (ARI), typhoid, malaria, hepatitis A, 
conjunctivitis, skin infection and gastroenteritis 
were particularly feared in the aftermath of the 
floods (Solberg, ). World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) data shows that out of the . million 
consultations it conducted, % were for acute 
Map 1. Pakistan Flood Extent and Losses
Source: OCHA 2010.
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diarrhoea, % were for ARI, % were for skin dis-
ease, and % were for suspected malaria (WHO, 
a).
Floods can also have substantial mental health 
impacts, although no studies were found for this 
case, such as post-traumatic stress syndrome, 
depression, anxiety, and even suicide (Ahern, 
:). In addition, the floods had indirect 
health impacts in Pakistan by damaging or de-
stroying  of the , hospitals and clinics pres-
ent in the affected districts, further aggravating 
the vulnerability of local communities to health 
risks (NDMA, ).
... The shelter crisis
Although the health crisis was contained, millions 
of people lost their home in the flood. A total 
of ,, houses were destroyed, which will 
amount to a total cost of some $.bn (ADB/WB, 
). About  million people were left homeless 
as a result and were forced to seek refuge along 
roadsides, in public buildings, within host commu-
nities, or in displacement camps (UN, ). In 
total, about . million people were forced to 
flee their area to live in some , relief camps 
(UNHCR, a).
According to a WHO survey conducted in the 
 most severely-affected districts, close to % 
of households were forced to move for at least 
 weeks after the floods, with over half having 
living in an Internally Displaced People (IDP) 
camp at some point. Most displaced populations 
also remained in their area of origin – with only 
% moving away. Finally, once they relocated to 
an IDP camp, the majority of IDPs stayed put, as 
shown in Table ; the paths taken by those who 
moved repeatedly were not captured in the survey 
(WHO, ).
Table 1. Movements of flood-affected IDP (after 
relocation to IDP camp)
Stayed in one place 64%
Moved once 34%
Moved more than 5 times 2.5%
Source: WHO, 2011.
UNHCR data also shows that IDPs mostly gath-
ered in small groups after the floods, with the 
average camp size being  IDPs and the larg-
est camp holding , people (UNHCR, ). 
With regards to camp management, the Pakistani 
authorities headed half the camps, a quarter 
lacked any central management, and the rest was 
organized by local NGOs, the Army, or individu-
als. The location of camps also varied, as shown 
in Table .
Table 2. Camp Locations
Sites % of camps
Schools 39%
Other public buildings 10%
Tents 28%
Spontaneous roadside settlements 11%
Other 12%
Source: UNHCR, 2010.
Then again, it is very difficult to draw a detailed 
picture of population movements, in part due to 
the sheer size of the disaster and because data was 
not systematically collected. Nevertheless, the In-
ternational Organization for Migration (IOM) is 
now rolling out a “displacement-tracking matrix”, 
which will enable detailed data about population 
displacements to be gathered systematically and 
centralized in a common database (IOM, b).
... The food crisis
Thirdly, the floods brought about an acute food crisis 
by destroying many crops shortly before harvesting 
season. This caused prices to increase at the very 
moment that the purchasing power of the affected 
population fell sharply. On the one hand, the floods 
reduced the availability of food by destroying agri-
cultural production. About % of food reserves 
were lost, . million hectares of standing crops 
(worth $ billion) were destroyed (including a third 
of the rice planted in ), and hundreds of thou-
sands of livestock and poultry were killed (WFP, 
). According to the World Bank, the damage 
inflicted on the agricultural and fisheries sectors 
amounts to about $ billion, roughly half the total 
cost of the damage (ADB/WB, ).
On the other hand, the food shortage was com-
pounded by a reduced accessibility to food. By 
submerging land, sweeping away stores of feed 
and seed, and destroying irrigation systems, the 
floods hindered agricultural production and de-
prived rural communities of their unique sources 
of livelihoods. As % of the affected populations 
depended on agriculture for their income, mil-
lions became dependent on food aid – especially 
those families forced to flee to IDP camps (IASC, 
:).
As a result, the floods gravely stressed food secu-
rity and increased under-nutrition, a condition that 
also exacerbates vulnerability to diseases (Black et 
al, ). UNICEF reported that six months after 
the floods, % of children aged - months in 
Sindh were still suffering from acute malnutrition, 
well above the WHO’s % emergency threshold 
level (UNICEF, a).
The floods wiped out years of development 
and aggravated the inequality that is endemic in 
STUDY 07/20112 0 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
Pakistan: two percent of households control more 
than % of the land in the country (World Bank, 
). The cataclysmic results of the floods further 
marginalized poor and vulnerable populations, 
leaving most farmers without productive land 
and severely curtailing access to vital services that 
would normally serve as a safety net in difficult 
times. 
... A complex emergency
Finally, a “complex emergency” occurred in areas 
of military conflict that were also affected by the 
floods. The precarious security situation in North-
west Pakistan aggravated the risk of negative 
outcomes from the natural disaster. The region is 
embroiled in the “War on Terror” pitting national 
and international security forces against Taliban 
insurgents, and over . million people have been 
internally displaced by the fighting (HRCP, ).
Conflict-induced IDPs were “among the most 
vulnerable groups in flood-affected areas” (IDMC, 
). Many had only just recently resumed farm-
ing activities when the floods destroyed their 
crops. Furthermore, the most severely affected ar-
eas were precisely those where people displaced by 
conflict and human rights abuses had sought pro-
tection. Finally, the precarious security slowed the 
delivery of emergency relief. Tellingly, the highest 
mortality rates occurred in areas controlled by Is-
lamist militants: for example, KPK province expe-
rienced mortality rates  times above the national 
average (WHO, b).
It is clear that floods are multidimensional cri-
ses with wide-ranging consequences for affected 
populations. But how do underlying vulnerabili-
ties interact with the crisis itself to trigger migra-
tion? The context of social vulnerability that paved 
the way for mass displacement in the wake of the 
floods will be now examined, in line with the legal 
rights that protected them.
.. Vulnerabilities and rights
The relationship between floods and migration 
is non-linear, but contingent on the vulnerability 
of the affected group or individual. Vulnerability 
refers to “the totality of relationships in a given 
social situation producing the formation of a 
condition that, in combination with environmental 
forces, produces a disaster” (Oliver-Smith, ). 
That is to say that disasters are socially produced, 
in so far as environmental hazards only become 
disasters when the social, economic, and political 
resources “to anticipate, cope with, resist, and 
recover from the impact of a natural hazard” are 
exhausted (Blaikie, Cannon, and Wisner, :). 
Population displacements, therefore, depend on 
the level of exposure to the flood, as well as on the 
ability to resist or adapt to its effects.
Vulnerability to environmental disasters, fur-
thermore, is determined by four categories of 
factors: (i) individual factors, such as the level of 
health or socio-economic standing of a person; 
(ii) community-level factors, such as the presence 
of water and sanitation infrastructure in a local-
ity and egalitarian access to drinkable water; (iii) 
access to information, which is facilitated by early 
warning systems and democratic institutions; and 
(iv) geographical factors, such as the proneness of 
low-lying river basin areas to floods (Adger, ).
The floods impacted Pakistani communities 
so markedly not solely because of their wide ex-
tent, but also because of the high vulnerability of 
the exposed population. The floods took place in 
flood-prone areas, and where communities had 
little access to information and similarly meager 
resources with which to cope or adapt. The people 
most severely-affected were predominantly small 
farmers and unskilled laborers that are reliant 
on agriculture for subsistence and live close to, 
or below, the poverty line. In addition, children 
were most affected by infectious diseases due to 
their inherent physiological vulnerability. Lastly, 
political instability and insecurity also contrib-
uted to this climatic event becoming a “complex 
emergency”.
Responses to floods may vary, including flight 
and evacuations of people from harm’s way, tem-
porary displacements, resettlements to new homes, 
or migration to new (and usually distant) areas 
(Oliver-Smith, ). Moreover, such responses 
are often linked with one another. In Pakistan, 
for example, people initially fled or were evacu-
ated by the Army, many were then placed in 
camps; and upon leaving camps, some resettled 
to new homes, while those who could not return 
to their area of origin simply migrated elsewhere 
(though detailed figures on such patterns are not 
available). 
The vast majority of Pakistani displaced also did 
not cross an international border, which is a pre-
requisite to be granted the “refugee” status. The 
populations displaced by the floods in Pakistan, 
therefore, are not refugees but environmentally-
induced internally displaced peoples (IDPs).
Although not a legal category as such, IDPs are 
more and more recognized in international law. 
. IDPs are those “forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a 
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, 
situations of generalized violence, violations of human 
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” 
( UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement)
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Certain legal documents do indeed provide pro-
tection to them, such as the  United Nations 
(U.N.) Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment, which sets clear rules to protect their hu-
man rights. But they remain instruments of soft 
law devoid of clear enforceability. While such 
principles have gained general acceptance and 
authority, and were broadly respected during the 
Pakistani floods, it is important to note that the 
Pakistani Government labeled flood victims “flood 
affectees” – restricting the IDP category to those 
affected by military conflict in the Northwest 
(IASC, ).
2. RESPONSE TO A HISTORIC 
CATASTROPHE
Underlying social vulnerabilities and the legal 
context shape much of how the flooding disaster 
unfolded. But how did the emergency response 
play out on the ground? 
The  floods in Pakistan occurred with such 
speed and on such a scale that few governments 
could have faced it alone. With over half the coun-
try’s districts affected, the sheer geographical scale 
and the number of affected people by the flood 
made the humanitarian response one of the big-
gest and most complex ever conducted by the hu-
manitarian community (IASC, ).
.. Timetable of the response
The timetable of the response to the floods was 
organised in three phases: () a “rescue & relief” 
phase focused on immediate emergency opera-
tions, to prevent epidemics and provide emergency 
food and shelter, which started with the floods 
and ended in January ; () an “early recovery” 
phase to help affected populations rebuild their 
houses, restore their livelihoods, and restore basic 
health and education services, which also started 
with the floods and is expected to end at the end 
of ; and () a “reconstruction & rehabilita-
tion” phase to rebuild all the remaining damage, 
which started in January  and is expected to 
be completed within three to five years (OCHA, 
). According to the Damage and Need Assess-
ment conducted by the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, the costs of the floods are as 
follows: 
. Also provide similar guidelines for action: the IASC 
Operational Guidelines on Human Right and Natural 
Disasters, the Humanitarian Charter, and Minimum 
Standards in Humanitarian Response.
Table 3. Total Cost of the floods (in $US)
Phase Funding
Emergency Relief $928 million
Early Recovery $956 million
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation $6.8 billion - $8.9 billion
TOTAL $8.6 - $10.7 billion
Source: ADB/WB, 2010.
.. Funding
The Pakistani authorities quickly solicited the help 
of the international community as the colossal 
scale of the floods became apparent. A first appeal 
was launched in early August  for $ million 
to respond to the immediate relief needs of the 
flood-affected populations. In November, the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA) launched the “Pakistan Floods 
Emergency Relief and Early Recovery Response 
Plan” (PFRERRP), which called for $. billion 
to finance the first two phases of the response. 
To date, only $. billion (.%) of funds 
requested have been raised, and only % of the 
early recovery components having been financed 
(OCHA Financial Tracking Service, ).
 These funds have been the main source of finance 
for the international relief efforts. They have been 
directly distributed to UN Agencies, international 
organisations and INGOs/NGOs to fund projects 
on the ground, but have not been routed through 
Pakistani government channels (NDMA, ). In 
addition to international funds, help came in the 
form of rescue operations, medical supplies, food, 
clothing, non-food items (NFIs) and shelter kits 
from various countries, donor agencies, NGOs, the 
private sector and individuals. 
In spite of these donations, the brunt of the cost 
of the floods is being born by the Pakistani govern-
ment, especially as it now enters into the “recon-
struction & rehabilitation” phase of the response. 
The immense cost of the disaster has placed an 
extreme burden on public finances in Pakistan 
(ADB/WB, ). 
.. Coordination
In Pakistan, natural disasters are managed by 
the National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA), which is mandated to oversee and 
coordinate all disaster response activities. At the 
national level, it coordinated the evacuation and 
rescue operations of the Army and established 
a logistic flow system to dispatch relief goods to 
affected areas. Relief goods were first centralised 
at the Pakistani Air Force “main operating base” in 
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Chaklala, then dispatched to provincial “forward 
operating bases”, and transported to “district 
nodal points”. From district nodal points, relief 
assistance was transported to affected areas by 
helicopter, boats, trucks or mules (NDMA, ). 
By and large, these early first-response operations 
are credited with having prevented massive loss of 
life (IASC, :). 
Within a few weeks, the vast array of actors who 
came to operate on the ground were organised 
into clusters, as requested by the  humanitar-
ian reform. Local and international non-govern-
mental organizations, international organizations, 
UN agencies and foreign aid agencies all worked 
to support the Pakistani authorities. The UN and 
its partner NGOs formed  clusters, each with a 
specific mandate and lead organisation at its head 
(see Table ). 
Table 4. Clusters and lead organisations
Cluster Lead organisation
Agriculture
Food and Agricultue 
Organization (FAO)














Shelter and non food items (NFI) IOM
Water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) UNICEF
Source: OCHA, 2010.
.. Humanitarian response
The humanitarian response has sought to meet 
three overarching objectives: implementing the 
“survival strategy” to prevent excess mortality 
and morbidity, restoring livelihoods, and re-estab-
lishing community services (OCHA, ).
The Health Cluster carried out  million medical 
consultations through the Disease Early Warning 
Systems (DEWS). With the help of its partners, the 
WHO also set up , mobile health clinics in di-
saster zones, which have treated . million people 
(WHO, b). Medical teams have been primar-
ily treating skin diseases, acute diarrhoea, respira-
tory infections and suspected malaria. They have 
also been running immunization programs as well 
as providing health education and maternal care 
(WHO, b). Six months after the floods, three-
quarters of households reported a flood-related 
health issue, but almost all reported sufficient ac-
cess to basic healthcare (WHO, :-).
The Food Cluster was able to nearly triple its 
food emergency distributions from three million 
to eight million beneficiaries by October , 
thereby preventing millions from temporary hun-
ger (IASC, :). The Nutrition Cluster, for its 
part, has focused on screening and treating chil-
dren for malnutrition (UNICEF, ). From Oc-
tober onwards, it substantially expanded its nutri-
tion programs: especially in Southern Pakistan, 
UNICEF established a total of  Feeding Centres 
for the management of severely malnourished 
children, as well as  Supplementary Feeding 
Programmes (UNICEF, a.). So far, . million 
young children have been screened, and , out 
of , severely malnourished, , out of 
, moderately malnourished and , out 
of , pregnant and lactating women have 
been treated in feeding centres (OCHA, b:). 
UNICEF also provided . million children with Vi-
tamin A supplements (UNICEF, a).
The Water Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) 
Cluster has worked to reduce the vulnerability of 
affected populations to water-related diseases, by 
improving access to safe drinking water and sanita-
tion, and raising hygiene awareness. UNICEF and 
its  reporting organisations have provided clean 
water to . million people daily (mainly by install-
ing and repairing hand pumps) and sanitation fa-
cilities to . million people. By January , it 
had also provided hygiene kits to nearly . mil-
lion people and distributed thousands of buckets 
and jerry cans (USAID, ). On the whole, the 
absence of major outbreaks of water or sanitation-
related diseases highlights the success and benefit 
of the WASH aid (IASC, ).
The Shelter and NFI Cluster, headed by IOM, pro-
vided emergency shelter to families made home-
less by the flood, and has since been helping them 
rebuild their homes. During the floods, the clus-
ter distributed one million tents and tarpaulins, 
mostly in the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and KPK 
– still, only accounting for % of the emergency 
shelter needs. In addition, it provided substantial 
non-food items (NFIs) that included , bed-
ding sets, , kitchen sets and , tool kits 
(IOM, b). As part of its “winterization strate-
gy”, moreover, it distributed more than . million 
blankets to help households get through the cold 
winter (IOM, a). 
Since March , the Cluster has focused on 
“Early Recovery” efforts to rebuild houses and sup-
port sustainable returns. Households with com-
pletely destroyed houses (% or more damaged) 
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have been helped to move out of their emergency 
shelter and into solid “one-room” or “transitional” 
shelters. Transitional shelters are wooden light-
weight structures that can be relocated, and are 
aimed to those who cannot yet return to their area. 
One-room shelters are simple traditional struc-
tures made from mud or brick, which can progres-
sively be upgraded with more rooms to form a 
home once finances are available. The cluster has 
used work-for-food programs and cash hand-outs 
(WATAN cards) in order to support the recovery of 
the local economy. It has refrained from conduct-
ing key-in-hand projects, while providing techni-
cal assistance and ensuring the fluid supply of lo-
cally sourced materials (NDMA, ).
Furthermore, other clusters have worked to re-
store livelihoods where crops and livestock have 
been destroyed and land inundated. The Agricul-
ture Cluster has distributed seeds (wheat and veg-
etable) as well as fertilizers for the winter plant-
ing season to over , households. Some 
, households have also received livestock 
feed to prevent further losses of animals. As a re-
sult, the latest estimates show that agricultural 
production in flood-affected areas will reach % 
of pre-flood levels (NDMA, :-). Finally, 
the response sought to restore basic commu-
nity services. The Education Cluster, for example, 
repaired about , flood-damaged schools, 
trained , teachers in disaster risk reduction, 
and established Temporary Learning Centers that 
benefited nearly , children. UNICEF also 
established about , Child Friendly Spaces 
(CFS), which today provide educational and rec-
reational activities as well as psychosocial support 
to , children. In addition, it plans to install 
 Transitional School Structures (TSS) in flood 
affected areas in  to ensure access to quality 
education for children whose schools were dam-
aged or destroyed by the floods (UNICEF, b).
3. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
.. Assessing the response
The emergency relief phase of the response was 
successful, as a major food crisis or epidemic 
outbreaks were avoided, despite being undertaken 
in difficult circumstances. Aid was sent to areas that 
were either under water, in mountainous regions 
cut off by damaged bridges, or in areas where the 
Taliban insurgency was under way. Conversely, it 
has been reported that aid distribution was subor-
dinated to political interference in some instances, 
and that organisations with ties to radical Islamic 
organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba engaged in 
relief and rescue operations, raised funds, and set 
up camps (Times of India, ).
In addition, most IDPs have now left relief 
camps. In the aftermath of the floods, . million 
people were displaced and forced to live in some 
, relief camps. Six months after the floods 
, people still lived in more than  camps 
and spontaneous settlements (UNHCR, a). To-
day, % of displaced populations have left relief 
camps. Some areas remain under water, however, 
such as in Sindh and Balochistan, where approxi-
mately , acres of land are still inundated 
with half a metre of floodwater. In these prov-
inces,  relief camps continue to host a total of 
, flood affected IDPs, while all other provinc-
es are now showing % rates of return (NDMA, 
). 
But due to the scale of the destruction, many 
returnees have not been able to live in their own 
homes. As of January , more than half the 
IDPs had returned to their original homes, but a 
third were still living in tents, while the remaining 
% were living with host families or in rented ac-
commodation in their area of origin, according to 
a survey conducted by UNHCR in Sindh (UNHCR, 
b).
Early recovery and reconstruction objectives, 
on the other hand, have only partially been met 
thus far. A year after the floods, affected popula-
tions report ongoing needs across all sectors, with 
the most pressing issues being permanent shelter 
(.%), economic support (.% for loans to 
restart farms or businesses and .% for employ-
ment), and food (.%) (WHO, ). The main 
impediments are by-and-large financial and or-
ganisational insufficiencies, as only % of the re-
quested funds for early recovery have been raised 
from donors to date, and most clusters have inad-
equate strategic plans (IASC, :). As detailed 
below, the funding gap particularly affects the 
housing and agricultural sectors, as well as health 
and education (OCHA, a).
Table 5. Funding gap for early recovery (in $US)
Sectors Balance needs
Agriculture and Food security
79,000,000.00
20,819,870.00
Health and Nutrition 44,958,230.00
Water and Sanitation 32,811,052.00
Education 44,079,573.95
Housing 118,601,921.00
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Limited financial resources have meant that few 
houses have been rebuilt. Only , one-room 
and transitional shelters have now been construct-
ed, out of the . million homes damaged or de-
stroyed by the floods. Likewise, the current com-
mitment to help build , solid shelters by the 
end of the year would only meet % of the total 
needs (UN, ). This shows that there remains 
a clear and dire need for increased funding if the 
shelter crisis is to be resolved. In addition, many 
houses are being rebuilt in dangerous riverbank 
areas, while many people without land rights have 
been returning home to find themselves without a 
place to plant or rebuild a house (OCHA, b).
Moreover, basic social services remain disrupted 
in flood-affected areas (UNICEF, b). Concerns 
subside about the potential outbreak of epidemics, 
while many people still lack food assistance, safe 
drinking water, and permanent shelter, particular-
ly in Sindh. Local communities are also facing the 
challenge of re-establishing their source of liveli-
hood and rebuilding destroyed infrastructure. In 
addition, Pakistan hosts . million IDPs, as well 
as . million refugees from Afghanistan (IOM, 
c:). These populations are particularly vul-
nerable to environmental disasters and underscore 
the continuing risks created by complex emergen-
cies in Pakistan.
.. Climate change 
and preparedness
Early recovery activities must transition as seam-
lessly as possible to support long-term reconstruc-
tion and avoid leaving affected populations in an 
even more vulnerable position to face the next 
disaster. Indeed, future prospects do not bode 
well for floods in Pakistan. It already is a disaster 
hotspot and one the most flood-prone countries in 
the world. Unfortunately, climate change will only 
. Nevertheless, the crisis has been resolved in certain 
regions, like in Gilgit-Baltistan where % of the casel-
oads have been covered. 
worsen the trend, forcing ever-larger numbers of 
people off their land. It will intensify monsoons, 
with up to % more rain falling in South Asia 
by . Melting glaciers will increase the risk 
of flooding during the wet season and drought 
in the dry-season, particularly in South Asia 
(IPCC, b). Global warming will also cause 
extreme weather events to increase in intensity 
and frequency, with category  tropical storms 
expected to triple over the next century (Knutson 
and Tuleya, ). 
Climate change is also set to cause more epi-
demics and malnutrition (IFPRI, ), as crop 
yields will fall by % in South Asia over the next 
 years (IPCC, a:), and diarrhoeal and in-
fectious diseases will affect more people due to 
higher temperatures and humidity levels (WHO, 
:-). This in turn will erode the systems 
sustaining health and may lead to conflicts over 
depleted resources.
Pakistan is therefore caught in a ratchet, as en-
vironmental factors steadily gain in strength while 
affected populations become ever more vulnerable. 
The  floods have stretched the coping mecha-
nisms of flood-affectees to their limit as many have 
reportedly sold whatever assets they owned to sur-
vive last year’s disaster (IASC, :). It is there-
fore urgent to help the most vulnerable groups 
build up their resilience. Until now, the interna-
tional response has largely focused on emergency 
relief, but a strong commitment to early recovery 
and reconstruction is absolutely necessary.
Pakistan must also improve preparedness. It 
must first build up national capacities and develop 
specific contingency plans for areas at risk. Since 
the floods, the NDMA has established a Strategic 
Planning Unit (SPU). The government has also 
set a goal to meet the Hyogo Framework for Ac-
tion (HFA) on disaster risk reduction by , and 
has established early warning systems for this 
purpose; flooding mitigation programmes are 
also being developed in collaboration with the UN 
(NDMA, ).
Pakistan must also strengthen its cooperation 
with external actors and improve cluster coordina-
tion. Indeed, reconstruction has been organised 
along cluster lines rather than having an integrat-
ed perspective at national and regional levels. An 
overarching strategy for reconstruction and reha-
bilitation as well as a comprehensive assessment 
of outstanding needs are both still lacking today 
in Pakistan. A major reason for this is that the 
NDMA and OCHA requirements for medium and 
long-term strategies have been inconsistent and 
changed over time (IASC, :). Also, while in-
formation was widely collected, it was often dupli-
cated and not used for strategic purposes. 
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The NDMA should, therefore, appoint a single 
unit to conduct continuous needs assessments 
during and after disasters to avoid duplications, 
while cluster leads must agree on standard assess-
ment formats and methodology. IDPs must also be 
systematically tracked, to better target their needs 
(IASC, ).
CONCLUSION
One year after the  floods in Pakistan, a 
mixed picture subsides of the disaster response 
and future preparedness. The floods were of an 
unprecedented scale as the heavy monsoon rains 
of the North traveled the length of the country, 
washing away entire communities and forcing 
massive population displacements. Within weeks 
the humanitarian response grew to become the 
largest emergency operation ever staged, thereby 
preventing the crisis from enduring unnecessarily 
and avoiding many deaths. 
Nevertheless, although the floodwaters may 
now have receded, the devastation remains. It is 
critical for recovery and reconstruction efforts to 
be maintained, and proper funding and strategic 
coordination to be provided, if the resilience of 
vulnerable communities is to be restored. The Pak-
istani authorities must also continue making head-
way towards institutionalizing disaster mitigation 
and integrated response to natural disasters, as 
well as improving preparedness.
Climate trends are unequivocal: floods will affect 
Pakistan with ever-greater frequency and severity. 
Therefore, the humanitarian community, local and 
federal governments, as well as local communities 
must learn from their shortcomings and better pre-
pare for the next, inevitable disaster in Pakistan.?
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INTRODUCTION
 In  Russia experienced the hottest and driest 
summer on record. Fast-spreading wildfires in July 
and August devastated forests and crops, destroyed 
dozens of villages and surrounding infrastructure, 
killing  people. As over , rural households 
were destroyed, thousands of people were forced 
to seek temporary refuge. Important efforts were 
undertaken by the government and civil society 
to contain the fires and assist the victims. This 
case study provides an analysis of the emergency 
response to the disaster and compensation and 
reparation policies in Russia, with a particular 
focus on the displacement and resettlement of the 
affected population.
1. CONTEXT OF THE DISASTER
.. Historical and socio-
economic context
Since the disintegration of the USSR in , the 
Russian Federation experienced various political, 
institutional, economic and legal reforms. Yet, 
the federal government has considerable power, 
and the responsibility over regional matters is 
shared between the federal bodies (responsible 
for general policy and decision-making) and the 
regional administrations (policy adaptation and 
implementation).
Since the s, Russia has faced a demographic 
crisis as low birth rates, low life expectancy, and 
high mortality rates contributed to a fast popula-
tion decline (-.% from  to ; Demo-
graphic Research Institute, ), only slightly 
mitigated by return and labour immigration from 
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) coun-
tries. The situation, however, started improving in 
the mid-s, and increasing immigration and 
decreasing natural decline led to an increase of the 
population by , thousand people in , the 
first increase since . 
Internal migration accounts for % of total 
migration flows in Russia. On average, . mil-
lion people migrate within the country every year 
(,, people in , Federal State Statistical 
Service, b). Federal Law of the Russian Fed-
eration N- () provides a legal basis for in-
ternal migration and guarantees freedom of move-
ment and choice of residence within the country 
for Russian citizens. Among these internal mi-
grants, a majority (%) migrate within the same 
federal subject. Main internal migration flows are 
directed from Northern and Eastern parts of the 
country (particularly, the Far Eastern federal dis-
trict) towards the west (Central federal district). 
Thus, Russia’s population is unevenly distributed 
and concentrated in cities located mostly in the 
European parts of the country (the Central and 
Volga federal districts account for % of the pop-
ulation; Federal State Statistical Service, b), 
whose better economic opportunities continue to 
attract both international and internal migrants. 
Moscow and the Moscow region attract % of in-
ternal migrants. 
Large areas of the country remain sparsely pop-
ulated, and rural areas suffer from depopulation: 
nearly , people left rural Russia in , 
mostly young people (- years of age). Rural 
Russians, who account for % of the national to-
tal (Federal State Statistical Service, b), often 
suffer from poor living conditions, limited infra-
structure and social services. Nearly half (%) of 
. The Russian Federation consists of  federal subjects, 
which are administrative units enjoying different levels 
of autonomy but an equal representation in the Upper 
House of the Parliament (two delegates for each federal 
subject).
2. WILDFIRES IN RUSSIA 
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the rural population is older than , and about 
% is older than , which points at another de-
mographic and social problem, as many elderly 
people live alone in harsh conditions in the coun-
tryside (Federal State Statistical Service, b)
Considering existing demographic and socio-
economic problems, the government is currently 
working on the design of a new framework for the 
national migration policy for the - period, 
following the  Presidential Decree, ‘On the 
improvement of the management of the migration 
policy’. The project is aimed at harmonizing exist-
ing federal and regional legislation and addressing 
existing gaps in the legislation and the rights of 
the migrants, to facilitate and optimize migration 
flows and encourage economic modernization and 
development in the country. The draft document 
was to be examined in  by the State Commis-
sion for migration policy (Federal Migration Ser-
vice, ). In addition, a Framework for the demo-
graphic policy of the Russian Federation until  
(Presidential Decree N, ) contains specific 
clauses concerning support to the improvement 
of living conditions and infrastructure in difficult 
and less developed regions that currently suffer 
from migration outflows, as well as support to 
the relocation of people from regions with harsh 
environment and climatic conditions. Currently, 
a federal programme ‘Zhilishe’ (‘Housing‘; Presi-
dential Decree , ) is being implemented 
to improve the living conditions and housing of 
the population. It includes initiatives to relocate 
people to better housing, and to provide new ac-
commodation to displaced people, including those 
displaced by nuclear accidents and disasters. Addi-
tionally, a special programme is being implement-
ed to close some old and isolated settlements in 
the Far Northern areas, with subsidies provided to 
the residents to help them obtain housing in other 
towns or regions (Federal Law N ). 
.. Geographical location and 
environmental characteristics
With an area of  million square kilometres, Russia 
occupies most of Northern Eurasia and is largely 
covered with biodiversity-rich, little-disturbed 
ecosystems, many of which are listed as glob-
ally significant by the World Wildlife Federation 
(WWF, ). Russia’s forests cover an approxi-
mate area of  million hectares, representing 
% of the world’s forest resources, and play an 
important role in the national and local economy 
(WWF, , Global Forest Watch, ).
Wildfires present a major challenge with sig-
nificant environmental and economic impacts 
that the Russian government has to confront on 
a yearly basis. Between , and , wild-
fires are recorded in the country every year, cov-
ering from  to  million hectares and destroying 
several hundreds of thousands hectares of forest 
and wood. 
These figures vary greatly among regional and 
governmental agencies, ministries and research 
institutes, and from year to year, but there is a 
general acknowledgement of the fact that the total 
area covered by wildfires has increased over the 
last decade. According to the Russian Federal For-
est Agency (Rosleskhoz, ), % of forest fires 
occur as a result of human activity, such as breach 
of fire safety regulations, negligence, as well as 
poorly controlled agricultural burning of land (a 
practice inherited from the Soviet times and still 
widely used accounts for % of wildfires). Natu-
ral causes, such as lightning, account for only % 
of forest fires. Peat from swamps that were drained 
Figure 1. Government statistics on forest fires 1990-2010
Source: Blokov, 2010.
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during the Soviet times constitutes another major 
fire hazard. Heat and low levels of humidity result 
in underground peat fires, which are harder and 
costlier to fight, and can have highly destructive 
ecological consequences and damage to human 
infrastructure. Most fires usually burn in vast, 
scarcely populated areas in Northern Siberia and 
the Far Eastern region, where fire-fighting efforts 
are limited because of difficulties of access, high 
costs and the near-absence of threat to the popu-
lation. Wildfires that occur in more densely popu-
lated areas are generally contained effectively. 
2. THE DISASTER
An unprecedented heat wave hit Russia in the 
summer of . Several temperature records were 
set in the European part of the country. Throughout 
the entire month of July, Moscow experienced 
the hottest temperatures recorded in more than 
 years, topping  degrees Celsius. The west 
of the country suffered from its worst drought in 
decades, destroying crops, raising concerns about 
food security and economic growth in Russia, and 
forcing the government to impose a ban on grain 
exports, which markedly reduced world wheat 
supplies. Extremely hot and dry weather condi-
tions resulted in intense and fast-spreading forest 
and peat fires as dry trees and peat caught fire 
easily.  federal subjects of the Russian Federation 
were affected by wildfires, mainly in the Western 
and Central parts of the country. 
Some spring fires had already occurred in April 
and May, but regional authorities and the minis-
tries in charge of forest protection claimed that 
the situation was under control by the beginning 
of the summer. Serious public, media and govern-
ment concerns were only raised with the intensi-
fication of fires starting on July , when several 
villages were destroyed in the Nizhny Novgorod 
region within minutes. On July , the head of the 
Russian Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies 
and Disaster Relief (EMERCOM) admitted that the 
situation was ‘complicated’, and  people were 
reported to have died (Ministry for Civil Defense 
website, ). On August , the President of the 
Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev declared 
a state of emergency in seven regions, including 
Vladimir, Voronezh, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, 
Ryazan oblasts, and the republics of Mordovia and 
Mari El. Despite important efforts mobilised in the 
following days, new outbreaks of fire continued, 
and the death toll reached  by August . Starting 
August , the situation improved, and President 
Medvedev announced on August  that the crisis 
had been overcome. The fires were significantly re-
duced by the end of August, but were followed by 
a short new destructive wave of fires in the Volgo-
grad region on September  and in the Altai territo-
ry (South Siberia) on September . Wildfires were 
almost completely extinguished by mid-September 
thanks to the efforts of professional fire fighters 
and volunteers. Some fires remained in the Far 
Eastern region and were put out by the third week 
of October (Ria Novosti News Service, b).
Map 1. Temperatures in Russia during heat wave in August 2010
Source: Reuters.
STUDY 07/20113 0 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
According to the official figures of the Federal 
Forest Agency published in a report in February 
, , wildfires occurred between the end 
of July and August , covering a total area of 
. million hectares, and destroying , hec-
tares of forest (Russia Federal Forest Agency, 
). At the same time, by the end of August, in-
dependent Russian research institutes of the Rus-
sian Academy of Science had identified fires cover-
ing a total area of nearly  million hectares using 
advanced satellite technologies, while according 
to the Global Fire Monitoring Center wildfires had 
burned over - million hectares (Yabloko Re-
port, ). Up to  new wildfires ( on av-
erage) were recorded daily at the peak of the fire 
season from the end of July to mid-August.
The scale of the fires in the summer of  
was unprecedented and resulted in many casual-
ties and material damage. According to official 
figures of the Ministry of Regional Development 
stated in October ,  settlements were 
entirely or partly burnt down and , houses 
destroyed.  people died in the fires, including 
 fire fighters. A total of , families were left 
homeless. Altogether, , people were affect-
ed, including , elderly people and  chil-
dren (Ministry of Regional Development Report, 
). Several industrial and military facilities 
were destroyed in the fires. A cloud of smoke 
stretched over , kilometres, enveloping sev-
eral highly populated urban centres, including 
the capital, for several days. Pollutants, particu-
larly carbon monoxide, were measured at two to 
three times maximum permission concentration 
levels, aggravating health problems. According 
to a report of the Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment (BBC Russian, ), the heat wave in Rus-
sia increased the mortality rate five times, with 
, deaths more compared to the summer of 
. According to Rosstat, the biggest increase 
in the mortality rate was recorded in the regions 
that were most affected by the fires, including 
Moscow region, Samara, Saratov, Ulyanovsk and 
Voronezh oblasts. Some residents of large cities, 
including Moscow, fled from the smog and heat 
and temporarily sought refuge in less affected 
regions – some went to their country houses, or 
to summer resorts in Russia or abroad (Interfax, 
). Exact nationwide figures of voluntary and 
forced displacement caused by the fires and smog 
are not available.
Wildfires reached radiation-contaminated areas 
in the Bryansk region (close to Chernobyl), and 
got dangerously close to a nuclear research facility 
in the Nizhny Novgorod region and a nuclear fuel 
reprocessing facility in Chelyabinsk Oblast. The re-
lease of radioactive material into the atmosphere 
was feared, however no increase in radiation levels 
was detected in the region. (BBC Russia, b).
The fires had a significant environmental impact 
as they reached natural protected areas, and de-
stroyed some pristine forests, ecosystems and rare 
species of fauna. It is also estimated that the car-
bon emissions generated by the wildfires in  
amounted to % of Russia’s annual GHG emis-
sions, raising concerns about their current and fu-
ture impact on the global climate and temperatures 
in the Arctic (Ria Novosti News Service, b).
3. RESPONSE
Three main phases can be distinguished in the area 
of disaster management. The first concerns preven-
tion and preparedness – design and implementa-
tion of safety standards, elaboration of emergency 
plans, dissemination of information. The second 
level is immediate emergency response in the 
case of disaster (informing the public, evacuating 
the population, providing first aid, fire fighting). 
The third level comprises long-term reparations, 
compensation, and restoration of adequate living 
conditions and means. 
.. Legal framework for 
disaster management
The rights of Russian citizens in disasters are 
little elaborated and not detailed, and legislation 
pertaining to ecological disasters focuses mainly 
on preventive and safety measures, and responsi-
bility for technological hazards and the liquidation 
of their consequences.
The responsibility to protect civilians, prevent 
disasters and manage their consequences is regu-
lated by internal legislation in the Russian Federa-
tion, and is based mainly on two Federal Laws: 
Federal Law N, dated //, ‘On the pro-
tection of the population and territories from nat-
ural and technological hazards’, and Federal Law 
N, dated //, ‘On civil defence’. 
The two Federal Laws set out the general respon-
sibilities and duties at different administrative 
levels (federal, regional and local), as well as the 
legal rights of civilians, and are complemented by 
additional regulations and guidelines at the fed-
eral and local levels. The general legal rights from 
which civilians benefit are stated in article  of 
the Federal Law ‘On the protection of the popula-
tion and territories from natural and technologi-
cal hazards’, and include the right for protection of 
lives, health and property by regional and local au-
thorities in case of disaster, right for information, 
compensation and allowances, medical assistance, 
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and free social insurance. Meanwhile, the Federal 
Law ‘On civil defence’ provides the basis for the 
conduction of evacuation of the citizens in case of 
war or disaster, and assigns this responsibility to 
local governments. 
Forest fire prevention responsibilities are set out 
in the Forest Code of the Russian Federation that 
came into force in January  (Federal Law N 
-FZ, ). The new code decentralised the 
control over forest resources, and assigned the 
responsibility to prevent forest fires to private 
tenants and local authorities. At the same time, 
the staff of the forest fire fighting force was sig-
nificantly reduced, the forest fire fighting air force 
‘Avialesokhrana’ dismantled, and the task of fire 
fighting distributed between various smaller pub-
lic and private companies.
The concrete implementation of regulations per-
taining to disaster management falls on regional 
and local authorities (although according to Fed-
eral Law ‘On the protection of the population and 
territories from natural and technological hazards’, 
article , citizens also have some duties in disaster 
prevention and relief). However, as it became ap-
parent that the regional governments failed to deal 
efficiently with the  wildfire crisis, the federal 
government took over the management of the dis-
aster on July , and the disaster management re-
sponsibilities were divided between various minis-
tries and overseen by the Prime Minister and the 
President. The Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergen-
cies and Disaster Relief, which is usually responsi-
ble for emergency response in disaster situations 
that threaten people’s lives, took over fire fighting 
activities, and mobilised more than , people 
in fire fighting operations (including several thou-
sands volunteers), whose efforts throughout the 
summer and autumn helped put out the wildfires.
.. Evacuation and 
emergency response
Responsibilities for civil defence in Russian legis-
lation include the provision of information to 
the population, the evacuation of the popula-
tion and valuables to safe areas, the provision 
of shelter and of means of self-defence, and the 
provision of services, including medical assis-
tance, first aid and accommodation. In theory, 
every administrative unit should have standard 
emergency plans for the evacuation of civilians in 
case of war or natural or technological disaster, 
as stipulated in the Federal Law ‘On civil defence’ 
(). Regional and municipal governments are 
expected to prepare and train the population, 
possess all necessary equipment and medical 
supplies, and organise and conduct evacuations. 
The Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and 
Disaster Relief (EMERCOM) and the Ministry of 
Interior and the Defence Ministry provide troops 
to assist with evacuation, guarantee the safety 
of people, and maintain order. Existing guide-
lines, such as those issued by the All-Russian 
Scientific Research Institute for Civil Defence 
and Emergency Situations, describe the standard 
procedures for the management of evacuations, 
including the creation of special evacuation 
committees and units at designated points of 
departure and arrival, the specific duties of each 
actor involved, and the provision of transport, 
shelter and medical support. 
The wildfires in  demonstrated that not all 
municipalities were prepared for emergency situ-
ations. The residents of the rural settlements were 
usually informed about the necessity of evacuat-
ing by units of the EMERCOM or by the police 
that patrolled in the region. Evacuation was not 
always assisted, and the people were expected 
to leave their settlements on their own means. 
However, later on, buses were provided by the 
authorities for those who did not have their own 
transport. Some people refused to leave their vil-
lages, for fear of looting. Many elderly people died 
in their burning houses, as they had nowhere to 
go and were not ready to leave their homes (Ar-
gumenty i Fakty, , Ria Novosti News Service, 
b; Moscow Komsomolets, ). Some rural 
settlements were difficult to access because of 
poor infrastructure, which made evacuation diffi-
cult or sometimes impossible. A prisoner camp in 
the Republic of Mordovia could not be evacuated 
as the single railroad that connected it to nearby 
settlements had been dismantled in  (Gazeta 
News Service, a). 
There are few available official statistics concern-
ing the temporary resettlement of the victims and 
evacuees (it is unclear whether the evacuees were 
registered in the temporary camps), and most in-
formation comes from individual testimonies and 
investigative journalism. It appears that the provi-
sion of temporary shelter varied qualitatively and 
quantitatively across the regions. Many victims of 
the fires who lost their houses initially went to live 
with friends and relatives. Others were relocated to 
nearby settlements, where temporary shelter was 
set up in schools, sanatoria, hospitals and nursing 
homes. Residents of the village of Mokhovoe that 
burned down in the Moscow region on July  were 
relocated to a nearby Army barracks. In the Volgo-
grad region, temporary resettlement camps were 
set up, offering three hot meals a day, medical and 
psychological care, as well as help with the recov-
ery of lost documents and identification papers 
(Russia Region Press, ). In the Altai region, 
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 people were temporarily accommodated in a 
local hospital, and some elderly people ‘agreed to 
temporarily stay in nursing homes’ (Russian Red 
Cross, ). Many citizens temporarily offered 
rooms in their apartments and houses to the vic-
tims – their offers were posted on the Ministry of 
Regional Development’s website. Many displaced 
people were able to move into their new houses by 
the end of October, and the majority had moved 
by the end of November, although as reported by 
some journalists, some people who did not quali-
fy for new housing had to stay in their temporary 
shelter, often unfit for the region’s harsh winter cli-
mate. It appears that the victims were not always 
satisfied with the way evacuations were conducted. 
Some complained about the lack of assistance, oth-
ers about the fact that they were kept in the tempo-
rary shelters with little available information, and 
could not return home for lack of transport. Some 
reported insulting treatment by government offi-
cials (Rosbalt News Agency, ).
Medical assistance was provided by the Minis-
try of Healthcare and Social Development and the 
EMERCOM. According to the Ministry of Health-
care and Social Development’s website, , vic-
tims of wildfires received free medical assistance 
in August and September: the majority received 
outpatient assistance, and about  were hospi-
talised (Ministry of Health and Social Develop-
ment,  and Ministry of Regional Development, 
a). Special medical units were created to pro-
vide medical assistance to fire fighters. A medical 
train circulated in the regions affected by the wild-
fires carrying doctors to assist victims, volunteers 
and fire fighters. 
Other services made available to the victims in-
cluded social and psychological support, as well 
as assistance with administrative matters. Educa-
tion services were provided from September for all 
temporarily resettled children, either through the 
organisation of classes in the places of temporary 
accommodation, or via the provision of transport 
to local schools. 
.. Compensations, 
reparations and costs
According to article  para.  of the Federal Law 
‘On the protection of the population and terri-
tories from natural and technological hazards’, 
all citizens are entitled to compensation for lost 
property in the event of natural disaster. The 
actual amounts of compensation and allowances 
are, according to the same article, para. , ‘to be 
defined by the legislation of the Russian Federa-
tion and the legislation of the [federal] subjects 
of the Russian Federation’. In practice, however, 
the insurance and compensation policies proved 
inefficient (Kremlin stenographic report, ). As 
highlighted by President Medvedev at a meeting 
on October , only % of the houses that burned 
down were insured. The amount of compensation 
for wildfires in  had to be determined on an 
ad-hoc basis by the ministries and local govern-
ments. Every person qualifying for compensa-
tion received , Rubles (roughly  USD or 
 Euros) soon after the fires, enough to cover 
initial expenses (clothes, sheets, food). Retired 
people received an additional , Rubles. In 
addition, early in August, the government prom-
ised , Rubles to each victim for the loss of 
personal goods (paid jointly from the federal and 
regional budgets), and families of the deceased 
received  million Rubles. Those who lost their 
houses were entitled to either a financial compen-
sation up to  million Rubles, accommodation in 
existing houses, or a new house built by the govern-
ment. According to the statistics of the Ministry 
of Regional Development, most of the families 
(,) opted for new houses, while , families 
opted for monetary compensation, the amount of 
which was based on the cost of the property lost, 
calculated on average real-estate prices in the 
region concerned. Only  families chose to move 
to existing houses in other towns (Kremlin steno-
graphic report, ). Although precise figures 
are not available, media reports suggest that some 
were helped by the government, but it is probable 
that many chose their new place of residence inde-
pendently, and some might have moved to other 
regions (a right guaranteed through the Federal 
Law N- ‘On the right of Russian citizens to 
freedom of movement and choice of residence 
within the Russian Federation’).
From September to November ,  new houses 
were built under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Regional Development, and the last evacuees 
in the Volgograd region and Altai krai were able 
move in on November . The houses were often 
built in the original settlements to satisfy the de-
mands of the victims, and followed the original 
street-plans (Vesti News Service, ). According 
to the construction plans published on the Ministry 
of Regional Development’s website,  settlements 
were rebuilt, out of the  reported as destroyed. 
However, the Minister of Regional Development 
had announced mid-August that some of the origi-
nal settlements could not be rebuilt: their residents 
therefore received apartments in nearby towns, or 
new houses constructed in nearby reconstructed 
settlements. As an example, the village of Verkhn-
yaya Vereya, in the Nizhny Novgorod oblast, which 
was entirely destroyed on July  with  houses 
burned down, was reconstructed in September, 
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and  additional houses were built to host people 
from nearby settlements that had been destroyed. 
The residents of the village of Mokhovoe, located 
in the Moscow region, where  residential build-
ings burned down, were relocated to a nearby vil-
lage Beloomut, where  new individual houses 
had been constructed for the fire victims (Ministry 
of Regional Development, b). 
Following the request of the President, the in-
frastructure in the affected rural settlements was 
improved. Gas was provided to  settlements, 
and important social services introduced with the 
construction of maternity clinics, a nursery for 
 children, a playing field, playgrounds, shops, 
and a post office. The Ministry of Regional De-
velopment had further plans for the construction 
of additional social facilities (such as maternity 
houses, healthcare centres, schools, sports cen-
tres, art houses), roads, and electrical networks 
up to the end of . According to the figures of 
the Ministry, by October , , billion Rubles 
(US$  million,  million Euros) had been dis-
tributed by the federal government and sent to the 
regions to finance material aid and reconstruction 
works (Ministry of Regional Development, c) 
.. Public response
As is often the case following major sudden humani-
tarian disasters, the wildfires galvanised civil society, 
resulting in various acts of solidarity and assistance. 
Many volunteered to fight fires that encircled settle-
ments and wildlife reserves. Youth political parties, 
churches, NGOs, such as the Russian and the Esto-
nian Red Cross, businesses, and individuals from 
all over the country collected and donated clothes, 
furniture, and electrical equipment to the victims 
who had lost all their possessions. As mentioned 
above, some people offered accommodation, and 
some owners of hotels provided rooms for tempo-
rary shelter. More than  large national and inter-
national companies donated funds for relief and 
reconstruction, and some companies made contri-
butions in-kind (for instance, Samsung provided 
, televisions for the affected families) (Kremlin 
stenographic report, ).
The international community also provided assis-
tance. Fourteen countries sent staff and equipment 
to help with fire fighting operations. Some countries 
raised funds (such as Switzerland, which contrib-
uted , Euros); some offered rehabilitation 
programmes for victims and helped in the con-
struction of the new houses. The International Fed-
eration’s Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) 
provided CHF , (US$ ,, , Euros) 
to the Russian Red Cross for humanitarian aid to af-
fected families (Relief Web, ). 
The role of the media and the Internet was cru-
cial in raising public awareness, complementing of-
ficial figures that often understated or even played 
down the facts, denouncing the lack of political 
response and cases of social injustices, during the 
crisis and throughout the reparation period. Infor-
mation and advice on how to help were posted on 
personal blogs, and helped mobilise public action. 
4. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
.. Criticism of the government 
response and policy
The main criticisms directed at the government 
concerned the failure to prevent the fires, which 
were aggravated by a slow, poorly coordinated 
and under-financed response. Many environ-
mental NGOs and experts condemned the reforms 
of the Forest Code conducted by then President 
Putin in , which resulted in spending cuts, the 
decentralisation and the dismantling of a forestry 
management and fire control system that had func-
tioned effectively for decades, with professional, 
t rained fire fighters and appropriate ground 
and air equipment. Following the  summer 
disaster and these criticisms, President Medvedev 
requested to review the Forest Code and increase 
the budget allocated to protection from wildfires. 
Some proposals were reviewed and amendments 
accepted by the State Duma in December  
(Federal Law N , ), and the Federal Forest 
Agency presented additional proposals for amend-
ments of the Code in February , which essen-
tially consisted of restoring the controls over the 
protection from fire to the Federal Forest Agency, 
increasing the staff and designing an efficient 
monitoring and warning system. 
Negligence and failure to implement regulations 
by responsible authorities were another important 
cause of the disaster and of the extent of its conse-
quences. Prime Minister Putin fired the head of the 
Federal Forest Agency, who had played down the 
extent of the fires at the beginning of the summer 
and claimed that the situation was under control. 
A new presidential decree in August, ‘On addi-
tional measures for the prevention and liquidation 
of the emergency situation, related to fire safety’ 
attributed personal responsibility to the governors 
for fire prevention and liquidation, and compensa-
tion to the victims. On September , the President 
requested the Prosecutor-General to conduct an 
investigation on the unpreparedness to manage 
wildfires among local authorities, who had not re-
acted to the disaster in a timely manner, and did 
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not implement existing regulations on disaster 
prevention and emergency evacuation plans. Lo-
cal authorities were accused of dereliction of duty 
and legal proceedings were initiated against some 
members of regional administrations, including 
in Moscow and Ryazan oblasts (Gazeta News Ser-
vice, b and c).
The allocation of compensation and the repara-
tion process also sparked many questions and crit-
icisms. First, not all victims of wildfires qualified 
for compensation. Owners of houses that burned 
from ground fire (caused by agricultural burning) 
or fires that occurred outside of the peak period, 
or in regions that were not declared as threatened, 
were not entitled to compensation. Those who 
could not provide a proof of residence for lack of 
registration documents were also forced to open 
legal proceedings, and some had to continue resid-
ing in temporary shelters in poor living conditions. 
Mass media regularly denounced compensation 
injustice and housing problems, which led to offi-
cial investigations by the Investigation Committee 
of the Russian Federation in May  (Ria News 
Service, ).
According to the official figures, of the 
, families that had been left homeless, only 
, received new housing or indemnity. Thus, 
 families seem not to have received any form 
of compensation. The reasons for this are unclear, 
but this figure perhaps includes the  own-
ers of burned property that had not been found, 
as reported by the Minister of Regional Develop-
ment. These owners had perhaps moved to an-
other region prior to the fires and did expect to be 
compensated. 
Some beneficiaries of compensation complained 
about fraud, as their new housing turned out to be 
smaller than their initial property. Moreover, the 
quality of the new hurriedly built houses was not 
always appropriate for the local climate. It became 
evident at the beginning of the winter that the 
thermal insulation of the new houses was poor, 
and the heating system was not powerful enough 
to heat the houses, or too costly for the elderly. 
Some new settlements were built in swampy areas, 
which could affect residents’ health and comfort. 
Those who complained were reportedly insulted 
by local government officials (Radio Free Europe, 
, Rosbalt News Agency, ).
Some people did not always have a choice de-
spite the initial offers of various compensation 
schemes by the federal government: most elderly 
people were resettled in new houses and were not 
offered financial compensation as an alternative, 
on the grounds that they would be more exposed 
to fraud if they tried to rebuild their houses without 
the government’s help. According to the testimony 
of the residents of the village of Mokhovoe, they 
were not given a choice, and were relocated to new 
individual houses on the outskirts of a nearby vil-
lage (Beloomut; Bigg and Kirilenko, ). In fact, 
many of the fire victims would have rather returned 
to their settlements, to which they were emotion-
ally attached. Many, especially older people, who 
previously lived in apartments, were not ready to 
look after a house, which would be physically more 
demanding and more costly to maintain.
All told, the disaster pinpointed many legisla-
tive and institutional gaps in the management of 
emergency situations in Russia, as well as organi-
sational weaknesses and a lack of professionalism 
at many levels of the country’s administration.
.. Displacement and 
Resettlement
The disaster led to the resettlement of a section of 
the affected population, and governmental deci-
sions and action in the aftermath of the disaster 
seem to have greatly shaped the patterns of 
displacement. Migration theory often refers to 
urbanisation processes, as difficult living condi-
tions, natural hazards and a lack of job opportuni-
ties push people from rural areas to urban centres 
with better possibilities, services and infrastruc-
ture. It is possible that the wildfires and the 
destruction of settlements resulted in the depar-
ture of some people from rural areas to larger 
Russian cities. Younger families may have indeed 
been tempted to seek better opportunities in urban 
centres. But about a third of the victims preferred 
to take the financial compensation offered by the 
government, and there is no information on their 
subsequent movement and place of residence.
However, two thirds of the victims chose to move 
into the houses built by the government, which 
means in most cases that they remained in or close 
to their original settlement. Nearly half of the af-
fected population were elderly and were not ready 
to leave the region with which they were familiar 
to start a new life elsewhere. At the same time, the 
compensation schemes designed by the govern-
ment made it more economically advantageous to 
opt for new houses rather than to accept financial 
compensation, and in this sense the government 
perhaps encouraged a return policy within the 
affected population through promises of better 
housing and improved infrastructure and services. 
Such a view squares well with regional develop-
ment policy, which has been designed to reverse 
the depopulation of rural areas.
While few people moved great distances as a re-
sult of the fires, much short-range displacement 
occurred. For example, official statistics show that 
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
STUDY 07/2011 3 5IDDRI
only  settlements have been restored out of the 
 initially reported as having been destroyed 
(Ministry of Regional Development, b). Con-
sequently, more than half of the settlements that 
burned down were abandoned. The reasons for 
this are not stated, but in some cases the govern-
ment claimed that certain settlements could not be 
repaired, and new houses were built in nearby lo-
cations (it is not clear whether the residents were 
consulted prior to the decision and whether or 
not they agreed with it). In some cases the aban-
donment of settlements may have been a result of 
social modernisation policy: in October , the 
Minister of Regional Development Victor Basargin 
requested the President’s permission to examine 
the possibility of relocating the residents of very 
small isolated settlements to larger villages, where 
they could benefit from better social facilities and 
services, and find employment opportunities. This 
project was suggested to be implemented as part 
of the federal target programme ‘Zhilishe’. Addi-
tionally, this would also reduce the costs of roads 
and infrastructure maintenance, and limit the vul-
nerability of the population in case of wildfires. 
According to the Ministry for Regional Develop-
ment (Ministry for Regional Development vide-
oconference, ), the population supported this 
policy and relocations have started in the Vladimir 
oblast. This policy again seems to have encour-
aged rural development, rather than an urbanisa-
tion process.
Overall, it seems that population displacement 
was limited and rather tightly controlled by the 
Russian government, which perhaps used the 
opportunity to support a policy encouraging the 




Despite potentially good intentions, the way 
compensation and resettlement were planned, 
organised and implemented can legitimately 
be criticized. Choices were sometimes imposed 
upon the victims, some social injustices occurred, 
and work was conducted too hastily and with 
little consideration of the actual needs of the 
population. 
Another criticism concerns the long-term im-
plications of the disaster. As President Medvedev 
acknowledged, the heat wave that hit Russia in 
 may have been an illustration of the effects 
of climate change and a hint of the challenges to 
come. Judging by the trends of the last decade, 
wildfires are likely to become more destructive 
every year. As a result, rebuilding burned houses 
and infrastructure is not a sustainable policy, and 
further displacement of the population to more 
developed and less vulnerable areas may be a bet-
ter solution. 
Given people’s reluctance or incapacity to aban-
don their homes and lifestyles on the one hand, 
and the risks of depopulation and loss of control 
of vast swathes of the country’s territory on the 
other, the government will have to address the 
issue through a more sustainable approach. This 
would include increasing the resilience of the 
population, through stronger preventive, warn-
ing and protection systems, improved implemen-
tation of evacuation procedures and appropriate 
legal and institutional frameworks (including 
the revision of the Forest Code). Investments 
required for these adaptation measures will cer-
tainly be less than the cost of annual reparation 
and emergency response. 
Where resilience cannot be built, voluntary mi-
gration can prove to be a positive adaptation strat-
egy and reduce the vulnerability of the population 
(as well as reducing fires, most of which are caused 
by human activity and negligence). However, this 
would require appropriate conditions and mecha-
nisms that would facilitate the relocation and the 
integration of people to new areas. These condi-
tions and mechanisms could include improved in-
frastructure, subsidies to acquire housing in a new 
location, help with transport, help with integra-
tion into the local community, taking into account 
the fact that many of the people concerned are el-
derly or unemployed and thus have special needs. 
This would require an appropriate legal and ad-
ministrative support, and therefore a revision of 
existing migration legislation. Some of these gaps 
have already been registered in the above-men-
tioned draft document for the new framework for 
the migration policy for -, but the con-
crete policies and mechanisms would need to be 
further elaborated and described in greater detail 
in binding legal documents and guidelines. A few 
programmes already present in Russian legislation 
under the umbrella programme ‘Zhilishe’ (such as 
subsidies to people moving out of the Far Northern 
regions), could be used as a model for a resettle-
ment and regional development policy supporting 
internal migration from wildfire-prone regions to 
safer areas. 
Migration and development policies could well 
complement each other and improve the condi-
tions of the population in the face of environmen-
tal hazards, through the assisted relocation of peo-
ple to settlements with better infrastructure for 
protection from wildfires, transport and communi-
cation. Better employment opportunities available 
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in larger settlements and regional urban centres 
could help improve the livelihoods of rural resi-
dents. As for now, many make a livelihood from 
forest ecosystem services such as wood, berries, 
hunting: better employment opportunities would 
therefore make them less dependent on their im-
mediate environment and more resilient to future 
disasters. The development of regional settle-
ments and towns would at the same time help re-
verse current migration flows, reduce the pressure 
on larger urban centres in the west and centre of 
Russia, and perhaps even attract new migrants to 
the new modernised areas. 
More generally, this case helps illustrate the com-
plex relationship between natural disasters, migra-
tion and development, as environmental disasters 
can influence trends in population displacement and 
regional development, but can at the same time be 
mitigated through appropriate migration and devel-
opment policies. Therefore, environmental factors 
and risks should be considered in both migration 
and development policy, and disaster prevention 
and relief policies should integrate migration and 
development as possible adaptation strategies. 
There is a great potential for improvement of Rus-
sian legislation and policies in this domain. ?
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Located in the Carribbean basin, which is subject 
to frequent natural and environmental disasters, 
Haiti’s geography can be considered as a liability 
(Eichler : ). It lies in the middle of the hurri-
cane belt and is subject to severe storms, occa-
sional flooding and earthquakes as well as peri-
odic droughts (CIA ). On January , , it 
was struck by a major .Mw earthquake, affecting 
more than  million people and leading to signifi-
cant protracted displacement.
INTRODUCTION: NATURAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS IN HAITI
Natural disasters have long been part of Haitian 
history. The earliest recorded disaster was a hurri-
cane that destroyed Santo Domingo in ; the 
first recorded disaster in modern times, “the great 
hurricane”, struck the island in  (Eichler : 
). A wave of devastating disasters began with an 
earthquake in  (prior to which quakes were 
virtually unknown on the island). Over the past 
decade, disasters have intensified and become 
more frequent. In , for instance, Tropical 
Storm Jeanne killed over , people, mainly in 
Gonaives. One year later, Hurricane Stan led to 
nearly , fatalities and left roughly $. billion 
in damage. However, the most brutal hurricane 
season ever experienced in Haiti was in . Four 
storms (Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike) destroyed 
agricultural land and crops, killed  Haitians, 
injured  people and destroyed or damaged 
around , homes (OCHA : ). 
Meanwhile, the country’s widespread environ-
mental disasters, such as deforestation, soil erosion 
and inadequate supplies of potable water, exacer-
bate the already-heavy impact of natural disasters 
(CIA ). According to Alscher (: ), Haiti 
has reduced its forest cover from % () to 
% (). Such environmental degradation can 
aggravates the impact of natural disasters such 
as in the case of Jeanne in . Though merely 
a tropical storm, Jeanne’s high death toll was due 
in part to the lack of tree cover (Masters d.u.). The 
same storm caused fewer than  deaths on the 
Dominican side of Hispanola, which is % cov-
ered by forests (Alscher : ). 
Largely as a consequence of deforestation and 
the resulting soil erosion, soil degradation in Haiti 
is severe over almost the entire country. Accord-
ing to the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), .% of Haitian soil is 
severely degraded and .% of the total Haitian 
population lives on this degraded soil. Further-
more, with more than % of forests gone, little 
topsoil is left to hold rains, leading to increased 
and nearly-annual flooding events. Lastly, all of 
these factors are aggravated by Haiti’s horseshoe 
shape, which gives it an disproportionately long 
coastline in the midst of one of the world’s busiest 
tropical storm belts (Eichler : ). 
These natural and environmental disasters went 
unaddressed in the years leading up to the quake, 
and caused significant social vulnerability among 
the poor. Thus, when a . earthquake struck the 
Southern coast of the country on January , , 
conditions were ripe for a humanitarian catastro-
phe. Though centered at the town of Leogane, the 
impacts were strongly felt in the nearby metropolis 
and capital of Port-au-Prince. Though exact death 
toll, damage, and displacement figures are never 
precisely known, the quake is thought to have con-
tributed to the deaths of tens or hundreds of thou-
sands of people, and displaced between one and 
two million people from their homes. 
These displaced persons adopted multiple strat-
egies. Some crowded into Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) camps, while others went to live 
with relatives. Only the lucky few were able to 
make their way abroad. This paper examines these 
different strategies, with a special consideration 
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of the political response, services provided to the 
various groups, and the legal context in which all 
of these environmental migrants were living. The 
first section of the paper deals with the domestic 
situation faced by IDPs, while the second section 
examines the fate of those who attempted to relo-
cate to other countries in the Western Hemisphere.
1. COPING WITH THE EARTHQUAKE: 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT STRATEGIES 
Right after the quake, some families stayed on their 
property even though their house was destroyed, 
or was vulnerable to collapse due to aftershocks, 
while others moved away from the quake zone to 
find shelter elsewhere. These quake-crated IDPs 
can be distributed into two groups: ) IDPs located 
in camps, which were mainly in urban areas; and 
) IDPs residing with host families, mainly in 
rural areas. However, it should be noted that the 
two groups were not so clearly defined in reality. 
Some households chose to keep a few members of 
the family in IDP camps, while sending others to 
live with host families in rural areas. Other IDPs 
traveled frequently between urban and rural areas 
over time. Still, this framework will be used in this 
paper for conceptual clarity.
.. Assessing protection 
and assistance to IDPs
... The role of the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM)
IOM has had missions in Haiti since . It was 
among the first organizations to respond to the 
flow of IDPs, and was able to do so by reallocating 
the funds scheduled for other emergency assis-
tance missions. In the first  months following the 
earthquake, IOM distributed  millions Non-Food 
Items (NFIs) to , families and registered 
, IDPs. It is now the head organization of 
the Camp Coordination and Camp Management 
(CCCM) Cluster, which is in charge of managing 
several major camps and registering the popula-
tion of IDPs. IOM also established an information 
system that covers all known camps (including 
those not managed by international organiza-
tions); qualified patrols make regular visits to 
manage the system. Based on this field informa-
tion, IOM issues regular surveys on the living 
conditions in camps, and on evictions or on the 
conditions of return of IDPs; it also informs IDPs 
about relocation opportunities.
However, many camps were built spontaneously 
on private ground or in places not sound for habita-
tion. Consequently, starting a few weeks after the 
quake, many IDPs were expelled by landowners. 
By March , % of IDPs had been evicted from 
their camps; % more had been threatened with 
eviction (CCCM, a). In a survey conducted on 
IDPs who had left camps, % declared that the 
reason for their departure was because they had 
been threatened of eviction. By comparison, % 
feared rains or hurricanes, % moved because of 
the poor living conditions and % because of se-
curity problems (CCCM, b). 
... Living conditions in IDP Camps
Although a great amount of resources were allo-
cated to camp management, living conditions 
in camps could be very difficult, especially in 
spontaneous camps. In the first few months, 
, households were given a tent each. But 
tents do not offer a sufficient protection to live 
through the rainy season, during which  to 
 mm of rain can fall in an hour. % of IDP camps 
provided no access to water and % did not have 
toilets. Access to such basic services is especially 
rare in smaller camps (fewer than  households) 
which account for % of all camps and % of the 
IDP population living in camps (CCCM, c). 
Cases of violence have been reported. 
Even though the number of IDPs living in camps 
has steadily decreased, almost half of the ini-
tial IDP camp population remains, and the rate 
at which camps are emptying has also begun to 
slow. Between January and March , the num-
ber of large and medium-sized camps (more than 
 IDPs) decreased while the number of small 
IDP sites (- households) grew by % (CCCM, 
c). This is particularly concerning since, as 
mentioned above, living conditions in small spon-
taneous sites are more severe and people are fac-
ing stronger threats of eviction. 
... IDPs in rural areas
From a humanitarian perspective, the interesting 
thing about IDP sites is that a lot of data is avail-
able on them and about the IDPs they are housing: 
where they are moving, what their needs are, 
and so on. Thus, despite the lack of financial 
resources, response strategies can be planned. On 
the contrary, movements of IDPs to host families 
in rural areas are more difficult to assess, because 
IDPs are not captured in the data and become 
invisible. Even counting them requires small-scale, 
costly surveys of rural households. Estimates of 
IDPs living with guest families in rural areas put the 
number between , and ,, or % of 
the total number of IDPs. % of them were hosted 
by immediate family members (either within the 
home, or in makeshift homes in gardens). In some 
areas, % of rural households reported hosting 
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new people after the earthquake; on average, they 
were hosting  adults and  children.
The main problem in rural areas is that IDPs ar-
rived with very little or no resources in households 
that were already poor themselves. Economic and 
natural resources were rapidly overstretched: re-
ports show that within a few weeks, many rural 
households had eaten the stock of food they had 
planned to live on for four months, until the next 
harvesting season. With no savings, some had to 
sell their production tools (shovels, land, seeds, 
etc) in order to buy food. These households are 
now facing high food insecurity since they can-
not produce enough for the next season. Coping 
strategies analyses show that they have reduced 
the number of meals per day, and the quantity of 
food eaten at each meal. Rural households have 
also turned to other sources of income such as tree 
cutting for charcoal production, even though they 
are aware that this practice makes their immediate 
environment more fragile and therefore exposes 
them to heightened environmental threats.
% of IDPs hosted in rural households are un-
employed. One response from IOM was to launch 
large Cash-For-Work (CFW) programs. The idea 
is simple: IOM hires IDPs to rebuild roads and 
evacuate the rubble. This program provides them 
with the salary they need and helps rebuilding the 
country, by involving the population in the recon-
struction process. IOM’s policy was to give prior-
ity to IDPs, therefore % of their hires were IDPs 
against just % locals of rural areas. However, 
this practice proved controversial, for several rea-
sons. First, local people also needed cash in order 
to buy food – for which prices rose sharply after 
the quake – and production tools, so IOM’s policy 
was seen as unfair and created social tensions. 
Secondly, wages paid by IOM were three to four 
times higher than wages for agricultural workers, 
many of whom therefore chose to abandon agri-
culture temporarily to earn more, putting the re-
gional agricultural production at risk. Third, work 
opportunities were very short-term, so as to maxi-
mize turnover and reach more beneficiaries. Since 
many of the workers were untrained, this practice 
elevated the risk of work-related accidents. Final-
ly, rubble removal requires very expensive equip-
ment, such as trucks, which were provided by for-
eign companies and international organizations. 
Thus, much of the money did not reach intended 
beneficiaries, and the impact was much smaller 
than anticipated (USAID Inspector General, ). 
Figure 3. Urban-rural migrations in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake
Source: JTF-Haiti. Operation Unified Response. Found under: https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/haiti
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.. Sustaining livelihood: 
relocation and returning home 
strategies and challenges
With so many problems in IDP camps, why did so 
many stay? Many simply did not know where to 
go: this was the reason given by % of IDPs still 
in camps. Housing reconstruction is on-going, and 
many IDPs do not know what state their house is 
in. The Ministry for Public Works used a three-
color coding system for housing: green for “not 
damaged”, orange for “in need of repair”, and red 
for “unsafe and in need of demolition”. However, 
a survey by the CCCM Cluster showed that % of 
people residing in camps do not know how their 
house was classified (CCCM, c). In addition, 
more than % of Port-au-Prince residents rent 
housing, and since rents for “green coded” houses 
have increased by % since the quake, many 
families on modest incomes cannot return. Finally, 
Haitian property law is highly disorganized, and 
many households existed on land with vague prop-
erty rights.
IDPs also need cash to relocate their household, 
and they need livelihoods in their new communi-
ties, as well as basic public services, water, sani-
tation, transport, education. Both the evacuation 
of rubble and reconstruction are on-going and are 
taking more time in poorer neighborhoods, which 
prevent families from going back. What’s more, 
IDP camps are often closer to home communi-
ties than permanent, reconstructed options (cf. 
map  in Annex, showing IDP sites near Port-au-
Prince). Ironically, leaving IDP camps would mean 
further displacement from family, friends, social 
networks, and livelihoods than simply staying put. 
What’s more, fear of returning to permanent build-
ings after the experience of the earthquake has 
also proven a barrier to return. 
Between January and March , the average 
number of people in households in IDP sites fell 
from . to .. The decrease implies that house-
holds were sending family members (mainly male 
heads of household) to their future relocation site, 
while keeping some family members in the camp, 
where at least a few services were accessible. This 
strategy allows families to prepare for their reloca-
tion while minimizing risks. However, when they 
do leave, about two-thirds of IDPs choose to return 
home over relocating elsewhere. Even after reloca-
tion, conditions are difficult: only % of relocat-
ed people live in undamaged houses, whereas % 
live in houses in need of repair or unsafe houses, 
and % live in a tent or in makeshift shelters on 
plots (CCCM, b). 
In rural areas, some parents also chose to leave 
their children with their host families and to 
register them at school, while they looked for work 
in urban areas or engaged in CFW activities. IDPs 
in rural areas are increasingly children, women 
with babies, and elderly people, categories who 
are not able to contribute to agricultural work. 
This demographic shift puts added pressure on 
rural families’ resources, who have to feed more 
people with less labor and increased environmen-
tal vulnerability: in short, a recipe for major food 
insecurity. At the same time, the bulk of interna-
tional reconstruction aid has been distributed to 
urban areas, both for reconstruction and to im-
prove access to public services. Labor migrants 
are pulled towards urban zones for employment, 
while rural areas (which were less directly affected 
by the quake) must cope with housing and feeding 
large vulnerable populations.
.. Improving the response 
to internal displacement
Even prior to the  earthquake, Haiti was one of 
the poorest countries in the world, and the poorest 
of the Northern Hemisphere. It has been struck by 
a series of natural disasters and has proven struc-
turally vulnerable as a country. So that rebuilding 
must also mean investing in people’s ability to 
cope with natural disasters. Although another 
earthquake of this magnitude is unlikely to occur 
again soon, Haiti will regularly be struck by violent 
storms and hurricanes in the years to come, espe-
cially in an era of climate change. Haitians need 
to be prepared for these natural threats. After 
the quake, some proposed that Port-au-Prince be 
entirely demolished and reconstructed in order to 
offer better living conditions and improved protec-
tion against natural disasters. However, such 
proposals encountered major financial, social, and 
logistical challenges.
One of the strategies of the CCCM Cluster was 
to keep as many people as possible in rural areas 
in order to avoid IDP return to the overcrowded 
and most vulnerable neighborhoods of larger cities 
(Pascal, ). However, most IDPs felt that their 
displacement was temporary, and that they should 
return home to their cities and neighborhoods as 
soon as possible. Indeed, most of the voluntary 
migration in recent months has been composed of 
people returning to urban centers, either perma-
nently or in circular migration from rural areas. 
These sorts of intentions and desires should be a 
part of employment, development, and migration 
strategies in the reconstruction phase, something 
that has not always been done in this case.
It is also important not to focus only on urban ar-
eas for reconstruction. IDPs have put heavy social 
pressure on rural areas, and have affected both 
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livelihoods and coping capacities of rural popula-
tions. Aid must be provided quickly to rural areas, 
not only to avoid an aggravation of the current 
situation and a humanitarian crisis, but also for 
the long run. Rural development aid, and particu-
larly agricultural aid, is essential to the country’s 
reconstruction, in order to avoid a new exodus out 
of rural areas in the years to come. Rural farmers 
must be capable of producing sufficiently to feed 
themselves and to save for coping in crises. 
In addition, an urban-centric reconstruction 
process might attract a surplus of labor migrants, 
adding to already overcrowded urban areas. Re-
construction has to be done quickly, but it should 
not offer wages and job opportunities that are so 
advantageous that they would compete with other 
vital economic activities, such as the agricultural 
sector. 
Temporary migration has also proven, in the 
Haitian case, to be a valuable adaptation strategy. 
Families planning to relocate have been sending 
individual members to future relocation destina-
tions in order to minimize risks, prepare for moves, 
and improve livelihoods. This sort of beneficial 
strategy can be aided by the provision of quality 
information on return/relocation opportunities. 
2. THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATIONS
.. Haitian international 
migration patterns prior 
to the  earthquake
From the late th Century through the s, poor 
rural Haitians increasingly began to migrate to 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic to find work in 
the sugar plantations (Alscher, : ). Since 
the mid-s, migration ties to the United States 
and, to a lesser extent, Canada have also been 
important. As the country descended into chaos 
after the breakdown of the Duvalier dictatorship 
in the late s, Haitians began arriving in the 
United States in large numbers. Between  
and , the Haitian population residing in the 
United States more than quadrupled from , 
to , to around , in  (Terrazas, 
). Haitians have also migrated to Europe in 
recent years, though in much smaller numbers 
(Alscher, : ). 
But how did environmental factors (including 
the earthquake) impact these migration pathways? 
Environmental degradation and disasters appear 
to be important triggers for Haitian migrations 
outside Haiti’s borders as well. Indeed, as Myers 
(: ) states, Haitian people are “abandoning 
their homelands in part because their country has 
become an environmental basket case”. The poor 
management and use of environmental resources 
impedes a prospering agricultural economy. 
However, political instability and oppression 
are also critically important to Haitians’ migration 
decisions. As Catanese (: , cit en Alscher 
: ) underlines, Haitian migration is induced 
by both environmental and political factors that 
have “reinforced each other over long periods of 
Haitian history”. Poor governance has had the 
effect of weakening food security, reducing state 
capacity, and triggering environmental migration. 
Such problems in governance include both the se-
rious flaws of the Duvalier regime as well as mac-
roeconomic stabilization policy in the modern era 
(Eliscar , Dupuy ). Indeed, the conditions 
put by the IMF and the World Bank for the payback 
of the debt, “impeded the development process of 
Haiti by demanding the breaking down of tariff 
barriers on imports” (Eliscar, :). Lowering 
tariffs impacted on Haitian food security as for-
eign commodities now flood the national markets 
in a way that Haitian producers have not been able 
compete with (Dupuy, ). Furthermore, with 
less state investment in the agrarian sector, the 
conditionalities put a toll on rural populations and 
forced them to metropolitan areas in search of fac-
tory-related employment opportunities (Eliscar, 
: ). The result was a rural exodus, as labor-
ers flowed to Port-au-Prince, as well as abroad, to 
the Dominican Republic, the wider Caribbean, and 
North America. 
.. Neighboring countries’ 
responses to Haitian 
international migrations
... Migration to the United States
Since the United States is home to the largest 
number of overseas Haitians (, people; 
Terrazas, ), it is worth analyzing the impact 
of the quake on Haiti-US migration flows. Imme-
diately after the earthquake, US immigration rules 
were relaxed. The Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) extended Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS), which is a “temporary immigration benefit 
that allows qualified individuals from designated 
countries (or parts of those countries) who are in 
the United States to stay here for a limited time 
period” (USCIS ), and offered an -month 
. Ironically, this rural-to-urban migration flow was halted 
not by economic change, but by the natural disaster 
of the earthquake, which created what Robert Fatton 
() calls “a reverse exodus” back to rural areas.
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visa to Haitians who arrived in the USA prior to 
the earthquake. According to the U.S. Department 
of State, , Haitians had approved petitions to 
migrate to the United States at the time of the earth-
quake and were waiting for visas to become avail-
able (Wasem, : iii). Furthermore, deportations 
in progress were halted by the DHS (Zissis, ). 
Nevertheless, three days after the earthquake, 
Secretary of the DHS Janet Napoliatano warned of 
the consequences of Haitian fleeing to the USA:
“At this moment of tragedy in Haiti it is tempting 
for people suffering in the aftermath of the earth-
quake to seek refuge elsewhere. But attempting to 
leave Haiti now will only bring more hardship to 
the Haitian people and nation… It is important to 
note that TPS will apply only to those individuals 
who were in the United States as of January , 
. Those who attempt to travel to the United 
States after January ,  will not be eligible for 
TPS and will be repatriated” (DHS Jan. , ).
According to the Coast Guard, , Haitians 
have been interdicted at sea in the fiscal year , 
a smaller number than in previous years (Agu-
ilera, ). These figures imply that attempts 
by Haitians to reach the USA (illegally and usu-
ally in small, unseaworthy boats) fell following 
the earthquake (a.u. EU Times ). Certainly 
the increased surveillance of the Coast Guard and 
military warships was a deterrent. But Michael 
A. Clemons, of the Washington-based Center for 
Global Development, points to a different reason: 
cost. The journey costs $-—well beyond 
reach for many families in the aftermath of the 
quake. Simultaneously, the US Department of 
Homeland Security reported a drop in the flow 
of legal migrants, from , and , in  
and , respectively, to , in . (Monger 
and Yankay [DHS] :). In the aftermath of 
the quake, it seems that financial resources for all 
forms of migration to the US were hard to come by.
One year after the earthquake, . million Hai-
tians still remain displaced from their homes 
(Wasem : ). Nevertheless, in January , 
US-immigration authorities began repatriating 
Haitians to their country (Armario, ). David 
Abraham, expert on US-immigration law, explains 
the repatriating of Haitians as follows: “The crud-
est explanation has always been that the situation 
in Haiti is endemically so bad, that if irregular en-
try is permitted to take hold, a dam would break 
and Haitians would come in massive numbers. On 
the one hand, the policy is a defence of the formal 
legal procedures for admission and immigration 
and the requirement that everyone follow those 
. Interview with Michael A. Clemens on April th, .
rules. On the other hand, it is a desire to keep 
Haitian immigration at a minimum. Now that the 
short-term earthquake emergency is over, it’s back 
to normal. If people are allowed to stay on, they 
will build social connections and become integrat-
ed into communities, and it then becomes much 
harder to deport them” (Abraham interview, ). 
A January  USA Today/Gallup poll backs these 
statements, showing that a majority of Americans 
(%) are opposed to accepting more Haitian im-
migrants into the United States. Abraham further 
maintains that “Haitians--like all unskilled immi-
grants--put negative pressure on the labor market, 
especially on the wages of the already-poor natives 
(mostly Black and Hispanic)…It’s the rude masses 
that the state is worried about” (Abraham, ). 
But Abraham’s comments beg the question: does 
the US really have to worry about the “rude mass-
es”? Clemens counters that, in the  years prior to 
the earthquake, , Haitians were caught in 
the high sees and violently brought back to their 
“prison” that they were desperately trying to es-
cape. This number represents just / of % of 
the current US population, and constitutes a group 
that is much too small to have any negative impact 
on the labor market. These forcibly repatriated 
Haitians became what Clemens calls “avoidable 
victims” of the  quake (Clemens, ). Sec-
ond, Clemens identifies a misconception of Haitian 
immigrants’ roles in US society: they are seen as a 
threat rather than as a valuable human resource.
Similarly, Lardner (cit. in Wasem :) asserts 
that the term of “threat to national security” was 
“being construed too broadly, being applied arbi-
trarily to Haitians, and wasting limited resources” 
in the aftermath of the quake. Clemens also notes 
that, for  years ( to ), US refugee law 
provided designations for environmental causes of 
displacement. It is only in modern times that the 
US has reverted to strict immigration control in the 
wake of natural disasters. Moreover, Wasem (: 
ii) observes that “Haitians are not afforded the same 
treatment as other asylum seekers”, and that Hai-
tians have been “singled out for more restrictive 
treatment” (Senate Subcommittee on Immigra-
tion , cit. in Wasem : )—even before the 
quake. Thus, the American clampdown on Haitian 
immigration after the quake is retrograde, but hard-
ly unusual given the social and political context.
... Migration to Latin American countries
In contrast to decreasing migration flows towards 
the USA, the Jesuit Refugees Service (JRS) and 
the Jesuit Migrants Service (JMS) have recorded 
increased numbers of migrants towards neigh-
bouring Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries after the  earthquake (Stapleton 
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). According to Edson Louidor, in charge of 
communications for JRS/JMS in Latin America, 
trafficking networks have emerged, promising 
Haitians passage to the French Guyana or the 
USA (for work or study) in exchange of money. 
However, these Haitians are mainly being aban-
doned in Brazil or in Ecuador. These activities 
have led to border crackdowns in French Guyana 
and Brazil in the year following the quake (Wilner, 
). In Brazil, Haitians fleeing the consequences 
of the earthquake are not entitled to refugee 
status. The status is given to people escaping 
circumstances such as political or ethnic persecu-
tion and religious discrimination, but not to those 
fleeing poverty and the consequences of natural 
disasters (Stapleton, ). In February , Brazil 
completely suspended the issuance of refugee 
status to Haitians.
The number of Haitians in Ecuador has also risen 
significantly after the earthquake according to the 
JRS Ecuador Director Fernando Ponce (Stapleton, 
). Based on statistics provided by immigration 
police services, , Haitians arrived in Ecuador 
in , a further , in  and as many as 
, during the first months of . In addition, 
the national tourism office in Chile reported that 
 Haitians entered the country in , almost 
twice as many as in  ();  more arrived in 
January  (Stapleton, ). Though the flows 
are small, these numbers show a clear increase in 
international migration to South America in the 
aftermath of the quake.
Concerning migration toward the Dominican 
Republic, Dominican migration director Sigfrido 
Pared Perez estimated that the earthquake led to 
a % increase in the Haitian migrant population 
(a.u. ). Like the USA, the Dominican Repub-
lic restarted the process of repatriating Haitians 
to their country at the beginning of , ending 
a moratorium put in place after the  earth-
quake. As of mid-March , nearly , illegal 
Haitian migrants had been brought back to Haiti 
(a.u. ). The Dominican Republic and Haiti 
have long been urged to work more closely to solve 
shared problems like environmental degradation 
and poverty. But the paramount issue has always 
been migration. The response of political leaders 
to this latest source of tension will be crucial for 
future relations between the countries.
.. Moving forward: improving 
the response to disaster-induced 
international migration
Migration is often an indicator of poverty, poor 
governance, and environmental misery in sending 
areas. It is also a response to these conditions. 
Indeed, Michael A. Clemens noted that “migration 
and remittances have been responsible for almost 
all of the poverty reduction that has happened 
in the island country over the past few decades”. 
Such continuous remittances of Haitians in the US 
are higher in the long term than official develop-
ment assistance. Thus, Clemens proposes to accord 
a special immigration status to “victims of environ-
mental degradation or disaster” and thus considers 
an entire new class of immigration (“golden door” 
visa), which would let more Haitians into the USA 
and could improve conditions in Haiti, as well. For 
David Abraham, on the other hand, “it would be a 
revolutionary idea to include “victims of environ-
mental catastrophes” in the asylum category, as 
all countries have so far refused economic condi-
tions as a ground for asylum status, even when 
those economic conditions have been caused by 
chaos, the disorder of failed states, etc. However, 
Clemens counters that there is precedent in US law 
for environmental causes to be considered among 
those seeking refugee status.
Despite the legal context, the fact remains that 
migration to the US is an expensive proposition: 
hence the fall in migration to the US in the imme-
diate aftermath of the quake. Still, if Haiti fails to 
reform its agricultural sector to promote food se-
curity and productivity, there will be people who 
try to leave Haiti in search of a better life else-
where. Yet in spite of the humanitarian imperative, 
the  earthquake has proven that powers in the 
region, such as the US and Brazil, are still hostile 
to open borders. In the international arena, it may 
be time to consider the establishment of “environ-
mental refugee” as a status in international law. 
CONCLUSION
Throughout Haitian history, internal and inter-
national migration, political and economic insta-
bility, and environmental and natural disasters 
have been bound up in one another. Before the 
earthquake, many Haitian farmers and peas-
ants had to leave their land as a consequence of 
environmental damages such as soil degrada-
tion, floods and droughts, which have not been 
addressed sustainably. The worsening humani-
tarian situation and the inability of the Haitian 
government to offer basic needs to their urban 
population after the devastating earthquake in 
January  has forced many to migrate back to 
the rural areas they once fled due to over-exploi-
tation of natural resources. Others have tried to 
leave or left the country, mainly destined for Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Migrations 
towards Ecuador, Brazil, Chile and the Dominican 
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Republic all increased in , implying a link to 
the earthquake and its aftermath. Meanwhile, 
migration—legal and illegal—to the US has fallen, 
due to strict immigration controls and the high 
cost of the journey. 
Although the  earthquake was a seismic—
rather than climatic—event, climate change will 
almost certainly pose more natural hazards to 
the country. Therefore, disaster risk reduction 
strategies and protection policies for displaced 
persons must be implemented. By studying the 
case, we can learn a great deal that may be use-
ful for future humanitarian practice. Haitians 
made use of multiple migration strategies in the 
aftermath of the quake. They were occasionally 
abetted by international actors, and sometimes 
thwarted by policies and legal loopholes that 
hurt their search for a better life. Vast policy 
change is needed, both domestically and inter-
nationally, both to improve the current humani-
tarian situation in Haiti, and to bolster resilience 
in the face of future disasters. ?
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
STUDY 07/2011 4 7IDDRI
Abraham, David (April 19, 2011). Interview with author. 
Professional Title: Professor, University of Miami School of 
Law.
Alscher, S. (2009). “Hispaniola Island (Dominican 
Republic and Haiti)”. Each For Case Study Report. Found 
under: http://www.each-for.eu/documents/CSR_
Hispaniola_090126.pdf
Alscher, S. (2008). “Latin American & Caribbean”. Each For 
Case Study Report.. Found under:http://www.each-for.
eu/documents/EACH-FOR_D.2.6.1_General_Overview_
Study_-_Latin_America_short.pdf
Aguilera, E. (Dec. 27th, 2010). “Rise in Haitian immigrants 




Armario, C. (Jan 21st, 2011). “US Deports First Haitians 
since Earthquake”. The Associate Press. Found under: 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/us-deports-first-
haitians-earthquake
AuthorUnknown (a.u.) (Aug. 4th, 2010). “In Dominican 
Republic, conflicting attitudes toward Haiti”. Global 
Post. Found under http://www.globalpost.com/
dispatch/americas/100723/haiti-dominican-republic-
immigrants?page=full
Author unknown (a.u.) (March 25th, 2011). “Legal Haitian 
immigrants deported from Dominican Republic”. The 




Author Unknown (a.u.). (Aug 7th, 2010). “US Coast Guard 
intercepted 323 illegal migrants from Haiti“. EU Times. 
Found under: http://www.eutimes.net/2010/08/us-coast-
guard-intercepted-323-illegal-migrants-from-haiti/
Author Unknown (a.u.). (2010). “Haiti IDP Migration in 
Relation to Flood Trends”. Operation Unified Response, 




CCCM, 2011a. Evictions Report: March 2011. Accessed 
at http://www.cccmhaiti.info/z_eviction_report_
march_2011.php on July 15, 2011.
CCCM, 2011b. IDP Return Survey: March 2011. Accessed 
at http://www.cccmhaiti.info/z_internally_displaced_
persons_return_survey.php on July 16, 2011.
CCCM, 2011c. Displacement Tracking Matrix v2.0 update: 
March 2011. Accessed at http://www.cccmhaiti.info/y_
dtm_data.php on July 15, 2011. 
Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. (2011). “Haiti”. The 
World Factbook. Found under: https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html
Clemens, Michael, April 13, 2011. Interview by author. 
Professional title: Professor of Political Science, 
Georgetown University; Researcher, Center for Global 
Development.
Dupuy, A. (Jan 9, 2011). Beyond the Earthquake: A Wake-




Eichler, L. (2006). “Community-based Envrionmental 
Management: A Tool For Natural Disaster Risk Reduction 




Eliscar, J. D.R. (2010). “Environmental and Natural 
Disasters in Haiti: The Impacts of Failed Policies From 
2004 to 2010”. Graduate Masters Theses. Paper 32. Found 
under:http://scholarworks.umb.edu/masters_theses/32
Fatton, R. (Jan 26th, 2010). “Hope amidst Devastation: 
Toward a New Haitian State”. The Carter G. Woodson 
Institure For African-American and African Studies. Found 
under: http://news.clas.virginia.edu/woodson/x16474.
xml
Haggerty, R.A. (ed). (1989). Dominican Republic: A 
Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of 
Congress. Found under:. http://countrystudies.us/
dominican-republic/
Masters, J. (d.u.). Hurricanes and Haiti: A Tragic History. 
Weather Underground. Found under: http://www.
wunderground.com/resources/education/haiti.asp
Monger, R. And J. Yankay. (2011). “U.S. Legal Permanent 
Residents: 2010”. Departement of Homeland Security 
[DHS]. Found under: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/publications/lpr_fr_2010.pdf
Morales, L. (Jan 25, 2010). Americans Lean Against Letting 
More Haitians Into U.S. GALLUP. Found under: http://
www.gallup.com/poll/125372/Americans-Lean-Against-
Letting-Haitians.aspx
Myers, N. (1993).Ultimate Security: The Environmental 
Basis of Political Stability, New York and London: W.W. 
Norton.
Napolitano, J. (Jan. 15th, 2010). “Statement from 
Secretary Janet Napolitano” [U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security],press release. Found under http://
www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1263595952516.shtm
Natural disaster. (n.d.). Dictionary.com’s 21st Century 
Lexicon. Retrieved April 5th, 2011, from Dictionary.com 
website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/natural 
disaster
Office for the Coordination of humanitarian affairs 
[OCHA]. (2008). Haiti. Flash Appeal Revision. United 
Nations: New York. Foun under: http://www.ht.undp.
org/_assets/fichier/publication/pubdoc36.pdf?PHPSESSI
D=5dda3ded4990abbb818b77263a01e39e
Pascal, Peggy, 2011. Interviewed by author. Professional 
title: Food Security Advisor, Solidarities International.
Sontag, D. (March 16th, 2010). “Rural Haiti Struggles 




STUDY 07/20114 8 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
Stapleton, J. (April 14th 2011). “Latin American: regional 
response needed to address the needs of Haitian migrants”. 
Jesuit Refugee Service. Found under https://www.jrs.net/
news_detail?TN=NEWS-20110414095420&L=EN
Terrazas, A. (Jan. 2010). “Haitian Immigrants in the 
United States”. Migration Policy Institute. Found under: 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.
cfm?id=770&feed=rss
The African-American Migration Experience [AAME]. 
(2011). From Haiti to the United States. Schomburg Center 
for Research in Black Culture. The New York Public Library. 
Found under: http://www.inmotionaame.org/migrations/
topic.cfm?migration=12&topic=3
USAID Office of the Inspector General, September 2010. 
“Audit of USAID’s Cash-for-Work Activities in Haiti”. 
Accessed at www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy10rpts/1-521-
10-009-p.pdf on July 17, 2011.
US Citizenship and Immigration Status [USCIS]. (2011). 
Temporary Protected Status & Deferred Enforced 




US Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. (Jan 15, 
2010). Statement from Homeland Security Secretary 
Janet Napolitano on Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for 
Haitian Nationals. Found under: http://www.dhs.gov/
ynews/releases/pr_1263595952516.shtm
Virdee, Jazz, June 2010. “Host Community Guidelines”. 
Prepared for Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Haiti 
Shelter Cluster) and Caritas Cordaid.
Wasem, R. E. (2011). “U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian 
Migrants”. Congressional Research Service. Found under 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21349.pdf
Wilner, J-L. (March 29th, 2011). “Le nombre de 
migrants haïtiens en Amérique latine augmente après 





Zissis, C. (Jan. 27th, 2010). “The Haitian Migration 
Debate”. Americas Society. Found under: http://www.as-
coa.org/article.php?id=2130
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
STUDY 07/2011 4 9IDDRI
INTRODUCTION
Following the dictatorship of Augusto Pino-
chet (-), Chile has experienced stable 
democracy and is now considered as one of the 
most developed countries in South America and 
one of the leaders of the continent, though its 
economic inequalities are among the highest in 
the sub-continent.
Chile is geographically unique, as it extends from 
the Atacama Desert in the North to Cape Horn in 
the South, with a varying landscape of deserts, 
lakes, mountains, and glaciers in between. It is 
also highly prone to natural disasters: the coun-
try lies on top of the tectonic Nazca Plate and the 
South American plates, and therefore frequently 
experiences earthquakes. Because of its long Pa-
cific coastline, these earthquakes can trigger tsu-
namis, as well.
Chile is therefore considered highly vulnerable 
to disasters related to climate change. The Unit-
ed Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) names Chile as a country of 
particular concern due to changes in prevailing 
global climate patterns (Government of Chile, 
b:), and the country has seven of the nine 
national characteristics that made up a “vulnera-
bility framework” in the article . of the UNFCCC.
1. CONTEXT AND VULNERABILITY: 
OVERVIEW OF CHILE AND 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DISASTER
.. The  Earthquake 
On Saturday, February , , at : am, an 
. magnitude earthquake hit central Chile. Its 
epicenter was situated  kilometers below the 
floor of the Pacific Ocean, . kilometers from the 
coastline,  kilometers from the city of Concep-
cion, and  kilometers Southwest of Santiago. 
It was the second largest quake ever recorded in 
Chile, and the fifth largest recorded in the world 
since  (Beittel & Margesson, :). After 
the earthquake, the US Geological Survey (USGS) 
registered at least  aftershocks, of which nine 
had a magnitude of . or greater (Beittel & 
Margesson, :). The earthquake lasted more 
than two minutes; some witnesses described the 
duration as an “endless moment” (BBC Mundo, 
). It was felt in Santiago and even in Western 
parts of Argentina.
Michelle Bachelet, the President of Chile during 
the event, quickly appealed for calm (BBC Mundo, 
). At : am, she put in place an emergen-
cy committee and announced that the national 
authorities were trying to evaluate the damage 
caused by the earthquake and the number of vic-
tims. She recognized that it was a “major earth-
quake” but reassured Chileans that all the national 
institutions were operational. Rescue teams start-
ed to search for people trapped in their houses and 
buildings (particularly in elevators), giving prior-
ity to the most dangerous and urgent situations.
 On Sunday, February , President Bachelet 
declared a state of constitutional exception for the 
two most affected regions (Bio Bio and Maule), for 
a period of  days in order to “guarantee the pub-
lic order and the delivery of the first basic needs” 
(El Pais, ). This procedure, authorized by the 
Chilean Constitution, empowered the Army and 
the policy, particularly to control looting. Mean-
while, national and international media began 
broadcasting the first images of the devastation 
. See Chilean Constitution (), amended en ; 
Article -: “The special powers vested in the Presi-
dent of the Republic are the following: (…)  .- declare 
states of exception in the cases and forms listed in this 
Constitution.”
4. THE EARTHQUAKE IN CHILE
Mylène André
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caused to houses, hospitals, and highways, as well 
as people gathering in the streets in the quake 
zone (Ruiz, ).
As the earthquake cut communications in parts 
of the country, parts of Chile were isolated from vi-
tal information flows; in some places, it took days 
to reestablish the communications infrastructure. 
The radio and the internet (including social me-
dia networks, such as Facebook and Twitter) were 
critical in making announcements, searching for 
missing persons, and relaying information to and 
from the affected area (La Nacion, ).
Unfortunately, such resources did not prevent 
tragedy in the immediate aftermath of the quake. 
The (US) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration recorded a tsunami moments after 
the quake. However, the Chilean oceanography 
service, SHOA, initially declared (on Twitter) that 
no tsunami was imminent (Rivas, ). By the 
time they noted the NOAA warnings and changed 
course, critical response time had been lost. For-
tunately, in some localities, port captains issued 
emergency warnings, and people were able to move 
out of the tsunami’s path. However, owing to the 
contradictory information from the national au-
thorities, many people were needlessly trapped by 
the tsunami and its eight-meter high waves. Earth-
quake and tsunami damage, aftershocks, shortages 
in basic needs, “and poor emergency management 
provoked panic and chaos in some areas in the days 
following the disaster. Desperate people turned to 
looting for food, though bigger items (including 
TVs) were also reported looted in some cases (El 
Comercio Perú, ). Because of memories of the 
dictatorial period, and because its term in power 
was days from ending, the Bachelet government 
was hesitant to send in the Army to restore securi-
ty. As a result, citizens organized their own protec-
tion, until the government finally instituted a cur-
few to curb looting. Police and Army forces were 
deployed against looters, sometimes resorting to 
tear gas and water canon (Long, ). 
After the disaster, the government declared six 
regions of catastrophe: Maule, Bio-Bio, Arauca-
nia, O’Higgins, Valparaiso and the Metropolitan 
Regions. The Maule and Bio-Bo regions were the 
most affected; Concepción (capital of the Bio Bio 
region) and Talcahuano were the most affected 
cities (ECLAC, ). 
The large number of missing persons created 
some confusion in counting the dead. On March , 
. The change of government took place on the th of 
March. The center-left alliance government of Michelle 
Bachelet was replaced by the center-right alliance 
government of Sebastián Piñera, after  years of center-
left alliance since the fall of the Pinochet’s dictature. 
the death toll stood at  (Fox News, ), but 
government critics claimed that this figure was 
riddled with inaccuracies (El mostrador, ). 
As bodies were identified and communications 
improved, the death toll was lowered in many re-
gions. A Chilean government report from March  
counted  deaths (El mostrador, ); the US 
Government issued an estimate of  deaths on 
March  (Beittel & Margesson, ). All together, 
approximately  million people were affected by 
the earthquake, the resulting tsunami, or both.
.. Socio-economic and 
natural characteristics 
of the affected areas 
The most affected areas were the Maule Region and 
the Bio Bio Region, in Central Chile (ECALC, ). 
Like much of the country, these regions lie at a 
significant distance from Santiago, and are isolated 
from the capital by large areas of wilderness.
The regional capital of Maule Region (VII Re-
gion) is Talca. According to the last census in , 
Maule was home to , people; the region is 
approximately the size of Belgium. The population 
density of the region is quite low ( per square 
kilometer), and it is the least urbanized region in 
the country (with % of the population in rural 
areas). Its major economic activities include agri-
culture and livestock, including the production of 
rice, beets, wines, and forestry products. The en-
ergy sector is also quite important, as Maule is a 
major source of hydroelectric production.
The Bio Bio Region (VIII Region) is to the South 
of the Maule Region. The region has nearly  mil-
lion people in just more than , square kilo-
meters; the regional capital is Concepción. This 
region is more rainy and colder than the Maule Re-
gion. Consequently, fishing and forestry are more 
developed than agriculture, manufacturing and 
services. Its capital, Concepción, is the economic 
center of the region, with  million inhabitants and 
a variety of commercial, touristic and educational 
services. 
Both regions score poorly on national CASEN 
studies, which measure poverty based on the 
number of people unable to afford basic needs 
(Ministry of Planification, ). While the na-
tional poverty rate is .%, Bio Bio has a rate of 
% (second worst in the country) and Maule a 
rate of .% (third). 
. Website of the Maule Administrative Division: http://
www.intendenciamaule.gov.cl/geografia.html 
. See Bio Bio Administrative Division website http://
www.intendenciabiobio.gov.cl/ 
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2. THE DISASTER AND ITS AFTERMATH
.. Preparations
Because of its timing (just two months after the 
devastating Haiti earthquake), its magnitude 
(much larger than Haiti), and its consequences 
(much less catastrophic than Haiti), the Chilean 
earthquake of  provoked significant debate 
about the nature of Chile’s preparations for 
natural disasters. Many of these debates focused 
on Chile’s governance structures, especially on its 
prevention-oriented building codes, which were 
credited with a key role in minimizing the damage 
(and thereby, the displacement) caused by the 
event (Reuben, ).
Due to its long history of earthquakes, Chile has 
developed a special building code called “strong 
columns weak beams”. Such codes are considered 
essential in a country that registered the world’s 
most violent recorded earthquake (a .-magni-
tude event in  that killed , people and left 
 million homeless), and that is likely to experience 
a quake of magnitude . or higher every five years 
(Lafsky, ). Chilean authorities have also de-
veloped extensive seismic studies and technology, 
and population-level awareness about earthquake 
safety is quite high. These policies (particularly in 
the area of building codes) are strictly enforced 
(Padgett, ). Enforcement in turn is aided by 
very low levels of corruption; Chile ranks th in 
the world in Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Index (Padgett, ).
.. Displacements
Partly as a result of these preventative steps, the 
number of displaced people was significantly 
lower than it might have been had a large number 
of structures collapsed. Still, a large number 
of people were on the move in the aftermath 
of the disaster. For one thing, approximately 
, people sought safer ground in the days 
immediately following the disaster. Many of these 
people departed from the cities of Concepción and 
Talcahuano, and the villages of Dichato, Pullay and 
Tregualemu, seeking refuge in improvised camps 
in nearby hills. Fearing further aftershocks and 
tsunamis, they made do for days with basic tents 
and blankets (Wurgaft, ). The Army tried to 
convince these “People of the Hills” to come back 
to the city in order to receive more significant aid, 
yet some remained in the hills as many as ten more 
days (Terra, ).
The disaster caused the displacement of many 
people whose houses were genuinely damaged. 
It is difficult to state a number of such displaced 
persons with certainty. Immediately following the 
disaster, it was announced that . to  million peo-
ple suffered from the effects of the quake and were 
“potentially displaced people” in need of shelter 
and basic needs (Barrionuevo & Robbins, ), 
but no number of actually displaced people was 
announced. Therefore, it is possible that the “po-
tentially displaced” figure includes both “People of 
the Hills” (who fled for safety reasons) and those 
whose homes were damaged but did not migrate 
at all (Barrionuevo & Robbins, ).
A more precise displacement figure can be de-
termined based on the number of people relocat-
ed to temporary camps (first in tents and then in 
wooden houses) after the disaster. A newsletter 
from the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), issued in late March, reported that around 
, houses had been destroyed by the earth-
quake and , to , persons needed ur-
gent shelter relief (IOM, c). These were the 
people who had truly lost everything, and thus 
were priorities for national and international aid 
efforts in the aftermath of the disaster (as well as 
in the reconstruction phase of the recovery effort).
The Chilean Government, IOM, local authori-
ties and local NGOs worked together to help the 
victims and provide housing. The construction of 
shelters for people left homeless (including , 
emergency shelts in Maule and Bio Bio) probably 
avoided larger flows of displaced people out of 
the affected region. (IOM, a). The IOM also 
helped migrants living in the Santiago metropoli-
tan area, including , persons severely affected 
by the disaster and needing shelter or other basic 
needs (IOM, b).Others needed assistance, but 
were afraid to leave what was left of their homes 
and thus refused to relocate for assistance.
.. Response of governmental 
and non-governmental 
actors to those affected
... Rights 
The earthquake created two basic categories of 
displaced: those who fled in fear in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster, and those who were 
forced into long-term displacement by the destruc-
tion of their homes. People in each group had a 
very different profile of needs, and were granted 
very different legal rights. For example, those 
who fled in fear needed basic needs in the days 
following the disaster, but were eventually able to 
return home; those in the other category required 
resettlement and related long-term social support.
Regardless of typology, all the internally dis-
placed people (IDPs) in Chile lived in a vague legal 
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context following the quake. Chilean law regulates 
migration on the basis of classical paradigms of 
migration. For example, Law  of  serves 
as the basis of migration law in Chile. Importantly, 
it only considers international migrants arriving in 
the country, and refugee or asylum status is only 
extended to those who flee their home countries 
for political reasons (as set forth in international 
refugee conventions). 
Environmental migrants—and especially envi-
ronmental IDPs—are not accounted for in Chil-
ean law. They are not tourists, migrant workers, 
refugees, or asylum seakers, and moreover, in the 
case of the quake, migrants were native Chileans, 
rather than foreigners. In , the Chilean Parlia-
ment approved Law ,, which further clarifies 
refugee protection law. However, the updated law 
still lacks a classification for victims of natural di-
sasters and IDPs (UNHCR, ).
Internationally, protections for IDPs (such as the 
environmental migrants in the wake of the Chilean 
quake) are enshrined only in guidelines, such as 
the “Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement” 
from the UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs. In addition, the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) Operational Guideline on the 
Protection of Persons in situation of Natural Disas-
ter was created by the IASC to advise countries on 
how to react in case of natural disaster and how 
to insure full protection of affected population 
(IASC, ).These guidelines put primacy on the 
protection of life; Chile did well in this regard as 
the death toll was limited, given the magnitude of 
the quake (though the government’s management 
of the tsunami warnings did come in for criticism). 
Secondarily, the guidelines emphasize the pro-
tection of displaced rights in the aftermath of di-
saster, and the assurance of displaced quality of 
life in the long-term rebuilding phase of recovery. 
Thus, the guidelines cover not only the humani-
tarian response, but also the long-range policy 
response from the national government. Such gov-
ernments are responsible for the protection of the 
rights to housing, land and property, livelihoods, 
and education (including secondary and higher 
education), as well as facilitating legal documen-
tation, freedom of movement and the re-estab-
lishment of family ties, freedom of expression and 
opinions, and the right to participate in democrat-
ic elections.
. Decreto Ley Nº ., DE  Establece normas sobre 
extranjeros en Chile. Publicado en el D.O. Nº . de 
 de Julio de . And especially “Parrafo , de los asila-
dos políticos o refugiados”, http://www.extranjeria.gov.
cl/filesapp/manual_aspectos_normativos.pdf 
... Services provided
The national government reacted quickly in the 
days following the quake, with the exception of the 
tsunami early warning debacle. An emergency 
committee was created, and a national rescue team 
composed of firefighters, emergency workers, and 
the Army, was deployed for search-and-rescue, as 
well as the identification of the bodies of victims. 
Within  hours, a State of Emergency had been 
declared (Moloney, ).
After the declaration of a State of Emergency, 
national authorities and local NGOs distributed 
basic goods (drinking water, three rations of food 
daily, blankets, sanitation equipment) quite effi-
ciently to those in the affected area. For example, 
by March , the government had mobilized  mil-
lion food rations, and was distributing , ra-
tions daily to the regions of O’Higgins, Maule, and 
Bio Bio (OCHA, :); areas outside of the im-
mediate quake zone (including the city of Valpara-
iso) were also receiving food assistance (ibid.).
Still, the immense scale of the disaster created 
tensions in the food delivery system. Though the 
emergency response prioritized those most in need, 
 million people were affected by the disaster, and 
the government came in for criticism among those 
who were not prioritized by the distribution system 
(Wade & Cambero, ). In particular, critics con-
trasted the outpouring of rapid support from Chil-
ean civilians with the slow reaction from national 
authorities (ibid). In the case of the city of Dichato, 
cargo ships could not come ashore and stopped 
short  kilometers from the village, which slowed 
down the delivery of food and water.
Meanwhile, in larger cities in the quake zone 
(such as Concepción), Army troops were sent in 
to provide security. The lack of food, water, and 
gasoline provoked looting, which resulted in the 
imposition of a month-long curfew. Still, victims of 
the looting argued that the looting was prevent-
able, and that the delay in the arrival of govern-
ment troops had led to a security vacuum (CBS 
News, ).
With the quake occurring at the beginning of the 
rainy season, shelter was a major concern during 
the emergency response phase. Forty-five camps 
opened in the quake zone, furnishing tents to 
those who had lost their homes. However, the vast 
majority (more than %, by some estimates) of 
those who lost their homes went to live with fam-
ily and relatives. Such strategies reduced pressure 
on the camps, but made it difficult to estimate and 
plan for housing needs among the affected popula-
tion (OCHA, :).
. President Bachelet later admitted the failure of the 
monitoring system. See Moloney, . 
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.. International response: 
mobilizing funds
Despite Chile’s relatively high level of develop-
ment, international assistance was still needed 
to respond to the earthquake. President Bachelet 
postponed it for two days, but finally called for 
international help on March . Her first request 
was for human resources (search-and-rescue 
teams and emergency aid workers), as well as 
water, food, and satellite cell phones (Franklin & 
Smith, ).
On March , United Nations Secretary-Gener-
al Ban Ki-Moon toured the country and declared 
that the UN would play a role in the reconstruc-
tion effort. He also devoted $ million from the 
Central Emergency Response Fund to support the 
response (UN News Center, ). Meanwhile, the 
International Federation of the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent launched a $ million fund raising cam-
paign for emergency needs (IFRC, ), and an 
international telethon raised a further $ million 
to support quake relief (Huffington Post, ).
As part of its mission to help children in emer-
gency settings, UNICEF also contributed to the ef-
fort (UNICEF, ). The organization re-opened 
schools in the affected area, distributed school 
supplies, and provided psychological support for 
child victims, especially in Maule and Bio Bio. 
Such efforts were particularly necessary as the 
quake coincided with the end of summer vacation 
(originally slated for March , but rescheduled af-
ter the quake to April ).
On March , the World Food Program sent  tons 
of food (including high-energy biscuits and “meals 
ready to eat”, or MREs) to the quake zone. Their sup-
plies fed , people for five days; a further  tons 
of food had arrived within a week (WFP, ).
A number of foreign governments also con-
tributed to relief efforts in different ways. For 
example, the United Kingdom provided tenting 
for , people (DFIP, ), while the United 
States provided technical advisors for humani-
tarian needs assessments (USAID, ). Japan 
sent medical teams, power generators, and water 
purification equipment (Government of Japan, 
), while a number of other nations (including 
India, Indonesia, Norway, and Vietnam) sent cash 
assistance.
Despite the diverse forms of assistance from 
many international actors, it is important to keep in 
mind that the overall cost of recovery and rebuild-
ing far exceeded the aid provided for emergency 
. See for instance Government of India, ; Jakarta Post, 
; Government of Norway, ; Government of Viet 
Nam, . 
relief. The American risk assessment firm Eqecat 
estimated that the disaster would cost $- bil-
lion (-% of Chilean GDP) (Long, ); oth-
er firms similarly projected total costs of around 
$ billion (US) (Associated Press - News , ). 
Many of these costs were related to critical infra-
structure. For example, the Chilean Ministry of 
Health estimated that the cost to rebuild hospitals 
and health facilities in the quake zone would be 
approximately $. billion (Government of Chile, 
a).
.. Situation today 
The Chilean government projects that reconstruc-
tion in the quake zone will last until  (Govern-
ment of Chile, ). When this article went to 
press, the government was reporting that % of 
income subsidies and % of housing payments 
had been made for  (ibid.). Meanwhile, it 
reported that % of educational facilities had 
been repaired and that the majority of public infra-
structure (roads, water systems, bridges, airports) 
was again functional (ibid.). 
Despite these rosy figures, many victims of the 
disaster have expressed frustration to national 
and international media. For example, reports 
have highlighted housing reconstruction has 
not been sufficiently rapid to prevent more than 
, families from going homeless in the wake 
of the quake (Associated Press – News , ). 
Meanwhile, Claudio Arriagada, president of the 
Chilean Association of Cities, claims that, despite 
the large number of payments that the govern-
ment claimed to have made, “only one percent” of 
recipients had been able to use the money to find 
new housing (ibid.). Some of the discrepancy may 
be due to the slow pace of physical reconstruction. 
Arriagada claims that only , homes had actu-
ally been built, one year after the quake, while 
more than , subsidies had been granted 
(Cooperativa, ).
Indeed, even on the first anniversary of the 
quake in February , many victims in the most 
affected areas were still living in huts (Nelsen, 
). Many had first been housed in leaky, rat-
infested tents in the four months following the di-
saster, at which point they were moved to wooden 
huts. Several residents spoke to the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, stating that they were still in search 
of permanent homes and that they had suffered 
from water and sanitation shortages and ill-de-
fined plans for reconstruction (ibid.). In part 
. Another camp, near Tacahuano, was also accused by the 
National Health Services of being out of compliance with 
regard to basic sanitation. See Tauran, .
STUDY 07/20115 4 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
due to these breakdowns, the anniversary visit of 
(newly-elected) President Sebastian Piñera to the 
quake zone in March  elicited protests from 
thousands of families upset with the management 
of the reconstruction process.
On July , , a wave of violent protests 
broke out in the Bio Bio Region. They denounced 
the Chilean government for the slow process of 
housing reconstruction, and were met with water 
cannon and tear gas from the police (Chilevision, 
). As the news spread via social networking 
sites, supporting protests broke out around the 
country, even at government facilities in the capi-
tal, Santiago (Terra, ). The protestors’ claims 
were supported by Clemira Pacheco, a member of 
the House of Deputies. She noted that,  months 
after the disaster, many families were still being 
deprived of basic living conditions, and that there 
had been a lack of citizen participation in recon-
struction planning (El Concecuente, ).
In response to the protests, the government met 
with community leaders to find solutions to the 
housing reconstruction crisis. A number of new 
measures were proposed by government represen-
tatives, including an increase in subsidy payments 
to affected people (Guerrero & Paz Nuñez, ). 
At the time that this article went to press, no final 
solution had been found, and the issue remains 
highly sensitive in the quake zone.
CONCLUSION
Among the many disasters worldwide in , the 
case of Chile stands out both for the enormous 
magnitude of the earthquake, and for the relatively 
low number of resulting deaths. The low death 
toll can be attributed to the array of prevention 
measures put in place by the Chilean government 
before the quake struck, and to the rapid deploy-
ment of humanitarian response in the quake zone. 
International financial assistance also helped avert 
a humanitarian disaster.
Nonetheless, the quake highlighted a few sig-
nificant problems with Chile’s disaster response 
system. Specifically, the failure of the tsunami 
early warning system and the extremely slow pace 
of reconstruction of housing in the quake zone 
have earned warranted criticism. The govern-
ment should also consider the degree to which it 
is prudent to have people settling in quake- and 
tsunami-prone “danger zones” along the coast. 
Lastly, the government should consider that flaws 
in its legal code led to a situation where environ-
mental migrants out of the quake zone lived in le-
gally ambiguous situations, as Chilean law makes 
no provision for internally displaced persons. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the findings of this case study, I would 
recommend the following:
. The Chilean Parliament should take up legisla-
tion to codify international guidelines on IDPs and 
IDP protection into Chilean law.
. The Chilean government should strengthen 
its emergency warning systems especially for tsu-
namis, and ensure strong lines of communication 
between national agencies and local agencies, as 
well as among national agencies themselves.
. Having codified IDP rights in Chilean law, 
the Chilean government should move to improve 
mechanisms for reconstruction in the wake of nat-
ural disasters. These plans would help ensure that 
aid to IDPs extends beyond the emergency phase, 
to the recovery and rebuilding. In particular, spe-
cial attention should be paid to local governments, 
who were responsible for camp management in 
the aftermath of the quake, and to the Home Min-
istry, which had administrative responsibility for 
the reconstruction effort. Such agencies should 
also be subject to higher levels of transparency. 
. The Chilean government should also begin a 
dialogue in quake- and tsunami-prone coastal ar-
eas about plans for future development and plan-
ning in the region. Any planning in this regard 
should have full public participation, including the 
voices of local representatives and associations. 
. The Chilean government should also consid-
er the potential impact of climate change on the 
country, and plan risk management accordingly. 
Though the earthquake was a seismic, rather than 
a climatic, event, Chile is vulnerable to natural 
disasters caused by global warming. Both public 
actors (ministries and local governments) and pri-
vate actors must have a role in climate planning, 
to ensure maximum efficiency and transparency. 
Climate risk reduction efforts should take place 
alongside, rather than in place of, the country’s 
traditional risk reduction measures related to seis-
mic activity. ?
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INTRODUCTION 
The Xynthia storm originated in Portugal on 
February , . It crossed much of Western 
Europe before dissipating on March  in Scandi-
navia. On the night of Feburary -, it struck the 
west coast of France, where it caused significant 
human and economic damage. At least  people 
were killed in France,  of them in a single town, 
La Faute-sur-Mer, located in the Vendée Region. 
 people were injured, and about , 
were affected. Damage costs were estimated at 
. billion euros (Anziani, ). 
This case study highlights the ongoing struggle 
against natural disasters, even in wealthy coun-
tries such as France. After explaining the reasons 
that led to this catastrophe, this article deals with 
the reaction of the government and the strong pro-
tests it triggered among the population touched 
by the storm. In order to avoid such a catastrophe 
happening again, and to anticipate likely seaward 
threats posed by climate change, the government 
tried to displace people living in the most danger-
ous areas and launched plans to establish stricter 
planning and development rules geared at pre-
venting disasters and protecting populations. This 
case study evaluates the positions and the argu-
ments of both government actors, and those in the 
affected region. It also sheds light on the ongoing 
debates about adaptation to climate change.
1. WHEN NATURAL AND 
HUMAN FACTORS MEET
Described as the most violent storm to hit France 
in over a decade, Xynthia was potent because of 
a combination of storm surge and high winds. 
Dikes were broached in some places, causing 
severe flooding. The departments most severely 
hit were Vendee ( dead) and Charente-Maritime 
( dead). In Vendée, two towns were particularly 
hit, L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer and La Faute-sur-Mer. 
.. The pressure for development 
along the coastline
Though Xynthia was a natural event of an excep-
tional strength, its human impacts were due to 
social factors. In recent past, the region has under-
gone significant development, as former marshes 
were drained, protected with dikes, and used 
for agriculture (Ecalle, :). In recent years, 
the land has again been converted, this time for 
mass tourism. Indeed, Vendée has become a very 
attractive destination, thanks to its beautiful land-
scapes and beaches. For example, the small town 
of La Faute-sur-Mer has only , permanent 
inhabitants, but welcomes about , tourists 
in the summer. L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer, located next to 
La Faute-sur-Mer, welcomes , to , tour-
ists in the summer, while its winter population 
is only , (Ecalle, :). In , % of 
the houses in L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer and % of the 
houses in la Faute-sur-Mer were holiday homes.
Tourism, and the significant wealth it attracts, 
has created strong pressure to develop land, in 
spite of potential natural hazards. In the case of 
Xynthia, all of the fatalities in La Faute-sur-Mer 
were in houses built in the last  years:  of them 
lived in houses built between  and , four 
in houses built between  and , and  in 
. See Cities data at http://www.lafautesurmer.net/carte-
didentitee/ and http://www.cartesfrance.fr/carte-
france-ville/_L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer.html. 
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houses built between  and  (Vinet, Defos-
sez & Leclere, ). Much of the damage occurred 
in areas supposedly “protected” by the dikes. 
However, these structures were built for agricul-
ture, not homes: among the , km of dikes in 
France, it is estimated that , km were meant 
for agricultural land but are currently being used 
to protect residential areas (Presse Ocean, a). 
For example, in La Faute-sur-Mer, the Côte de 
Lumiere camping area was located in a hazardous 
low-elevation zone, and was completely destroyed 
during the storm. Only the fact that the camp was 
closed for the winter prevented mass fatalities. 
.. A predictable (and 
predicted) catastrophe
The story of the Côte de Lumiere Campsite illus-
trates perfectly how development in the Vendee 
region took place in a highly unplanned manner. 
The site was considered to be dangerous, and 
the camping facilities were built illegally. The 
government attempted to close it but was opposed 
by the mayor of La Faute-sur-Mer, René Marra-
tier. In , he organized a protest gathering of 
, people. Their main argument was that the 
campsite was essential for the town’s economy. 
Because local authorities had a vested interest in 
developing tourist infrastructure, they were reluc-
tant to impede development. Thus, the govern-
ment failed in its preventive efforts.
In La Faute-sur-Mer, a disaster prevention plan 
had been in development for nearly ten years, and 
still had not been formally adopted at the time of 
the storm. In , the French government had 
asked La Faute-sur-Mer, and a few other coastal 
towns, to adopt disaster prevention plans. The 
mayor did not respond, and in , a prefect at-
tempted to force adoption of his own plan. Though 
it was not very strict, the prefect’s plan still trig-
gered strong opposition. In November , 
three months before Xynthia, the town council 
of La Faute-sur-Mer again postponed adoption of 
the disaster prevention plan, arguing that there 
had been « no constructive dialogue » with the 
state (Ecalle, :). Similar scenes played out 
in other coastal towns, where disaster prevention 
was viewed as a drag on economic development.
After Xynthia, it was now clear that such a lax 
attitude was a mistake. Indeed, the risks were 
known: in La Faute-sur-Mer, studies pointing to 
the risk of flooding were made public in  (Info 
ExpoProtection, ), and a report from the lo-
cal public works administration was made public 
in . This report states, « The conjunction of 
two phenomena, a rise in the water level of the 
Lay Estuary [separating L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer and 
La Faute-sur-Mer] and a rise in sea level, could 
have a very strong impact on densely developed 
areas behind an aging set of dikes » (Raison, 
:).
Who is responsible for these errors? The French 
Senate asserted that responsibilities were shared, 
since both local and national authorities could 
refuse to issue construction permits (Anziani, 
:). Soon after the storm, an association 
was created to defend the victims of the storm in 
La Faute-sur-Mer and the surroundings, the Avif 
(in French: Association pour la défense des vic-
times de La Faute-sur-Mer et des environs) The as-
sociation filed a sealed complain against persons 
unknown to the public at the time of this article’s 
publication. Three local authorities from La Faute-
sur-Mer (including the mayor, René Marratier) 
and a state civil servant have so far been put un-
der investigation for “involuntary homicide”, and 
“endangerment”. Legally, the main objective of 
the investigation is to determine who was respon-
sible for the issuance of construction permits for 
two housing developments in La Faute-sur-Mer, 
“Les Doris” and “Les Voiliers.”
After Xynthia, the consensus was that hous-
ing regulations and prevention measures needed 
beefing up. However, the investigations were only 
the first part of the saga between the government 
and the victims of the storm. Days after the storm 
had passed, the government announced that some 
houses wouldn’t be rebuilt, and that the people 
living in the most dangerous areas would be dis-
placed to homes on safer ground, with compensa-
tion. But when the prefect of Vendée, Jean-Jacques 
Brot, announced the terms of compensation, he 
elicited a massive protest among locals unhappy 
with the terms offered.
2. THE STATE, THE DISPLACED, 
AND THE CONTROVERSY 
OVER “BLACK AREAS” 
.. A quick and 
generous reaction?
The strategy of the French government after 
Xynthia was to act fast. The first reaction, a few 
days after the catastrophe, was to issue a state 
of emergency for the four most-affected depart-
ments (Charente-Maritime, Deux-Sèvres, Vendée, 
Viennes), allowing the victims to be compensated 
. In French : “homicide involontaire” and “mise en danger 
de la vie d’autrui”
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for storm damage. On March , President 
Nicolas Sarkozy announced in a speech that « no 
one would be permitted to return to live in areas 
where there is a risk of death.” (Sarkozy, ). On 
March , the prefects of Vendée and Charente-
Maritime were asked to demarcate “areas of 
extreme danger”; their findings were made public 
April . These areas, now called “black areas”, 
included , houses. On April , Prime Minister 
François Fillon argued that priority should be 
given to those who desired to relocate away from 
dangerous areas. He claimed that, “if we had gone 
by normal procedures, residents would have spent 
many months in temporary housing, not knowing 
where they would live or how to go about repairing 
their houses.” (Fillon, ). 
Having one’s house within a demarcated “black 
area” carried a double significance, one good and 
one bad. On the good side, owners who consented 
to sell their houses to the state were offered high-
ly advantageous conditions: “an unprecedented 
measure for our country”, Fillon called it (Fillon, 
). Though compensation was based on market 
value before the storm, the payments were regulat-
ed by the Major Natural Disaster Prevention Fund, 
also known as the Barnier Fund. Created in , 
the fund had a cap on payments at , euros 
per house, but this cap was raised suddenly in May 
 to , euros per house—a major windfall 
for owners who sold voluntarily (Roux-Goeken, 
). Such voluntary sales were well-received, 
and are likely to be re-enacted by the French gov-
ernment after future emergencies. On the other 
hand, for those who did not sell voluntarily, the 
“black area” meant a forced expropriation of one’s 
property by the state (Presse Ocean, b). Un-
surprisingly, it was such cases that engendered a 
protest movement from dissatisfied owners who 
refused to leave voluntarily.
.. Hasty demarcation of 
the “black areas” and poor 
communication lead to protest
“The state announced the black areas as areas of 
massive destruction”, explains Renaud Pinoit the 
vice-president of the Avif (the association of victims 
of La Faute-sur-Mer). The lawyer Hervé Cassara, 
from the Huglo-Lepage firm (which represents 
Avif), described the forced expropriation of land 
as “a second crushing blow to the heads” of the 
. Without this text, insurance companies only cover wind 
and rain damages, not flood damages, much more 
important.
. Interview with Renaud Pinoit, vice-president of the Avif, 
conducted on August nd .
disaster-stricken homeowners along the coast. 
Demonstrations emerged, with protesters carrying 
signs saying “spared by Xynthia, hit by the state” 
and “leave us our houses, we have other solu-
tions”. Boyardville, a town in Charente-Maritime, 
even “seceded” from the state, creating the “Free 
State of Boyard” by a vote of -. Vote organ-
izers declared that “the state doesn’t respect our 
liberty to live in a place where there is no danger.”
The protest movement was triggered by three 
factors. First, the decision-making by prefects was 
so rapid that data assessment was incomplete and 
field work was precluded, so some decisions were 
taken on the basis of estimates rather than hard 
data. Second, the government and the prefects 
used a brusque and sometimes incoherent commu-
nication strategy. Third, the unusual procedures of 
assigning “black areas” elicited public confusion.
 The demarcation of black areas was executed 
with tremendous speed. Three days after they re-
ceived orders from the government, the prefects 
had proposed initial maps to the Ministries of Ecolo-
gy, Energy, Sustainable Development, and Maritime 
Affairs. Though these ministries offered comments 
and feedback, % of the initial maps remained un-
changed (Anziani, :). When these maps were 
made public, disaster victims reacted with surprise 
and discontent. “In the initial black areas, there 
were some houses that had not suffered any dam-
age, there were even houses two of three meters 
above sea level,” explains Renaud Pinoit. 
On April , Corine Lepage, a lawyer for Avif, 
sent a request to the administrative court of 
Nantes, asking for the documents and assessments 
on the basis of which the black areas were de-
marcated. The request was accepted by the court, 
which ordered the prefect of Vendée to release 
these documents on April . On May , the pre-
fect responded by releasing eight pages of docu-
ments—far less than had been requested by Avif. 
Despite their limited scope, the court accepted the 
documents as sufficient on May . Cassara, Avif’s 
lawyer, argues that this release of documents 
proves that, contrary to the government’s claims, 
“there were no [comprehensive] assessments” pri-
or to the drawing of “black areas.” In this part of 
the controversy, Vendee was a special case, as the 
. Interview with Hervé Cassara, lawyer of the cabinet 
Huglo-Lepage defending the Avif, conducted on July th 
.
. Interview with Renaud Pinoit, vice-president of the Avif, 
conducted on August nd .
. Tribunal Administratif de Nantes, ordonnance du  
avril  relative au référé n°.
. Interview with Hervé Cassara conducted on July th 
.
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French Senate reported that experts contributed 
more than , work hours to complete assess-
ments in Charente-Maritime before “black areas” 
were designated (Anziani, :).
The Xynthia case also highlights the problems 
of a poor communications strategy. Initially, the 
prefect of Vendée, Jean-Jacques Brot, emphasized 
the danger of living in these areas and the neces-
sity of displacing residents. It was not until April  
that the government tried to adjust its message. It 
changed the terminology, from “black area” to “sol-
idarity area”, and stressed the generous terms of 
compensation offered. Though it initially claimed 
that no modifications would be made to “black 
areas”, it later relented:  houses were removed 
from the “black area” designation on September  
(though  previously unlisted houses were also 
given the designation.) “There is no doubt whatso-
ever that the confusion in public communications 
was an aggravating factor in the vigorous reaction 
from the affected population,” the French Senate 
noted in its report (Anziani, :).
Lastly, the legally vague status of the “black ar-
eas” further aroused public discontent. Cassara 
notes that the black areas are “a legal UFO…with 
no legal basis, it is neither in the urban planning 
code, nor environmental codes, nor property ex-
propriation codes.” It was created to move faster, 
to show that something was being done”. He and 
his colleagues with Avif argue that normal legal 
procedures for expropriation should have been 
followed. Indeed, when Avif went to course in 
January , the court ruled that judgment was 
impossible since the black areas “had no legal 
base”—leaving the homeowners in the midst of a 
“catch-” situation. 
.. Extent of the discontent
For some people, the opportunity to sell their 
house to the state was met with relief. In La Faute-
sur-Mer, “in [the most dangerous] half of the black 
area, everybody was happy to sell their house”, 
says Renaud Pinoit. Pinoit further argues that 
those who lived through the storm wanted to leave 
as soon as possible, while those who lived perma-
nently elsewhere “could not imagine being in any 
danger, even with two meters of water flooding 
their houses.”
In the end, many people sold voluntarily. By Feb-
ruary , , , of , homeowners in “black 
areas” had agreed to sell, and  of them had al-
ready been sold (at a cost of more than  million 
. Interview with Renaud Pinoit conducted on August, nd 

. Ibid. 
Euros) (Ministry of Ecology, a). Conversely, 
only  houses ( in Vendee and  in Charente-
Maritime) had been expropriated. 
3. THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT 
ALONG THE COAST LINE
The damage caused by Xynthia led the French 
Senate to observe that “the risk of sea level rise 
and coastal flooding has, up to now, largely been 
ignored in laws and regulations, as well as in popu-
lation protection measures enacted at the local 
level” (Anziani, :). In February , the 
government enacted a “Plan Against Rapid Coastal 
Flooding” (Ministry of Ecology, a). This plan 
is meant to set forth a five-year “roadmap” for 
national and local planning on the issue. This new 
effort, along with the review of existing flooding 
risk reduction plans in La Faute-sur-Mer and 
L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer, has triggered a new debate: 
should the emphasis be put on the control of devel-
opment in areas exposed to natural risks, or should 
these areas be better protected by dikes?
.. The Plan against Rapid 
Coastal Flooding: a priority given 
to the control of development
Even if Xynthia showed how dangerous some 
areas can be, “Xynthia has not tarnished the 
dream of a house next to the sea” (Kerjouan, ). 
Insee, the French national statistics institute, 
projects that the population of Vendée could add 
, people within  years, bringing the total 
population close to one million (Insee, ). The 
Plan proposes axes for action to reduce vulner-
ability in the face of such demographic pressure. 
Two axes are geared at improving knowledge, 
monitoring, and alert systems, as well as public 
awareness of natural hazards. The other two are 
meant to control development and improve phys-
ical protection infrastructure.
Xynthia exposed the fact that tools meant to con-
trol development in dangerous areas have not been 
fully used. Natural Disaster Prevention Plans (of 
which Flooding Risk Prevention Plans are a part) 
are designed by national government authori-
ties, in concert with local authorities, and are ap-
proved by city councils. Such plans delineate three 
types of areas: “green” (suitable for construction), 
“blue” (construction suitable under certain condi-
tions), and “red” (construction not suitable). Yet 
at the time of the storm, only  of  communes 
exposed to the risk coastal submersion in France 
had approved flooding prevention plans; another 
 had been asked to adopt a plan but had yet to do 
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so (Anziani, :). A key measure of the Plan 
Against Rapid Coastal Flooding is to accelerate 
adoption of new Flooding Risk Prevention Plans, 
and to revise some existing ones. At the time of the 
storm,  coastal towns in Charente-Maritime had 
approved a risk prevention plan, but none in Ven-
dée. The new national Plan calls for  new plans 
to be adopted in Charente-Maritime (and  to be 
revised), while also calling on  plans to be ad-
opted in Vendée (Ministry of Ecology, a).
With regard to dikes, the first action taken was 
to repair  km of dikes in Charente-Maritime and 
 km of dikes in Vendée damaged by the storm 
(Ministry of Ecology, a). The new Plan Against 
Rapid Coastal Flooding also establishes a roadmap 
for improving existing dikes. This is more complex 
than it may seem, as , km of the , km of 
dikes in France are “orphan dikes”, without identi-
fied owners (Ministry of Ecology, b:). Dike 
rehabilitation is expected to begin at the earliest 
by the end of . 
The twin goals of development control and dike 
construction highlight a tension in priorities. For 
example, in a speech on March , , President 
Sarkozy noted that “in high flooding risk areas, it 
will not be possible to build houses behind dikes 
anymore. Indeed, sooner or later, no matter how 
high or solid, these dikes will be submerged” 
(Sarkozy, ). The Plan against Rapid Coastal 
Flooding adopts the same position, stating that 
“any work likely to be put in charge, even in ex-
ceptional cases, can be considered safe” and thus, 
“new dikes will not be used to open new areas for 
development.” ((Ministry of Ecology, b:). 
Thus, the official state position is that dikes should 
be the protection tool of last resort (Ministry of 
Ecology, b:).
.. Diverse positions among 
the disaster victims
The land use planning discussions in the wake 
of Xynthia inspired great debate in the coastal 
communities affected by the storm. In August , 
a new Flooding Risk Prevention Plan was made 
public for La Faute-sur-Mer and L’Aiguillon-sur-
Mer. Public consultations lasted through the end 
of , and a second round of consultations are 
still underway. Meanwhile, groups that had mobi-
lized in the wake of the storm (including “L’Avenir 
ensemble” in L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer and the “Associa-
tion pour la défense des propriétaires fautais” in 
la Faute-sur-Mer) organized September demon-
strations that drew  people. These groups 
. « Plan de Prévention des Risques d’Inondation » (PPRI) 
in French
protested against the Flood Risk Prevention Plans 
on the basis of their negative economic impacts. 
Indeed, they took a far more radical view than 
Avif, which does not endorse unrestricted devel-
opment in new parts of the coast.
Pinoit, of Avif, notes that the new rules are be-
ing “tested” in Xynthia-affected communities: 
“The Risk Prevention Plan in La Faute-sur-Mer 
and L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer is likely to influence the 
other Risk Prevention Plans adopted elsewhere in 
France, which will cover five million people na-
tionwide.” With the coming presidential election 
(April-May ), Pinoit feels that the government 
ministries are in no hurry to move quickly this time.
Moreover, Avif considers dike repair a top pri-
ority. “Before establishing risk prevention plans, 
we should make sure the existing protections are 
up-to-date. Let’s first protect what is built, and 
then adapt the houses and set rules for develop-
ment…people died in houses with a second floor 
too”, says Pinoit. And while some feel there is time 
before the next storm, Pinoit notes that La Faute-
sur-Mer suffered two floods in the space of four 
months in -.
CONCLUSION
The Xynthia storm highlighted significant gaps 
in the French system of flood control and popu-
lation protection in coastal areas. In addition, 
the response of the government, the protests of 
the victims, and the attempts to address coastal 
development policy add complexity and intrigue 
to this case. From outside, one might be tempted 
to dismiss the protest movement. Indeed, the 
compensation provided by the state was very 
favorable to disaster victims. However, this essay 
tries to highlight a different view. The controversy 
over “black areas” was due more to the form than 
the content. The lack of assessment and the poor 
communication strategy from the government 
was more problematic than the idea of displacing 
people from dangerous areas. These problems 
imply that the government significantly underesti-
mated the psychological sensitivities of the migra-
tion/displacement process. 
This is not to say that people may justifiably live 
wherever they choose, even in areas of mortal 
danger. But it is to say that precautions should be 
taken when displacement is necessary. Moreover, 
there are reasonable disagreements about how far 
development control policies should go. While the 
central government is more in favor of restricting 
. Interview with Renaud Pinoit conducted on August, 
nd 
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coastal development, local authorities and civil so-
ciety groups prioritize protection through the sys-
tem of coastal dikes. 
Xynthia is likely to be an important precedent 
for future crisis management. Yet key questions re-
main unanswered: how to go about moving people 
from their homes, how to pay for the expensive 
process of compensating displacees, and how to 
balance development and planning policy with 
the construction and maintenance of physical 
protective infrastructure. Future generations of 
French policymakers will have to continue to work 
through these difficult issues in the years and de-
cades to come. ?
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PART 2 ON-GOING 
CRISES
In the second part of this volume, we address the world’s forgotten crises. While emerging disasters often inspire dramatic media coverage and substan-tial policy response, the world’s slow-onset disasters deserve much more examination, both in terms of their ecological circumstances and the types of migration to which they are linked. For example, while emerging disasters 
are connected with massive and sudden displace-
ment in the acute aftermath, incremental environ-
mental degradation may be connected to diverse 
migration patterns in and out of the affected area. 
Such heterogeneity makes it difficult to measure, 
much less address, these flows. Moreover, the pol-
icy response may even be part of the problem. 
While human activity is often a major contribu-
tor to the environmental degradation outlined in 
this section, many of these challenges will be exac-
erbated by climate change in the coming decades. 
Moreover, while climate change theorists often 
posit that migration constitutes a failure of adap-
tation, it is important to consider the linkages be-
tween migration and adaptation in these cases. For 
better or worse, people in these rapidly degrading 
ecosystems use migration as a strategy of adaptive 
response to their local conditions.  Adaptation 
policy, then, should consider migration dynamics 
as part of the adaptation process, rather than as a 
barrier to be overcome via adaptation. This is not 
to say that every migration is healthy (socially or 
environmentally), but rather, that policy should 
be responsive to the demographic situation on the 
ground.
In our first case, we examine the hazards from 
glacial melting and the potential risks for popula-
tions in the Himalayan Mountains of Nepal. Inter-
estingly, this case of slow-onset degradation may 
be linked to sudden disasters, as melting may trig-
ger frightening and deadly glacial lake outbursts 
that could quickly overwhelm local settlements. 
Next, we examine the case of Darfur. Despite its di-
minishing place in world headlines, our case shows 
that the underlying environmental problems re-
main largely unsolved. Lastly, we present a collec-
tion of three case studies from Brazil: the Amazon 
frontier, northeastern plains, and the hills around 
Rio de Janeiro. The cases highlight the diversity of 
environment-migration linkages in Brazil, while 
also making connections in all three cases to under-
lying demographic and environmental policy aims 
pursued by local and national authorities during 
different periods of the country’s modern history. 
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INTRODUCTION
In December , in order to highlight the threat 
of climate change to the Himalayas region, the 
Nepalese government held a meeting at a height 
of ,m and adopted a resolution on climate 
change. Such a symbolic meeting had already 
been conducted a few months earlier by the 
government of the Maldives, which met under-
water, thus drawing the attention to the sea-level 
rise posing an existential threat to the island state. 
Like the Maldives, Nepal faces several threats from 
climate change-induced environmental change. 
The melting of glaciers results in the creation of, 
and additional pressure on, glacier lakes. When 
glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) take place, 
as, for instance, in  (Dig Tsho Lake), its conse-
quences for the population and the destruction it 
causes are significant (Schild : ). 
Glacial lake outburst floods are but one kind of 
environmental disaster Nepal is likely to face as 
global temperatures continue to rise. For ex-
ample, the  monsoon triggered major floods, 
causing the Saptakoshi River to break through a 
dyke and flood the Sunsari district in Southeast 
Nepal; , people were displaced (MSF ). 
Moreover, while natural disasters are the most 
obvious linkages between environmental change 
and migration, slow-onset environmental deg-
radation resulting from floods, landslides, and 
human activity can also harm livelihoods and in-
crease the likelihood of migration and displace-
ment (Shrestha and Bhandari ). At the same 
time, the environment is only one of several factors 
. The average increase of temperature in Nepal is expected 
to increase by . degrees Celsius per decade--higher 
than the global average (Webersik and Thapa : ).
. It should be noted that the natural/human categoriza-
tion of disasters is not always straightforward. For exam-
ple, the  floods were caused not only by heavy rains 
but also by poor maintenance of the dam itself.
that explain migration, which is a complex social 
process.
This case study aims to provide an overview of 
the progressive melting of glaciers in Nepal, a type 
of slow-onset environmental degradation that 
can lead to rapid-onset disasters such as GLOFs. 
This paper will examine how these processes and 
events affect the migration decisions of local peo-
ple, as well as how policymakers and NGOs have 
addressed the issue of melting glaciers potentially 
leading to devastating GLOFs.
1. CONTEXT AND VULNERABILITIES
.. General description of Nepal 
Kumar divides Nepal into three main regions, 
defined by “a combination of altitude, climate, 
district boundaries and drainage basins from 
South to North and East to West,” (Kumar KC 
: ): ) the mountain zone (which includes 
.% of Nepal’s  million people, covers .% 
of the country’s area and .% of its arable land); 
) the hilly area (.% of the population, .% of 
land area, .% of arable land); and ) the Terai 
area (.% of the population, .% of land area, 
.% of arable land). As a result, the “mountain 
districts are chronically deficient in the produc-
tion of staple foodstuffs. This, in combination with 
their poor transport infrastructure, means they are 
also chronically food-insecure” (Gill : ). The 
hill area also suffers from an agricultural produc-
tion deficit, while only the Terai land has a food 
surplus (ibid.). Environmental hazards may affect 
these regions differently, widening inter-regional 
disparities.
. This overview is based on Gill () and K. C. () 
6. DISPLACEMENT RISKS FROM 
GLACIAL MELTING IN NEPAL
Radu Nikolaus Botez
STUDY 07/20116 8 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
.. Historical description 
of affected areas 
Glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) are consid-
ered one of the most imminent threats resulting 
from environmental change in Nepal. As glaciers 
melt, new glacial lakes are formed and existing 
lakes expand, increasing the risk of GLOFs. In 
, a GLOF in the Dig Tsho Glacial Lake in 
eastern Nepal attracted international atten-
tion. An “ice avalanche” had fallen into the lake, 
causing a five-meter high flood wave that over-
came a moraine dam and ran down mountain-
sides, destroying houses, land, infrastructure, 
and causing $. million in damage to a hydro-
electric power plant (Schild : ). The glacial 
lake, , metres long and  metres wide, was 
almost completely emptied by this event (Horst-
mann : ). In one of Asia’s poorest countries 
(UNDP, ), such events impose a heavy toll. 
And while the Dig Tsho GLOF was among the most 
devastating, such floods occur every two to five 
years according to the Nepalese Department of 
Hydrology and Meteorology (Kattel ). 
.. Socio-economic and natural 
characteristics of affected area 
In recent years, much emphasis has been put on 
the notion of vulnerability as a way of anticipating 
the impact of environmental changes on popula-
tions. Vulnerability is “a function of the character, 
magnitude, and rate of climate change and varia-
tion to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, 
and its adaptive capacity.” In other words, vulner-
ability is equal to ‘f’ (exposure + sensitivity - adap-
tive capacity)” (ICIMOD :). Resilience can be 
defined as “the capacity of a system to absorb distur-
bance and reorganize while undergoing change 
so as to still retain essentially the same function, 
structure, identity, and feedbacks” (ibid.). Finally, 
endowments and entitlements also need to be 
analyzed in order to understand vulnerability and 
resilience. Dulal et al. (: ) define endow-
ments and entitlements as “important resources 
required by every society or group to enable them 
achieve a sustainable livelihood. […] This includes 
capital assets of individuals, households, commu-
nities, or groups, such as human, physical, natural, 
financial and social capital [that will define] their 
ability to achieve a sustainable livelihood, [which 
in turn will] enhance their adaptive capacity and 
resilience in the face of increasing climate change 
threat.” 
“Human capital” refers to the “level of education 
and productive skills of the people [and which] 
includes knowledge, skills, competencies, and at-
tributes embodied in people that facilitate the 
creation of personal, social and economic well-
being.” (Dulal et al. : ) In Nepal, human 
Map 1. Ecological zones in Nepal 
Note: White areas: Tarai; dark area: Hills; grey area: Mountains. Source: Kumar KC 2003: 122.
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Figure 2. Glacier recession and expansion in Hindu 
Kush-Himalayas and Central Asia 
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal 2010.
capital is present (through traditional knowledge) 
but needs to be supplemented. The general level 
of education in Nepal is low and information 
needed to cope with environmental change is not 
available to much of the population. As a conse-
quence, both training and awareness-raising is 
needed to foster the adaptive capacity of the popu-
lation. However, as Pokharel and Byrne (: ) 
point out, “adaptation to climate change, while 
of course widely practiced in an ad hoc (autono-
mous) way, is new to Nepal as a field to be regu-
lated through policy.”The fact that Nepal is one of 
the poorest countries in Asia represents a further 
vulnerability. Unemployment (%) and the num-
ber of those living below the poverty line (.%) 
is generally high – Nepal ranks th in the UN 
Human Development Index – yet some groups 
are in an even more perilous situation: Women 
and members of lower castes are heavily disad-
vantaged, and poverty is higher among ethnic mi-
norities and tribal groups which are regarded as 
“inferior” by members of the higher castes (Bhusal 
: ). These groups are likely to be harder 
hit by an environmental disaster. Furthermore, a 
look at Nepal’s progress towards the achievement 
of health related Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) – eradicate extreme poverty and hun-
ger (GOAL ), reduce child mortality (GOAL ), 
improve maternal health (GOAL ), combat HIV, 
malaria and other diseases (GOAL ) - indicates a 
critical situation and thus a vulnerable population 
(WHO ). For instance, “addressing child mal-
nutrition, the underlying cause for half the child 
deaths, remains a challenge in Nepal. About half 
of children under three years […] are too short for 
their age, and most children suffer from some type 
of micronutrient deficiency.” (ibid.). Also, as for 
the fight against HIV, malaria and other diseases, 
“the trend shows that unless programmes are im-
plemented on a war footing, a generalised epidem-
ic with high mortality in the most economically 
productive group will begin and will start a vicious 
circle. The spread of HIV/AIDS will increase pov-
erty and vulnerability, which in turn causes more 
infection and has serious impacts on the country’s 
socio-economic conditions” (ibid.).
Remittances by migrants play an important role 
with regard to income diversification and thus 
reduction of vulnerabilities. According to Thieme 
and Wyss (: ), “ninety per cent of the house-
holds farm for their own consumption but cannot 
meet the need for the whole year. Seventy-five per 
cent of households have no income from gainful 
. While the literacy among the male population was .% 
in , only .% of women were able to read and 
write. 
employment within Nepal. Remittances from pre-
sent migration or income of past migration in the 
form of pensions from a foreign army are for most 
households the only or most important cash in-
come.” Financial capital, another important asset 
to determine the adaptive capacity of the popula-
tion, is thus limited. Cash transfers suffer from the 
weak banking system, especially in regions that are 
farther away from the capital and main cities. As 
in many developing countries, there is a need for 
a more elaborated system to transfer remittances. 
The country’s topographic profile also contrib-
utes to the impact of the floods and thus the vul-
nerability of the Nepalese population. Elevation 
ranges from  meters in Southern Terai to more 
than , meters in the North. As a result, flood-
waters are carried rapidly downhill, causing great 
destruction in their path. However, the population 
also depends on this topography to bring water 
from glacial melt and mountain lakes during the 
dry season.
The precipitation during the monsoon season is 
crucially important for agriculture and other basic 
needs, but floods often go hand-in-hand with these 
monsoon rains, which can displace thousands 
and destroy agricultural land and crops. In recent 
years, precipitation patterns have changed due to 
climate change, which creates additional vulner-
abilities (particularly in the agrarian population). 
While traditional knowledge certainly helps in 
dealing with the rains, it must be supplemented 
with detailed data on precipitation patterns in or-
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As noted above, vulnerabilities can be under-
stood as a lack of necessary assets to realize ca-
pabilities to cope with the environment. Because 
Nepal suffers from a lack of endowments and en-
titlements needed to ensure adaptation to envi-
ronmental change, and because of the country’s 
unique geography and topography, it is particu-
larly vulnerable to global environmental change, 
and thus represents an important case study for 
climate scientists.
2. MIGRATION PATTERNS OVER TIME 
.. General patterns 
According to figures from the  census (Kumar 
KC : ), the most important internal migra-
tion takes places from rural to rural areas, 
accounting for about .% of all migration 
activity, while rural-to-urban migration accounts 
for .% of total internal migration. Moreover, 
migration takes place more often from higher 
to lower altitudes (Gill : ). Reasons for 
internal migration are marriage (%), agricul-
ture (.%), service (.%), study (.%), busi-
ness (.%), and ‘other reasons’ (.%). The Mid-
West and Far-West parts of the country experience 
population loss as a result of migration.
Internationally, the most prominent emigra-
tion destination from Nepal is India, where about 
, Nepalese (.% of the expatriate com-
munity) are believed to live (Kollmair et al. : 
). India is a prime destination because of the 
open border between the two countries (Shrestha 
and Bhandari : ). Migration to the Gulf 
States, officially estimated at ,, is believed 
to be at around , (.%) while , 
(.%) are estimated to have left for Europe, the 
US, Japan and Australia (Kollmair et al. : ). 
.. The environment-
migration nexus 
Two studies, Massey et al. () and Shrestha 
and Bhandari (), address the environment-
migration nexus in the Chitwan Valley (Terai), 
examining the importance of environmental dete-
rioration on human migration. Massey et al. (: 
f.) identify five specific aspects of environmental 
change that they deem important in order to estab-
lish the link between environment and migra-
tion: ) “higher levels of population density will 
be associated with higher rates of out-migration 
among residents of the Chitwan Valley”; ) they 
anticipate that “a perceived decline in agricultural 
productivity will be associated with a greater like-
lihood of out-migration among farm households”; 
) “local areas with less open farmland will have 
higher rates of out-migration than those where 
agriculture is more abundant”; ) “families facing 
less access to fodder will have higher rates of out-
migration”; ) “variations in access to fodder and 
firewood are expected to have different effects 
on the migratory behaviour of men and women.” 
They also assume that “given that the Chitwan 
Valley continues to exhibit a great deal of envi-
ronmental variation, local environmental changes 
[are expected] to have a stronger influence of local 
moves within the valley than on long-distance 
moves out of the valley”. Both Massey et al. () 
and Shrestha and Bhandari () conclude that 
labour migration is a coping strategy to environ-
mental degradation. However, such migrations 
are almost all local; there is little evidence that 
international migration patterns into and out of 
Nepal have a strong environmental component 
(Massey et al. (: ). 
In their study, “Labour migration as a response 
strategy to water hazards in the Hindu Kush-
Himalaya”, Banerjee et al. () find that “nearly 
% of the migrant households surveyed consid-
ered water-related hazards as an important influ-
ence on the decision to migrate for work. But even 
in these households, non-environmental reasons 
such as lack of income, unemployment, dissatisfac-
tion with livelihood, and lack of livelihood oppor-
tunities were significant determinants of labour 
migration”. It should be pointed out that there is 
a considerable difference between the role of “rap-
id-onset hazards” such as floods and “slow onset 
hazards” such as droughts, floods playing a role in 
% of migrant households’ migration decisions, 
Figure 3. Glacier Lake Outburst Floods
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal 2010.
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while droughts influenced migration behaviour in 
% of migrant households (Ibid.). 
As Baherjee et al demonstrate, not all disasters 
have the same impact—or perceived impact. In the 
case of GLOFs, it is unlikely that mountain com-
munities can engage in in situ adaptation. GLOF 
adaptation would require strong early warning 
systems, a change from mud to stone as the build-
ing material of choice (ICIMOD : ), and 
other costly interventions that only the central 
government (and international donors) can rea-
sonably fund. Conversely, in the case of droughts, 
traditional knowledge can lead to successful local 
adaptation strategies (ICIMOD, ).In addition, 
since drought is a slow-onset process, it is possi-
ble for families to arrange for temporary migration 
out of the affected area.
3. POLICY RESPONSES 
.. Risk assessment 
and reduction
The International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD) has undertaken consider-
able efforts to assess risks emanating from glacial 
lakes. In , it created an inventory of glaciers, 
identifying more than , glacial lakes in the 
greater Himalaya,  of which are potentially 
Figure 4. Topography of Nepal
Source: WWF 2005:6.
dangerous (Schild : ). A further assessment 
of glacial lakes in Nepal, using remotely sensed 
data, took place in : , glacial lakes were 
identified,  of which are “potentially dangerous” 
(ICIMOD a: ).
Together with the Kieo University (Japan), ICI-
MOD has implemented a Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) 
monitoring system of the Imja Tsho Lake, regarded 
as being at high risk for a GLOF. Two web cameras 
provide images of the area every  minutes, ac-
companied by additional data from sensors of the 
monitoring system (Garung et al. : ). 
The threat posed by Tsho Rolpa Lake was ad-
dressed in the late s after Dr. J. Reynold, a 
GLOF specialist, warned that the lake might burst 
in the summer of  (Matambo and Shrestha 
). An early warning system was installed, first 
in the form of Army posts in the area, which would 
warn population in case of a GLOF, then through 
a more sophisticated system that would receive 
signals from a GLOF sensor system and warn the 
population by air horns and sirens (ibid.). Further-
more, a channel system, financed by the Nether-
lands, was installed to lower the water level by  
meter (Horstmann : f.). 
The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), together with the EU’s Humanitarian 
Aid Agency (ECHO), also aims at strengthening 
GLOF risk reduction through “non-structural and 
community-based interventions [and through 
fostering] understanding of socio-economic risks 
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associated with GLOFs” (UNDPa). This project 
includes raising awareness among the popula-
tion, land use planning (through, for instance, in-
troduction of land use management concepts and 
practices at the community and local administra-
tion level), preparedness planning (through, for 
instance, the development of contingency plans 
and identification of evacuation routes and safe 
shelters), knowledge networking (through, for 
instance, documenting traditional coping mecha-
nisms and practices, and facilitating information 
and knowledge sharing between different stake-
holders), risk mitigation, early warning systems, 
disaster management planning and, finally, main-
streaming disaster risk reduction into develop-
ment (UNDP, ECHO). 
.. Resettlement programs 
Resettlement has taken place on a small scale 
and only with regard to the Tsho Rolpa Lake. As 
it was believed that an outburst would take place 
in June , an evacuation for the population 
living downhill from the lake was issued. Approxi-
mately % of the population of , that lived 
downhill from the lake was evacuated for one 
month (Matambo and Shrestha ). According 
to reports from the area, the physical risk reduc-
tion measures put in place gave the population 
the impressions that they were safe and thus that 
there was no need to move. 
.. Relief action 
Relief actions are undertaken by the state and 
international organizations in the event of 
floods, including GLOF. Action takes place under 
different policies such as the  Natural Disaster 
Relief Act, stipulating, for instance, that families 
of victims shall be provided NRS , (€) 
as relief assistance (Pokharel ) and the 
National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management 
of . The former also establishes a Central 
Disaster Relief Committee, under the leadership 
of the Minister for Home Affairs, consisting of 
 members; it also authorises the government to 
set up aid funds at national, regional, district and 
local level (Government of Nepal : ).  
Following the  Koshi floods that dis-
placed , people, the government of Nepal 
provided a return package worth NRS , 
(€) to those returning to their original places 




of residence from the relief camps (IFRC : 
). Moreover, it purchased land and allocated 
. square meters to each of , landless 
families (Shankar ). However, critics pointed 
out that the Chamar community, a Dalit (lowest 
caste) sub-caste, had been discriminated against 
in the reallocation process. Having been com-
pelled to live on the borders of the Kosh river and 
landless because of their status, Dalits are more 
vulnerable to such floods (ibid.). Furthermore, 
the return package was provided only to those 
that had registered as Internally Displaced Peo-
ple (IDPs). Due to weak registration mechanisms, 
however, up to half of the IDPs were not able to 
register in some districts (IDMC : ). Addi-
tionally, the  IDP policy adopted by the gov-
ernment “has not been disseminated effectively 
across the country” (ibid.). 
According to the International Federation of 
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 
“throughout the response, the work of the hu-
manitarian actors, of clusters and coordination, 
has been largely focused on temporary camps es-
tablished in and around community buildings as 
well as on available unaffected land. Almost all 
those who fled needed housing and thus emer-
gency shelter had an important role to play. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that the response and the 
coordination of the response have overall been 
good. Throughout the disaster, with perhaps a 
few problematic exceptions, humanitarian need 
has been met.” (Kellett : ). Despite these 
and other measures, Chhetri (: ), focus-
ing on the domestic landscape, points out that 
there is a “lack of coordination among agencies 
related to disaster management, and of clear-cut 
job descriptions for those agencies.” Other short-
comings include a lack of technical manpower. 
International organizations, besides provid-
ing relief to those hit by floods, also play a role 
with regard to capacity building and training of 
authorities. The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), for instance, runs a program 
on “Migration, Climate Change and Environmen-
tal Degradation”, in the framework of which it 
trains authorities in “Humanitarian Response in 
Emergencies, Shelter and Settlement Planning 
and SPHERE Standards to ensure a consolidated 
response to the advent of new disasters in the re-
gion” (IOM ). 
. For the policy document, see Government of Nepal 
(). 
. For a more comprehensive account, see the Government 
of Nepal, UNDP, EC (). 
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Figure 5. Determinants of labour migration and their perceived importance in the migration decision
Source: Banerjee et al. 2011:8.
CONCLUSION
The forgoing overview of GLOF and their link to 
migration in Nepal has demonstrated that thus 
far, the threat of such floods has not led to people 
moving in anticipation of the phenomenon. Evacu-
ation of a part of the population living downstream 
of the Tsho Rolpa Lake for a period of around 
one month has been the only movement directly 
linked to this slow-onset environmental change. 
However, the ongoing and quickening process 
of glacial melting is likely to increase the likeli-
hood of GLOF which will trigger displacement (as 
occurred after the GLOF at the Dig Tsho Lake in 
) if no comprehensive prevention measures 
are put in place. 
Actions taken by the government when an 
outburst of the Tsho Rolpa Lake was expected in 
 have addressed several issues, yet several 
shortcomings remain, especially concerning prob-
lems regarding the early warning system put in 
place at that time and later abandoned. Moreover, 
the positive role played by the ICIMOD has dem-
onstrated the importance of strengthening local 
capacity for research and risk assessment. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
 m Carry out more fine-tuned studies in the differ-
ent regions (Terai, hills, mountains) to assess 
different vulnerabilities and capacities of the 
different communities.
Migration patterns (and vulnerabilities to 
environmental change) differ from area to 
area, and even within districts. In order to ful-
ly understand the phenomenon, more detailed 
studies need to be carried out, ideally by local 
research institutions. Research in this area 
should identify different configurations of cap-
ital assets and role in both adaptation to envi-
ronmental change, and migration behaviour.
 m Implement the  National IDP Policy and de-
velop an effective registration mechanism
According to various NGOs, little progress 
has been made on the implementation of the 
 National IDP Policy. The Government of 
Nepal needs to implement the policy and also 
develop effective registration mechanism for 
people displaced by natural disasters in order 
to ensure that best assistance possible is pro-
vided to victims of such events. 
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 m Design mechanisms to include the local com-
munities in the decision-making process at state 
level
Since environmental conditions and vulner-
abilities are often highly localized, local actors 
need a role in setting State policy on environ-
mental change, adaptation, and migration. 
International organizations and civil society 
may also contribute valuable technical knowl-
edge and expertise to these processes.
 m Provide information on anticipated environ-
mental change to local communities, especially 
to those that are in remote mountain areas
Access to information depends on several 
factors, the most important being the ability to 
acquire data and reports on anticipated envi-
ronmental changes and their impacts. Access 
to information thus requires both education 
and resources (such as internet access), both of 
which are far from universal in Nepal. Interna-
tional donors can help fill these gaps. Moreo-
ver, data and knowledge on environmental 
change should be mainstreamed into develop-
ment projects in Nepal.
 m Provide funding schemes for communities to 
adapt houses to potential GLOFs and to allow 
for other capital-intensive adaptation measures
Changing housing materials from mud to 
stone can be protective against GLOFs. Howev-
er, as noted in this analysis, many mountainous 
areas suffer from food insecurity and a general 
lack of financial resources. Thus, international 
and national support may be necessary to fund 
such capital-intensive investments. However, 
any such program should avoid exacerbating 
local inequalities, including those fueled by re-
mittance revenue.
 m Foster development of expertise through the 
funding of research institutions
Research institutions play an important role 
in understanding changes in the environment 
and how they will affect populations. They 
have provided valuable data and have also 
carried out awareness-raising training. The 
activities undertaken by ICIMOD, which has 
mapped risks resulting from glaciers in the 
Hindu Kush-Himalaya region is but one ex-
ample. These sorts of locally-driven research 
institutions should be supported and nurtured, 
preferably through cooperation with interna-
tional actors who might benefit from lessons 
learnt with regard to environmental change 
and adaptation strategies. 
 m Inter-agency cooperation in disaster response 
operations 
The different agencies responsible for disas-
ter relief operations in Nepal do not always 
cooperate sufficiently, undermining efficacy. 
New organizational frameworks should be 
considered and developed. ?
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INTRODUCTION
Droughts are among those naturally recurring 
features of climate change that have caused mass 
migration throughout human history. Archae-
ologists now agree that drought was a leading 
factor in the massive migration of early humans 
, years ago out of Africa to the rest of the 
earth. Written records of ancient cultures from all 
over the world also speak of droughts and their 
disastrous consequences. The Epic of Gilgamesh 
speaks of a drought brought on by a Bull of Heaven 
that ceased only with the slaughter of the bull 
by Gilgamesh. Scholars now agree that this tale 
stems at least in part from the story of Joseph, son 
of Jacob, and the seven-year drought he faced in 
his lifetime. Egypt was then the only kingdom that 
had anticipated the drought by stocking resources 
vital to man and livestock. The Book of Genesis 
describes massive migrations of unprepared 
nations “from all over earth” towards this country. 
However, the severity of the drought is such that 
all the world’s nations go bankrupt, including 
Egypt (Tanakh, Bereishit-Genesis). Although this 
story remains a legend, there is certainly some 
truth in it. If a worldwide drought sounds unlikely, 
it remains, however, perfectly conceivable that 
a drought did take place and that it did lead to 
massive migrations and instability in the region.
In modern times, droughts are still known for 
causing mass migration. Unfortunately, the driv-
ers of migration are complex and it is difficult to 
establish causality. Moreover, data on migration 
induced by environmental changes has always 
been difficult to obtain (Jonson, ). The Darfur 
case is no exception. 
This case study concentrates on Darfur’s drought 
and its linkages with internal displacement in the 
region. The environment-migration nexus will be 
explored to assess how it may be related to con-
flict in the region. Consequently, the challenges 
faced by the international community in dealing 
with the humanitarian crisis will be discussed, 
highlighting good practices for further steps in the 
rehabilitation of livelihoods in Darfur. 
1. THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
RECURRENT DROUGHTS IN DARFUR 
.. Socio-economic background 
of Darfur and historical 
migration patterns
The categorization of the different types of 
communities in Darfur may help understanding 
the possible tensions rising from their respective 
use of their environment. Indeed, ethnic groups 
in Darfur are numerous (over  tribes call Darfur 
their home) and complex, as can be seen on Map . 
Yet, potential environmentally-induced disputes 
may be understood through the division of the 
people of Darfur according to their lifestyles. 
First, nomadic herdsmen and semi-nomadic 
farmers are generally Muslims of various Afro-Ar-
abic origins, and originated from Northern Sudan, 
the Darfur region, and Chad. The second group 
consists of sedentary and semi-nomadic farmers, 
often Animists or Christians of sub-Saharan Afri-
can origin and from Southern Sudan (Burr, Col-
lins, ). The ethnic boundaries between these 
two groups, who have largely intermarried, are 
not clear-cut. Additionally, nomadic lifestyles in 
the region have always led to various migration 
influx. 
Historically, nomadic tribes resided in the drier 
North of Darfur and relied on water holes, oases, 
wells and subsistence farming for themselves and 
* I would like to express my gratitude to Dr Rony Brauman, 
physician and writer, member and former head of Doc-
tors without Borders (MSF), and to Mr Roger Persichino, 
author and desk officer at Action against Hunger-Amer-
ica, who generously shared their knowledge of humani-
tarian action and of the situation in Darfur with me.
7. MIGRATION AND RELIEF ACTION IN 
DROUGHT-AFFECTED DARFUR
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their herds. During the dry season, they would 
travel southward with their animals into the more 
temperate Southern farmlands and would migrate 
back North with the onset of the rains. Jonsson 
() notes that the high degree of mobility of 
these populations is their strategy to cope with the 
high variability of the local climate. 
Traditionally, only men would travel south-
ward with the herds. Women and children would 
remain behind to tend the crops. These seasonal 
cycles corresponded to harvest seasons, histori-
cally. However, as drought worsened, the need for 
agricultural labor in Northern Darfur dwindled. 
(Burr, Collins, ). Indeed, in the s, cyclical 
droughts began to plague Northern Darfur and its 
water holes and seasonal rivers vanished. The ini-
tial effect was crop failures. Those left behind were 
unable to feed themselves and their herds. As a re-
sult, the population was pushed away from home 
and pulled south, where they searched for fertile 
land to pasture. What had started as a traditional 
seasonal migration pattern involving adult men 
eventually became a permanent migration involv-
ing whole families (Bond, ).
.. Environmentally-induced 
migration patterns
Migration in Darfur may indeed obey to the push 
and pull theory, theorized by Lee (). Indeed, 
Lee’s law distinguishes two types of factors that 
lead to human migrations: push factors involving 
deteriorated living conditions and pull factors 
attracting migrants by safer livelihoods. In the 
Darfur case, push factors would include desertifi-
cation, famine or drought, natural disasters, and 
war, all of which were more prevalent in Northern 
Darfur. Thus, in Darfur, many migrants would 
have been pulled to the relative peace and pros-
perity of Southern Darfur. 
Over the years, not only did rainfall patterns 
change, but rainfall also declined drastically. 
Map 1. Darfur, Sudan and neighboring countries
Source: Wikipedia, 2011
Darfur
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Repeated years of droughts induced desertifica-
tion and environmental degradation and dam-
aged the ecological balance, which once existed 
between sedentary agriculture and nomadic pas-
toralism (Braun, ). Ever since the mid-s, 
reoccurring periods of cyclical drought (, 
, , , , ,  and ) have 
caused crop failure, loss of livestock and pas-
tureland, and severe environmental degradation 
(Morrod, ). At the same time, even when the 
rains do not fail, the rainy season has shrunk from 
five months (May through September) to three 
(June to August; Bonde, ). By the mid-s 
desertification had become so severe that even the 
poorest populations migrated to escape starvation 
– confirming the understanding of migration as an 
adaptation strategy (Martin, ).
Consequently, a snowball effect took place, 
when the nomadic herdsmen expanded the range 
of their circulatory migration routes and brought 
. Yet, this linkage is always complex to directly address. 
Indeed, because of the relationship between agricultural 
labor and climate, it is difficult to assign these sorts of 
migrations to “climate” or “economics.” Additionally, 
as droughts are slow-onset events, it is very difficult to 
assign direct causality between environment crisis and 
migration. Further complicating matters, migration-
related drought does not typically happen at the peak of 
the drought, but rather just before or after conditions are 
at their worst (Gemenne, ).
Map 2. Map of Darfur Ethnicities 
Source: Miller, 2004.
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along their whole families in search of water. It re-
sulted in over-grazing the little arable soil that re-
mained throughout Northern Darfur and the dis-
appearance of the little plant life that had survived 
the drought. In turn, this increased erosion and 
exacerbated the desertification process. Migration 
snowballed as those who had not yet migrated did 
so in response to desertification in the North. More 
migrating pastoralists in turn caused shortages of 
food and water; herders began to roam hundreds 
or thousands of kilometers in search of water and 
pasture land (Teklu, von Braun, Zaki, ). Even 
through the s, however, migration remained 
highly seasonal: as shown in Figure , migration 
typically peaked in early fall.
Figure 1. Arrival Time of Displaced Populations around 
Omdurman in 1984







December  5.2 
Source: Khalil, 1987.
Pull factors that made other parts of Sudan 
more attractive were partially climate-related: 
less desertification and more natural resources. 
As long periods of drought extended over Darfur, 
the Nomads, originally from the North, lost most 
of their livestock and sought other employment 
in the South. However, the dramatic decrease in 
rainfall in the s resulted in a drastic decrease 
in crops produced by the Southern Darfur farming 
community. At that point, Southern Darfur had 
become overpopulated while its available natural 
resources had susbstantially diminished (Bilsbor-
row & de Largy, ).
.. Drought, Migration 
and Conflict 
Throughout history, different Darfuri ethnic 
groups had usually cooperated and lived together. 
However, when resource scarcity became an issue, 
it led to an upheaval among pastoralists who could 
no longer maintain their nomadic way of life 
because of the lack of both grassland and water 
(Burr, Collins, ). 
By , when the drought seemed at its worst, 
migration continued into areas in Southern Dar-
fur populated by Christian and Animist popula-
tions. The two groups, even though competing 
over resources, traditionally depended on each 
other for survival. Pastoralists relied on the farm-
ers’ land and water, and farmers, in turn, relied 
on the nomads’ herds to fertilize their land and 
carry their crops to market. Nevertheless, as the 
migrations towards the South continued, local of-
ficials imposed heavy taxes on the migrants. This 
aggravated the situation and led to rioting. Sub-
sequently, tensions escalated as Southern officials 
fired on the rioters, killing more than . Muslim 
leaders in the North declared jihad against South-
ern populations in response, and one of Africa’s 
longest and bloodiest civil wars erupted (Teklu, 
von Braun, Zaki, ). 
 In the s, the government of Sudan sup-
pressed the tribal councils that had for centuries 
been mediating disputes between the various eth-
nic groups and replaced them with government 
programs just at the time a severe drought hit Dar-
fur. In the absence of a legitimate and fair system 
to resolve conflicts, social tensions escalated (Pow-
er, ). Furthermore, the Sudanese government 
dealt with the crisis by forcing relocation of IDPs, 
often to desert and barren areas (UN, ). In 
, the civil war reignited. A peace agreement 
signed in  ended this second phase of the Su-
danese civil war. 
Climate is not solely responsible for the conflict 
in Darfur. It is safer to argue, as Etienne Piguet 
does, in his  UNHCR report, that environ-
mental factors were a significant contributor to 
migration, which in turn was a major factor in 
causing the conflict. Meanwhile, Jonsson () 
argues that environmental change leads to migra-
tion when it is magnified by underlying social and 
economic factors. This framework is useful, in that 
it enables more complex analyses of the phenom-
enon. This structure also allows for the consider-
ation of migration as an adaptation strategy, par-
ticularly (as in the case of Darfur) when few other 
options exist.
2. FACING DROUGHT: 
POLICY RESPONSES
.. Humanitarian relief
The - Sahel droughts had localized 
impacts throughout Darfur. However, no aid 
relief was provided. In fact, between the mid-
s and early s, no institutions whatsoever 
provided help. The droughts of - and the 
great famine of - revealed the inability of 
the rural population to subsist on its own. The 
onset of the famine had been predicted by  
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as northern populations had been moving south 
on a permanent basis (Teklu, van Braun, Zekly, 
). In the s, there were three major aid 
efforts in response to major crop failures. The first 
significant program was initiated in  and ran 
through . 
Another crop failure in  prompted a sec-
ond relief operation. In response to this hu-
manitarian crisis, in which over , people 
died of starvation, a relief operation in southern 
Sudan was coordinated by Operation Lifeline 
Sudan (OLS). Established in , OLS is a con-
sortium of U.N. agencies and three dozen non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that oper-
ate in both government and rebel-controlled 
territories (Dagne, ). 
It rained in , the crop was good, but the 
next two consecutive years involved bad harvests 
because of severe droughts and necessitated a 
third wave of aid in Darfur. All these operations 
were about relief and did not involve much devel-
opment aid. International recognition with regard 
to the underlying patterns of drought, migration, 
livelihood loss, and civil war was also quite low 
and full awareness did not emerge in the interna-
tional community until the year  (Blogicus).
The international aid actors faced in the years 
s the dilemma of a complex emergency. In-
deed, NGOs did what they could to face the emer-
gency. For decades, Darfuris were provided with 
food in emergencies, with NGO actors believing 
that they would eventually find a viable way of 
supporting themselves. Analysts now agree that 
this was a misjudgment: had drought relief been 
instituted earlier on, it would have prevented the 
crisis scale of the past ten years (Anderson, ; 
Connell, ; Malek, ).
By , despite the escalation in the number 
of climate migrants living in poor conditions, and 
professed commitments by the international com-
munity to help alleviate the suffering, the UN had 
taken only a few steps. The African Union Mission 
dispatched a small contingent of approximately 
, peacekeepers to deal with the violent con-
flict. However, due to these limited human re-
sources, they were not able to achieve significant 
results. Living conditions continued to be appall-
ing for the IDPs who remained targets of violent 
crimes, often from government officials. The UN 
Security Council failed to impose serious sanctions 
on Sudanese officials for their abuses of power. 
Furthermore, it did not authorize the use of force 
to protect civilians. 
The first step in mounting a humanitarian in-
tervention was UN Resolution , proposed by 
the United States, which suggested sanctions on 
Sudan for war crimes, demanded Sudan disarm 
militants in Darfur, and dispatched international 
monitors. The problem was that these monitors 
were sent to watch the conflict, not to tackle its 
primary causes. 
.. Adaptation and 
development strategies 
Starting in , the regional government had 
implemented a rehabilitation project. The primary 
goals of this project were to restore the degraded 
natural environment through rehabilitation of 
forest and natural pasture, improve availability 
and distribution of the rural water supply, promote 
agricultural production, and provide support for 
households targeted for resettlement (Teklu, van 
Braun, Zekly, ). 
In  and  a project to replant gum-
arabic trees and other forest plants was under-
taken by UNDP in villages with little tree cover. 
This project was intended to reverse the effects 
of drought, desertification, and overuse of tree 
products on the tree population. By , the 
project had helped over , farmers, but the 
demand was much higher still. Not enough aca-
cia trees were planted due to lack of funds. Also, 
the local population used them for cooking pur-
poses before the trees had reached maturity, a 
period that averages between six to eight years 
(Teklu, van Braun, Zekly, ).
UNICEF and Oxfam also targeted additional pro-
grams at low-income, female-headed households 
with no livestock. Women were chosen because 
they have the most impact on child nutrition. By 
,  female-headed households had each re-
ceived two breeding female goats under the con-
dition that they would use the goats to feed their 
children and not for sell. The project had posi-
tive economic effects and again there was great 
demand from other women to participate in the 
program; however, there was not enough money 
to meet such demand (Teklu, van Braun, Zekly, 
). Other projects in this program included 
home garden development, irrigated culture, and 
grain storage. However, the NGOs again had a lim-
ited capital budget for the projects and could only 
offer them to a small portion of female-headed 
households. These projects were also put in jeop-
ardy due to the persistent droughts (Teklu, van 
Braun, Zekly, ).
In , the Sudanese government called for a 
broad-based strategy for sustainable growth in tra-
ditional, rain-fed agriculture. Again, drought, fam-
ine, migrations, and conflicts impeded the devel-
opment of this program. Finally the military coup 
of  put a stop to most development programs 
in the region (Teklu, van Braun, Zekly, ).
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3. ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL AID 
.. A conflict that 
was not forecast 
Droughts are slow onset events whose impacts 
are difficult to forecast. Still, early warning 
systems could have helped anticipating the crisis. 
According to Burr (), many of the subsistence 
farmers of Darfur had already noticed the effect of 
droughts on their oases in the s. Had a better 
information system been in place, it might have 
been possible to monitor the situation and mobi-
lize the response at earlier stages, which would 
have saved lives and prevented the worst environ-
mental impacts. By the time the UN acknowledged 
the civil war, in , , people had already 
been killed and . million people displaced.
.. A failure of (non-
governmental) organization(s)
Despite these efforts, capacity building in Darfur 
has also remained slow, in part because the crisis 
is considered ongoing. As Dr. Rony Brauman, MD, 
former head of MSF (Doctors without Borders), 
points out, notwithstanding good faith and laud-
able intentions, humanitarian NGOs are often 
overwhelmed by the quantity and urgency of 
work that remains to be done and must often 
satisfy themselves with basic “patch-up” jobs. Dr. 
Brauman also draws attention to the difficulty in 
dealing with slow-onset events as humanitarian 
NGOs have much more experience in dealing with 
the immediate effects of disaster. Again, this shows 
the urgent need for implementing new frame-
works and policies to deal with climate change 
since it often takes the form of slow-onset events. 
Fear of sanctions did force Sudanese officials to 
allow humanitarian NGOs to come to Darfur, but 
this authorization did not last. On March , , 
authorities in northern Sudan ordered the global 
humanitarian organization ACF International to 
leave Darfur along with CARE, MSF, Oxfam, Mer-
cy Corps, Save the Children, the Norwegian Refu-
gee Council, the International Rescue Committee, 
Solidarities, and CHF International. These ten or-
ganizations provided -% of the total amount 
of assistance reaching Darfur at that time (ACF, 
). Later on, other humanitarian NGOs were 
expelled on the grounds they were acting against 
the Khartoum regime, which said it would handle 
most humanitarian aid from that point on.
In addition, humanitarian help in refugee camps 
acts as a magnet; it unconsciously adds incentive 
to migrate by populations in need of help. This 
increases migration flows, blurring the differ-
ences between war refugees, climate migrants, 
and economic migrants, and making it difficult for 
aid groups to satisfy demand. In addition, ethnic 
tensions in the region are seldom solved by NGO 
aid. Basic needs may be met, but underlying social 
tensions remain.
Lastly, capacity building is meant to let Darfur 
better handle its own affairs once the NGOs leave; 
however, it only reinforces the imbalance between 
different regions. By incentivizing migration into 
Map 3. Migrations trend of peasants farmers in the semi-arid and central parts of Sudan
Source: IFRI, 1998.
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camps, NGOs are undermining the capacity of 
those who do not or cannot migrate. Eventually, 
such people may be forced to leave their homes, 
as well. 
.. A failure of the 
international community
What’s more, the UN Security Council’s action was 
only focused on the conflict itself, rather than on 
root causes. Efforts to address the conflict more 
thoroughly were stonewalled by UN Security 
Council members with economic ties to the oil-
exporting central government, including France, 
China, and Russia. 
Prunier () acknowledged the failure of the 
international community, mentioning how “pow-
erless in the face of this disaster” the UN and the 
AU (African Union) had been. They had only been 
able to produce “symbolic measures and stalling 
tactics” (ibid.) He then went on to explain how 
“totally ineffectual” the “under-equipped” Afri-
can Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had been. He 
pointed out that “at least , men” would have 
been needed considering the size of Darfur, rough-
ly that of France (ibid.).
That same year, UN Secretary Ban Ki-moon him-
self used the word inertia in describing a conflict 
that “claimed more than , lives during [the 
last] four years of diplomatic inertia.” He wrote 
this when “Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir ac-
cepted a plan to deploy, at long last, a joint United 
Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Dar-
fur.” (Washington Post,  June ). UNAMID, 
which was established in , was in August  
the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the 
world involving , uniformed personnel and 
an annual budget, up to June , of more than 
$. billion. However, it has since had to withdraw 
from the north, following the government’s refusal 
to allow a temporary renewal of its mandate, de-
spite concerted international pressure to do so.
In June , Kyung-wha- Kang, UN Deputy High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, visited the Dar-
fur Zamzam IDP camp. She described herself as 
“shocked” by the living conditions (in spite of her 
experience in such camps), and said that “the UN 
system, protection cluster, and humanitarian as-
sistance” were “trying as best as they can” but ad-
mitted they are rather powerless considering the 
“enormous challenge presented by the high level 
of migration” (UN News Service,  June ).
4. STEPS FORWARDS: IMPROVING 
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
Migration is, for many Darfuris, the only viable 
adaptation strategy. NGOs and international 
actors should make migration one of several 
adaptation options. For example, by sharing seed 
technology that is more drought-resilient, NGOs 
can provide alternatives to migration for Darfuri 
farmers. Enhancing options for adaptation is much 
easier when interventions start early. In Darfur, 
much of the response came after a heated conflict 
was already underway. As a result, aid was limited 
to immediate and short-term assistance, instead 
of offering training on coping with drought. Such 
interventions trap refugees in a vicious circle 
where they grow dependent on the humanitarian 
groups and become more vulnerable and less 
autonomous. 
) Pre-emptive resettlement in anticipation of 
the drought could have been another adaptation 
strategy that could have helped mitigate the crisis. 
Indeed, most voluntary migration does not occur 
at the peak of a drought, but before or after (Ge-
menne, ). By encouraging people to move be-
fore conditions hit rock bottom, it may have been 
possible to move vulnerable populations out of 
harm’s way and reduce ecological pressure. How-
ever, policymakers should be careful not to con-
fuse such resettlement with the abusive forced dis-
placements practiced in many parts of the world.
) Two NGOs present in Darfur, Oxfam and the 
Danish Refugee Council (DRC), were involved in 
“peace-building linked to water and other basic 
services” until they were expelled (Bovey, ). 
Oxfam and DRC set up inter-tribal committees 
“to reinforce the local traditional authorities’ ca-
pacities to solve and prevent local conflicts linked 
to basic necessities” (Danish Refugee Council, 
). Prior to colonization, and until about some 
 years ago, the relationship between Arab no-
mads and African farmers was friendly and, as 
mentioned earlier, tribal councils addressed major 
issues of social conflict. The Oxfam/DRC project 
was geared at reviving these vital social organs. 
And it worked: local councils settled many con-
flicts, receiving help from the NGOs only when an 
additional mediator was needed (DRC, ). Lo-
cal partnerships are more effective: Oxfam’s IDP 
camps, for example, met basic water and sanita-
tion needs in less time, with fewer resources and 
staff, than many other international actors, thanks 
to their community partnerships and their highly 
sustainable model of hiring national staff.
 Some small NGOs have programs that could 
be implemented in Darfur. CARI (Centre d’actions 
et de réalisations internationales, Center for 
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International Actions and Achievements) for in-
stance, helps African populations in arid areas in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa using agro-
ecology. It works in desertification control, protec-
tion of oases, and access to water and sanitation 
(Burget, ). Again, as seen with Oxfam and the 
DRC, CARI works with local partners, as well as 
national and international actors, to implement 
the UN Conventions to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD). Its expertise would benefit the Darfur 
region. But due to safety concerns, political tension 
with the Khartoum regime and the presence, often 
overwhelming, of international instances and ma-
jor NGOs it is difficult for small NGOs first to be 
present, and when they are, to be heard as most 
are often kept out of meetings. Though such 
programs have a direct impact on environmental 
change (and therefore, on migration and displace-
ment patterns in the region), their technical exper-
tise has not been part of the international response 
(CARI, ). Similarly, designs for a “Great Green 
Wall” of trees along the Sahel-Sahara border are 
promising from an ecological perspective, but re-
main unimplemented politically in some places, 
including Sudan, which suffers from some of the 
region’s fastest rates of deforestation.
CONCLUSION
The recent famine crisis in the horn of Africa reveals 
that the international community has learned 
little from Darfur: intervention is again happening 
only after the crisis is well underway, despite the 
consensus of experts that early action is essential. 
While vast sums are spent on humanitarian aid, 
little of it is being spent efficiently, in part because 
of this “crisis” mindset; a lack of coordination and 
collaboration is also problematic. Most of all, the 
entire humanitarian enterprise fails to account for 
deeper social processes of famine, drought, and 
. Interview with M. Persichino, over the academic year 
/. 
migration in Northeast Africa, processes that in 
many cases do not adhere to national boundaries 
but are regional.
In June , the UN-backed International Con-
ference on Water for Sustainable Peace in Darfur 
opened in the region. This conference was spon-
sored by the UN-AU peacekeeping mission in Dar-
fur (UNAMID). Officials from the Sudanese gov-
ernment and the UN Country Team (UNCT) were 
involved. A $ billion appeal was launched for 
 water projects across Darfur. So far this year, 
UNAMID has distributed , rolling water car-
riers to villages across Darfur. In the past year, it 
has procured  recycling waste-water treatment 
plants, drilled  wells throughout the region, and 
plans on developing  water sources (UN News 
Service,  and  June ). However, these re-
sources are tiny compared with the region’s vast 
size and population.
For all of the expert consensus about the causes 
and consequences of the conflict in Darfur, chang-
ing global mindsets remains elusive. “Crisis” brings 
international attention and funds, while sustain-
able development programs, many of them driven 
by smaller, less politically-powerful NGOs and civil 
society organizations with a community-based 
model, remain sidelined. The result is that the root 
causes of the conflict in Darfur remain. The land 
remains degraded by climate change and ecologi-
cal disaster. Migration remains the only adaptive 
strategy for many households. Social tensions re-
main in place and methods for mediating conflict 
are few and far between. Considering such a situ-
ation, it seems likely that Darfur will continue to 
experience environmental pressure, no-choice mi-
gration, and weak social capacity for adaptation in 
the face of global climate change. To avoid such a 
fate, local, national, and international actors must 
change their paradigmatic understanding of the 
environment-society-migration nexus. ?
. Ibid. 
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Figure 1. Brazil’s Regions
INTRODUCTION
This chapter combines tree individual case studies 
of environmentally-linked internal displacement 
and migration in Brazil. This chapter is not meant 
to be comprehensive of all forms of environ-
mental migration in Brazil, but a tripartite anal-
ysis allowing for a more nuanced understanding 
of a complex phenomenon. It covers both slow-
onset migration and disaster-related displace-
ment; both “natural” and “human” causes are 
explored. Moreover, these case studies take into 
account the unique context for migration in three 
distinct parts of the country: the legal Amazonian 
region, the Northeast Coast, and the Southeast 
near the metropolis of Rio de Janeiro. In doing 
so, they present a glimpse at the emerging issues 
and debate on environmental migration in South 
America’s largest country.
The first case study, “Drought and Migration in 
Northeastern Brazil” details one of the most im-
portant mass migration waves in Brazilian history. 
From the s to the s, millions of North-
easterners were driven by recurring drought to mi-
grate to other parts of the country, especially the 
wealthy, industrialized Southeast. However, this 
study does not take a deterministic view of these 
migration patterns, but rather examines ways in 
which drought and migration have shaped social 
adaptation systems. Likewise, the study is careful 
to avoid strictly natural explanations for drought, 
exploring how local economic powers and politi-
cal leaders have contributed to a socially unjust 
“drought industry.” Because of the migratory link-
ages between the Northeast and Southeast, this 
study is also linked with the Rio case study at the 
end of this chapter.
The second case study, “Environmental Migra-
tion in the Brazilian Amazon: what is the role of 
policy?” analyzes internal migration and displace-
ment in Brazil’s ‘legal Amazon’ region. First, it 
analyzes cycles of settlement, deforestation, re-
sources exhaustion and further migration that 
characterize migration in the region, as well as 
the social, political, and economic consequences 
of these patterns. Second, it examines linkages 
between massive infrastructure projects (such as 
dams and mines) and mass population displace-
ment in the region. The case also explores the po-
litical economy of these large-scale projects and 
questions their role in the region’s social welfare, 
suggesting that a different development model 
may be needed to avoid recurring patterns of 
“boom-and-bust” on the Amazon frontier.
The third case study, “Environmental and Hu-
man Disaster in the Hilly Regions of the State of 
Rio de Janeiro” focus on an environmental disaster 
that took place in the Hilly 
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“…his fate was to pace around the world, walking 
up and down, aimlessly wandering as an errant Jew. 
A tramp pushed by the drought.” (Ramos, )
“Ceará is always between one drought that’s going 
and another that is coming down the road.” (Theo-
philo, )
1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
.. The Northeast region 
by the numbers
The Northeast region of Brazil has an area more 
than . million square kilometers. It covers % 
of the country’s territory and contains  million 
people, % of the national population (IBGE, 
). Economically, it produces .% of Brazil’s 
GDP, though the region’s GDP per capita is % 
lower than the national average (IPEA, ). 
It has large concentrations of poor people and 
contains % of Brazil’s urban population (IFAD, 
).
Though geographically diverse, semi-arid cli-
mates cover more than half of the region’s territo-
ry, and droughts are recurring. Indeed, part of the 
region has been labeled the “polígono das secas”, 
or “polygon of drought”, for its frequent droughts. 
Significant parts of the region’s public policies are 
geared towards drought crisis prevention. 
The social impacts of the region’s frequent 
droughts are exacerbated by its high popula-
tion density; indeed, the region is the most 
densely-populated semi-arid region in the world 
(Sales, ). Socially vulnerable populations, 
. Including the states of Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas, Pernam-
buco, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceará, Piauí and 
Maranhão.
particularly the poor, have historically been heavi-
ly dependent on state “rescue policies” for drought 
relief, or migrated elsewhere in the country as a 
form of adaptation to the droughts.
Though drought is partially a function of the 
region’s climate, it is also true that the region ex-
periences extremely heavy rains between Septem-
ber and March. However, these heavy rains are 
offset by rapid evaporation during the dry season 
(Centro Feminista  de Março, ). In such con-
ditions, modern irrigation and water storage are 
vital, but such development is hindered by large-
scale poverty. Thus, social vulnerability and cli-
matic conditions interact to create and aggravate 
the environmental crises in the region.
.. Drought in the 
history of the region
The region’s first recorded drought occurred in 
-; drought hit every - years throughout 
the sixteenth century. From -, a particu-
larly severe drought took , lives, , 
from the City of Fortaleza alone (Leprun et al., 
).
Because of its susceptibility, drought has in-
duced environmental migration in the region 
for centuries. For example, Campos and Studard 
() found that indigenous populations often 
migrated as a result of climatic conditions; simi-
lar historical studies in post-colonial times have 
shown the same results. Thus, even in periods of 
low population density and small “human foot-
prints”, environmental migration has been a part 
of the region’s social history.
In the lates, disparities between the rapidly 
industrializing Southeast and the poor and stag-
nant Northeast grew rapidly. The policy response 
from then-President Juscelino Kubitschek was to 
establish the Working Group for the Development 
of the Northeast, known as GTDN and headed by 
8.1. CASE 1: DROUGHT AND MIGRATION 
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the well-known economist, Celso Furtado. The 
group recommended stepping up investment in 
the region and stimulating food production (Melo 
et al, ). In , this report was adopted as the 
main strategy of the Superintendency of North-
east Development, SUDENE, a new body created 
to bolster regional development and address the 
urban social tensions created by drought.
.. The “drought industry” 
and clientelism 
Because of the primacy of food, water, and health 
needs in the region, the path to political control is 
through the meeting of these basic needs despite 
the droughts. Therefore, regional elites have often 
used drought as a pretext for donations and poli-
cies from the federal government that benefit 
them personally. Local colonels and latifundiarios 
(large property owners) play a central role in this 
“Drought Industry”. They are abetted by Brazil’s 
concentration of land: % of property owners 
control % of the land, when small farms (less 
than  hectares) make up just .% of rural land 
(Serra, ).
In response to drought, agricultural policy has 
prioritized damming. Though this creates water 
reservoirs, these storage mechanisms are vulner-
able to evaporation. Furthermore, the reservoirs 
are often not accessible to the population, as they 
are generally built on private properties. Patron-
age—what Kenny () defines as personal con-
nections determining or facilitating resource ac-
cess— inevitably follows.
Even for those who do have access to the 
. “Drought industry” is a concept very used in Brazil, both 
by the academic field and by the medias and the popula-
tion. See for instance Goncalves, ; Fernandes, ; 
Marin, .
Figure 2. The Polygon of Drought
Source: Leprun et al., 1995.
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reservoirs, the labor of traveling many miles to 
fetch water and returning with heavy kegs often 
represents a full quarter-day’s work for farmers. 
This work is often done by women (Centro Femi-
nista  de Março, ). The water obtained from 
these reservoirs is often full of mud and debris, 
and is therefore unfit for consumption (Reboucas, 
).
2. A CHRONOLOGY OF MIGRATION AND 
PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NORTHEAST 
..  to 
Mass migration within Brazil began in the s, 
as intense urbanization and widening regional 
inequalities created economic incentives to move. 
Concentration of economic activities in cities and 
surplus labor in the countryside led to rural-to-
urban migration, though urban areas in poorer 
regions were unable to absorb this population 
growth (Patarra, ). The rapidly developing 
Southeast, particularly around Sao Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro, became a destination for Northeastern 
migrants; the new capital of Brasilia, coffee 
plantations in Parana, and rubber plantations 
of the Amazon were also popular destinations 
(with the state sponsoring migration to Amazon 
destinations).
These flows coincide with two periods of severe 
drought: from  to  and again in . Dur-
ing the s, migration in and out of the North-
east stabilized, as government efforts to reduce 
regional imbalances halted—and may have even 
reversed—flows from the region (Patarra, ).
In , and from  to , a major drought 
hit the region once again, triggering a remarkable 
exodus from most states. However, the states of 
Bahia, Sergipe and Alagoas received significant 
investment in oil and petrochemicals during this 
period, which reduced outflows considerably (Pa-
tarra, ).
During this period, the State also institutional-
ized its response to drought in the Northeast (Melo 
et al, ). The Inspectorate for Works Against 
Drought was formalized into the Department of 
Works Against Drought: a key institution that crit-
ics claim is dominated by the regional elite (Ibid.). 
Meanwhile, SUDENE’s efforts did enhance de-
velopment in the Northeast, but the region re-
mains deeply dependent on more dynamic parts 
of the country for both capital and demand (Re-
boucas, ). At the same time, urban areas in the 
region were ill-prepared for the influx of labor mi-
grants from rural areas, leading to infrastructure 
shortages and urban decay in the form of under-
serviced favelas, or slums (Melo et al, ).
From  to , drought affected .% of 
the districts in this region: . million farmers 
had to cease productive activities during these 
droughts (Leprun et al. ). Many rural workers 
were forced to migrate to nearby cities, where they 
came to inhabit favelas in peri-urban areas. This 
process is evident in - Census figures, 
which show urbanization in the Northeast occur-
ring much more rapidly than the national average.
The second half of the th century was also 
characterized by intensive state investment in 
major irrigation projects. As Campos and Studart 
() show, these projects were meant to be co-
operatives, but the concentrated land ownership 
by wealthy elites made such projects infeasible. In-
stead, large landowners invested in their own re-
gional water provision schemes, often with public 
subsidies and limited benefits to local, small-scale 
farmers. 
Main migration flows: -
Figure 3. Main migration flows by period
Source: own elaboration
Main migration flows: - Main migration flows: ’s
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..  to present 
From  to , % of all rural migrants in 
Brazil came from the Northeast, though the region 
represented less than % of the total rural popu-
lation at the time (Patarra, ). 
In , a severe drought struck; the State re-
sponded, through SUDENE, with an emergency 
program aimed at providing temporary employ-
ment to . million workers put out of work by the 
drought. The program was a milestone in that it 
marked the first time that emergency relief ex-
tended beyond food and water to emergency em-
ployment (Duarte, ). 
Official state figures showed that the drought 
caused a % increase in local unemployment. 
The state data also show that % of families re-
ported decreased income. Meanwhile, the emer-
gency employment, which paid around  Euros 
per month, constituted % of families’ incomes.
In , under the government of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, SUDENE was dismantled. 
The main argument of the government was that 
the body was highly corrupt; government figures 
showed that nearly  million Euros had gone 
. As Duarte () shows in his article, a research was 
made with the people that participated on the program. 
This researched was ordered by the state, and was lim-
ited to a sample of  people.
missing. In , SUDENE was re-instated, with a 
new mission: “(to) promote inclusive and sustain-
able development of the Northeast and competi-
tive integration of regional production in the na-
tional and international economy”. 
As Northeast-Southeast migration flows have 
taken place for decades, a social network has 
emerged to facilitate the journey for new potential 
migrants (Fusco and Duarte, ). Migration is 
also an important part of households’ adaptation 
strategy to drought, as it reduces household food 
needs.
However, Figure  shows that these historic 
Northeast-to-Southeast patterns disappeared in 
the s, and indeed were reversed. Baeninger 
() asserts that economic changes, including 
a reconfiguration of national industry and eco-
nomic stagnation in the Southeast, account for 
these changes. For example, survey data show 
that Sao Paulo received , migrants from 
 to , compared with ,, migrants 
from  to . Migration to other parts of the 
country, including the Central-West (Brasilia) and 
within regions has also become more prevalent 
(Baeninger, ).
. See Sudene program website: http://www.sudene.gov.br/
. The PNAD, National Survey by Household Sampling, is a 
survey conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (IBGE).
Source: IBGE, Census of 1991.
Figure 5. People of more than 5 years old, by destination and origin regions (1995-2000)
Source: IBGE, Census of 2001.
Origin
Destination
Total North Northeast Southeast South Mid-west
North 292 751  86 836 68 186 22 956 114 773
Northeast 1 411 420 182 709  969 435 31 029 228 247
Southeast 946 283 75 467 462 628  214 914 193 274
South 349 813 26 989 27 897 205 975  88 952
Mid-west 363 185 70 721 70 012 161 276 61 176  
Total 3 363 452 355 886 647 373 1 404 872 330 075 625 246
Origin
Destination
Total North Northeast Southeast South Mid-west
North 277 319  79 483 73 275 29 182 95 379
Northeast 1 354 461 216 979  917 482 21 582 198 418
Southeast 786 816 78 945 334 434  170 418 203 019
South 470 640 41 421 16 630 282 118  130 471
Mid-west 336 734 71 177 47 381 154 068 64 108  
Total 3 225 970 408 522 477 928 1 426 943 285 290 627 287
Figure 4. People of more than 5 years old, by destination and origin regions (1986-1991)
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Public policies played a role in this new configu-
ration. ASA Brazil recently launched a program to 
build one million cisterns in the region; , of 
them (benefiting . million people) had been built 
by  (CEDEPLAR/UFMG & FIOCRUZ, ). 
Meanwhile, in , the Environment Ministry 
launched a Program for Fighting Desertification 
and Mitigating Drought Effects (PAN-Brazil). The 
program explores technology for small-scale, sus-
tainable farming and energy use in the region, pro-
moting resilience against the droughts. Lastly, the 
Bolsa Familia program (a nationwide conditional 
cash transfer program) and the food-security fo-
cused Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) program have also 
alleviated poverty and thus may have attenuated 
migratory flows out of the Northeast.
3. THE FUTURE: CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND DESERTIFICATION 
.. Present and potential 
affected areas
A recent report has analyzed potential climate 
impacts in Northeast Brazil (CEDEPLAR/UFMG 
& FIOCRUZ, ). It projects that % of the 
population of the region’s poor cities will migrate 
as a result of climate change between  and 
. Network of NGOs, trade unions and civil society in the 
Region
. In spite of recent economic gains, climate 
scientists think that the most-affected areas will 
be those with both high population density and 
unstable environments, such as Northeast Brazil 
(Ojima and Nascimento, ). Indeed, parts of 
the Northeast may experience desertification, as 
increasing temperatures, decreasing rainfall, and 
inappropriate agricultural activities take their 
toll.. According to the Ministry of Environment, 
, square kilometers of land in the region 
are vulnerable to desertification, which could cost 
$ million annually (Sales, ).
The above image shows the areas of desertifi-
cation in the Northeast in  (first image) and 
in  (second image). The darker areas are 
more desertified. Four are already called “cent-
ers of desertification”: the cities of Gilbués (PI), 
Irauçuba (EC), Seridó (RN) and Cabrobó (PE) 
(Madeiros, ). In addition to climate change, 
natural climatic and soil conditions, as well as hu-
man practices (such as deforestation, forest fires, 
and overgrazing) are driving these processes. Ir-
rigated areas may also be degraded by saliniza-
tion from water reservoirs (Sales, ). All of 
these processes are likely to push poor populations 
off the land, decreasing quality of life for many 
. Cf. Ecodebate,  : “The increase in minimum temper-
atures on the planet, low levels of rainfall and inappro-
priate agricultural activities can lead to desertification in 
part of the Northeast, according to the Professor Augusto 
José Pereira Filho from the Astronomy, Geophysics and 
Atmospherical Sciences Center in the University of Sao 
Paulo”.
Figure 6. Net migration between the Northeast and the Southeast of Brazil
Source: IPEA (2010).
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households. Urban areas may see increased migra-
tion flows, with poor migrants likely to settle in 
favelas of peri-urban areas. 
.. Public policies for the future
The risk of desertification and climate change will 
further increase threats to vulnerable populations. 
To combat these threats, the government must 
pursue a new development policy that weakens 
existing patterns of patronage in the region. More-
over, alternatives to the status quo, such as new 
methods for water storage and the organization of 
rural cooperatives, should be pursued, to increase 
water access sustainably. 
Survey data shows that % of families in the 
region do not adequately prepare for droughts, in-
stead waiting for government assistance (Duarte, 
). Such attitudes imply a sense of helplessness 
that results from the rigid political context of the 
region. This political context may allow for infra-
structure development, but these projects serve to 
consolidate and enhance existing inequalities.
For example, the federal government has re-
cently undertaken a two billion-euro project to 
“integrate the Sao Francisco River watershed.” In 
theory, the project will irrigate large parts of the 
region. However, critics argue that benefits will 
accrue to a tiny percentage of the semi-arid land 
in the region (.%), while triggering massive 
negative environmental changes in the riparian 
ecosystem (Centro Feminista  de Março, ). 
Others argue that large landowners will continue 
to benefit from the project, which they see as a 
continuation of the “Drought Industry” (Ab’saber, 
).
Adapting to climate change, including the ef-
fects of drought and desertification, must take 
place in the context of a more democratic—and 
sustainable—process than has been the norm in 
the Northeast for the last half century. Small farms 
and cooperatives can be sustainable, but only if 
preceded by meaningful land reform. While such 
reforms have never been undertaken for reasons 
of political will, they are the best hope for an end 
to the cycles of chronic crisis and emergency relief 
that constitute the status quo.
Meanwhile, migration policy must take on two 
dimensions. First, receiving areas must have suf-
ficient resources to welcome new arrivals. Second, 
action must be taken to address environmental 
push factors out of rural areas, so that migration 
becomes less desperate and more voluntary (Ojima 
& Nascimento, ). What’s more, by strengthen-
ing local adaptive capacity in the rural Northeast, 
such policies can simultaneously reduce displace-
ment and improve quality of life in the region.
Migration out of Northeastern rural areas will 
likely increase unless the State carries out major, 
structural reforms in the region. Northeasterners 
need access to water, for their subsistence and 
their livelihoods, as well as public health and edu-
cation services. Though many actors can be part of 
the solution, only the State can guarantee rights of 
access to basic needs for all its citizens, most espe-
cially those living (precariously) with droughts. ?
Figure 7. Desertification in the Northeast region (1982 and 2010)
Source: Universidad federal de Alagoas - Image processing laboratory (2010).
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Migration in the Brazilian Amazon takes two main 
forms: ) displacement based on the social, polit-
ical, and economic consequences of deforesta-
tion, that results in land degradation and social 
conflicts and prevent people from keeping their 
livelihoods; and ) displacement caused by major 
development projects (hydropower and mining) 
aimed at extracting the regions considerable 
natural resources.
While migration dynamics have been discussed 
in other works, few have examined the issue 
through the lens of environmental change. This 
angle is instructive, since humans not only contrib-
ute to environmental change, but also are affected 
by these changes, which can induce a disruption 
of livelihoods and social networks, as well as social 
unrest. 
1. A HISTORY OF STATE INTERVENTION 
AND POLICY-INDUCED MIGRATION: 
IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT
The Brazilian Amazon is globally important due to 
its role in biodiversity, climate, and geo-chemical 
cycles. The region’s biomass, hydropower, and 
natural gas resources have led to it being labeled 
“the world’s last reserve of energy.” Yet to date, the 
region has not been fully developed, economically.
In this context, the Amazonian development 
model of rapid forest clearing has been viewed 
through the paradigm of the “frontier economy”, 
based on the continuous incorporation of land 
and natural resources. This paradigm associates 
the idea of “clearing the forest” with “progress” 
(Becker, ). 
8.2. CASE 2: ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION IN THE 
BRAZILIAN AMAZON: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF POLICY?
Carolina M. Castro
The region has experienced the rise and decline 
of economic cycles: economic expansion (and con-
comitant labor in-migration) has been closely tied 
to international market prices for raw materials; 
and has often been followed by long periods of 
stagnation and out-migration (Becker, ). The 
appropriation of forestry resources has led to un-
sustainable extensive practices and ebbs, as well as 
significant flows of migration.
.. Early economic immigration
One of the first important waves of in-migra-
tion occurred in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. At the time, the region expe-
rienced the rubber boom, when thousands of 
Northern migrants (the seringueiros) first came 
to the Amazon to work on the extraction of latex. 
However, structured settlement patterns only 
emerged with the establishment of the modern 
Brazilian state, following World War II. In the 
s, President Kubitschek constructed a number 
of major roads (such as the Belem-Brasília and 
Brasília-Acre highways). The Amazon region’s 
population rapidly expanded through migration, 
increasing from one to five million during the 
decade (Becker, ).
In the s, the military government estab-
lished a new ideological paradigm. The Amazon 
region represented a “demographic vacuum” that 
should be occupied in order to secure sovereignty 
over the territory. With minimal consideration for 
local context, the federal government launched 
ambitious projects of colonization and develop-
ment. These policies were mainly aimed at the 
expansion of the productive frontier, through road 
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construction, support to agriculture, ranching and 
logging, and public investment in large mining 
and hydroelectric projects. This model acceler-
ated deforestation, migration, land conflicts and 
violence in the region (Hochstetler & Keck, ; 
Becker, ).
Between  and , the National Institute of 
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) sent 
more than , settlers to occupy lots along 
roads in the region (Ibase,  apud Lui & Molina, 
). In particular, many migrants were sent to 
take up residence near the , kilometer Transa-
mazonica Road, inaugurated in  in Para state 
(IPAM/FVPP, ).
Government policy also shaped migration and 
development patterns indirectly. For example, 
land titles were given in proportion to the amount 
of land cleared. Because livestock-raising had low 
start-up costs (and was government-subsidized), 
settlers started building ranches as a cheap way of 
acquiring land. However, these policies backfired: 
overgrazing and decreasing economic returns cre-
ated a massive ecological disaster. From  to 
, more than half of primary forest that was 
converted to pasture became so degraded that it 
had to be abandoned; much of the remainder was 
highly unprofitable (Buschbacher et al  apud 
Hurtienne, ).
The ecological failure of the s did not lead to 
a roll-back of frontier settlement. Conversely, set-
tlers migrated deeper into unoccupied forest: by 
, % of families had abandoned their govern-
ment-issued plots (Oliveira,  apud Henchen, 
). The legacy of government colonization in 
the region has thus been an “arc of deforestation”, 
which is still expanding to this day.
In addition to cattle farming, mining was a main 
economic activity in the Amazon, and attracted 
large numbers of migrants (Santos, ). Mining 
was lucrative but highly unsustainable and weakly 
integrated with the rest of the regional economy, 
so that its social benefits were scarce (Carvalho, 
et al., ). 
Mining generally requires very large capital in-
vestments and nearly all capital control takes 
place outside the region (Monteiro, ). Except 
for substances used in the construction industry, 
almost all mining products are exported, creat-
ing very little added value for the local economy 
(DNPM, ). Moreover, steel and other met-
als require energy-intensive processing (Mon-
. Ironically, Amazonian settlement was also perceived as 
a response to social tensions arising from the expulsion 
of small farmers in the Southern region, due to the mod-
ernization of agriculture. 
. Over U.S. $  billion in many cases (Monteiro, )




Large hydroelectric projects in Amazon have also 
faced recurring criticisms on the basis of social 
and environmental concerns. In the s, such 
projects (including Tucuruiin Para and Balbina 
in Amazonas) displaced communities, flooded 
huge tracts of land and destroyed local fauna and 
flora. The construction of Balbina hydroelectric 
usine has meant the flooding of Waimiri-Atroari 
reserve, fish mortality, food shortages and hunger. 
, hectares of indigenous land were flooded 
and one third of that population was displaced. The 
river Uatumã was then considered biologically dead 
according to the National Institute of Amazonian 
Research (INPA). And because of the construction 
of Tucuruí, almost , families had to leave their 
land. Many migrated to other regions in the same 
state. Besides, the environmental change caused 
an intense proliferation of mosquitoes, bringing a 
qualitative change in people’s lives (Silva, ).
There are no systematic data on the number of 
people affected by hydropower projects in Brazil, 
but according to the Brazilian Movement of Peo-
ple Affected by Dams (MAB), nearly one million 
Brazilians have suffered the ill effects of dams (the 
government and the dam industry contend that the 
figure is much lower, around ,; Carneiro Fil-
ho, et al., ). Population flows that have ensued 
from dam’s construction and mining activities fol-
low two movements in the Amazon: the territoriali-
zation of groups in search of labor, and the de-terri-
torialization of population displaced from the areas 
of the plant. In this context, plans to build the Belo 
Monte dam in the Xingu River Basin (projected to 
provide up to , MW) have been facing contro-
versies for the last  years. Social movements and 
indigenous leaders believe that the socio-environ-
mental impacts are not adequately sized and after 
Belo Monte, five other dams will be built, changing 
completely the local life (Fearnside, ).
Roads influence migration and development pat-
terns, as well. By lowering transportation costs, 
they reduce barriers to in-migration. At the same 
time, they increase incentives for individual farm-
ers to participate in extractive activities. Once the 
land is exhausted, the farmers simply sell it (if he 
or she has property rights) and relocate deeper into 
the frontier, expanding the “arc of deforestation” 
. Notably, approximately % of the electricity produced 
in the country is consumed for exports goods produc-
tion, especially aluminum.
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and replicating the pattern of boom-and-bust (Ce-
lentano, et al., ). 
.. The boom-and-bust pattern 
of recent population mobility
Boom-and-bust economics often generates popu-
lation movements. In the early years of economic 
development and clearing of the territory, a rapid 
but short-lived increase in income and employ-
ment occurred, attracting migrant labor. This 
period was followed by social, economic, and 
environmental collapse, leading to out-migra-
tion (Celentano, et al., ). In the Amazon, 
logging set off economic booms and immigra-
tion, followed by cattle ranching. This ultimately 
led to ecological collapse, inducing an economic 
bust and mass emigration (a pattern that Rodri-
gues et al [] demonstrated through an 
assessment of  frontier municipalities.) Our 
own statistical analysis shows that people do 
indeed migrate to an area where deforestation 
is underway, only to vacate the area again once 
resources are depleted.
We can assert that people migrate to munici-
palities in which economic activity associated 
with deforestation is high, but tend to emigrate 
after the depletion of natural resources and the 
disruption of local economy. After deforestation, 
migration rates decrease, meaning that people 
stop immigrating. 
. Analysis based on  Census data. 
In summary, development projects and de-
forestation affect human migration patterns in 
Brazilian Amazon. Those projects attract labor 
migrants, while also displacing many indigenous 
people due to their environmental impacts. Addi-
tionally, the deforestation process caused by log-
ging, cattle, agriculture, etc., make Amazonian 
lands unproductive, disrupting local economies 
and livelihoods. This is followed by subsequent 
migration flows heading either to regional cities 
or to new frontiers of deforestation. 
Indeed, as the International Organization for 
Migration notes, environmentally-induced mi-
gration increases pressures in urban areas, exert-
ing additional pressures on already fragile urban 
infrastructures and services, what has happened 
in the Amazon context (IOM, ). % of pop-
ulation growth in the region occurs in cities, in 
the form of migrants returning from the frontier 
(Moura & Moreira ). Most immigrants go-
ing to the inner frontiers are coming from nearby 
consolidated frontiers, showing how the frontier 
perpetuates itself.
. However, these author judiciously stress the caution we 
should have in adopting the concept of “urbanization” to 
perform analysis on macro areas of the Amazon region. 
They prefer the term “new rurality” for most of frontier 
agglomerates, since most of them do not even count on 
basic urban services. 
This pattern is grounded in the deforestation 
process. That is, in the early years of economic 
development and clearing of the territory, there 
was a rapid and transient increase in income and 
employment (boom), followed by a social, eco-
nomic and environmental collapse (bust) (Ce-
lentano, et al., ). 
In the short term, there is a growth of eco-
nomic indicators, and HDI is favored by income 
growth and immigrant’s arrival. But when there 
are no more trees standing, loggers give way to 
cattle ranching and look for another area nearby. 
The income falls with the livestock industry and 
the deforested areas show lower socio-economic 
indicators than those of regions where defor-
estation is taking place (Celentano, et al., ). 
Based on this model, we intend to show the 
relationship between environmental degrada-
tion and migration patterns in the region. Migra-
tion rates from the  IBGE Census of all Am-
azonian municipalities are grouped into seven 
classes (A to G) describing their position relative 
to deforestation frontier in . Both deforesta-
tion activity (rate) and deforestation extent are 
considered.
The classes ranged from pre-frontier munici-
palities, with essentially intact forest (A), to pro-
gressively deforested regions with high (B to D) 
and low (D to F) deforestation activity, and to 
heavily deforested post-frontier municipalities 
with almost all their natural resources depleted 
(G). The results show a slight but significant dif-
ference between migration rates of each group 
of municipalities. 
The boom-and-bust pattern
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2. ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION
The Amazonian case draws on a context of human 
mobility widely associated with the use of natural 
resources and subsequent environmental changes. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that if on the one 
hand the pressure on the environment results from 
socio-economic patterns, on the other hand, these 
changes also induce disruption of local economies 
and change in social and cultural life, making the 
issue a multidimensional process. 
For example, the impacts of environmental 
change on traditional floodplain agriculture, in-
land fisheries, and forest productivity have pro-
voked serious disruption, affecting populations 
such as indigenous and riparian populations who 
have practiced varzea (floodplains) agriculture 
for many years. Fishing is another important eco-
nomic activity that has been disrupted by envi-
ronmental change. Rivers have become polluted 
from mining activities and social tensions have 
been registered between traditional fishermen and 
commercial fishermen in places such as Southern 
Para (Lopez, ).
All these aspects led to constraints on income 
and labor of the riparian populations. Environ-
mental change, in large scale, is responsible for 
prior social, political, and economic variables that 
contribute to so-called “side effects”, or secondary 
impacts, that can precipitate disputes. 
Recent narratives about climate change have 
maintained that environmental change itself leads 
to social conflict. However, Lopéz () posits 
that migration flows and economic disruptions—
rather than environmental change itself—drives 
social conflict. Drawing from the case of the 
Amazon, the general web linking environmental 
change to social conflicts follow three different 
phases: (I) environmental change; (II) side effects, 
such as economic disruption and population dis-
placement; and (III) conflict-issues, such as land 
and mineral conflicts.
Society in the Amazon region is composed of 
a fragile constellation of social actors, including 
landless people, posseiros (settlers without legal 
title), grilleiros (land grabbers), large landowners, 
and indigenous people. Environmental change, 
and associated population movements, alters the 
social order in ways that places two or more of 
these groups in conflict with one another, increas-
ing the risk of violence. 
Clearly, social tensions run higher in the case of 
the Amazon deforestation zone. Indeed, % of 
rural murders in the Amazon region between  
and  occurred in the zone of deforestation, 
and the area had a much larger homicide rate than 
the regional and nationwide rates. Land conflict 
Figure 9. Major deforestation fronts, derived from the integrated analysis of the Amazon urban network, population 
movements and socioeconomic index, laid over 2000-2001 deforestation hotspots
Source: Alencar et al, 2004
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and slave labor rates were also higher in the defor-
ested area, leading to high rates of violent crimes 
(Celentano, et al., ). Such social unrest often 
reflects the land tenure issues that were brought 
upon by deforestation.
In a nutshell, environmental change in the Ama-
zon region has provoked large population displace-
ments and livelihoods disruption, with a clear in-
fluence in the dynamics of manifest disputes. 
3. CLIMATE CHANGE, ECOSYSTEM 
DEGRADATION AND VULNERABILITY: 
THE ROLE OF POLICYMAKING
The Amazonian case should also be discussed 
in the light of adaptation strategies to climate 
change. Recent studies indicate that the region 
faces alarming risks. For example, climate models 
show that the region will experience consider-
able warming and drying in the coming decades. 
General Circulation Models project a regional 
increase of -°C by the year  and a decrease 
in precipitation in the Amazon during dry months, 
leading to widespread drying (WWF, ). Land 
use and climatic changes may turn the Amazon 
from net sink of atmospheric CO into a source of 
emissions. Such changes would not only be glob-
ally devastating, but would have serious local 
impacts, including soil erosion, ecological degra-
dation, loss of biodiversity, decreased agriculture 
yields, and increases in infectious diseases. At the 
biome level, it is projected that evergreen forests 
could be succeeded by mixed forests, savannah 
and grassland in Eastern and in parts of Western 
Amazonia (Cramer et al., ; Cramer et al.  
quoted WWF ). According to the INPE (Brazil’s 
National Space Research Institute), between % 
and % of the Amazon rainforest could become a 
dry savannah.
The forest can also be threatened by secondary 
effects of climate change, such as a potential in-
crease in the frequency and intensity of fires (Nep-
stad et al., ; Laurance and Williamson, ; 
Laurance et al., ; Cochrane and Laurance, 
 all in WWF ). A decrease in rainfall dur-
ing critical dry months may also lead to increased 
evapotranspiration and pest infestation, which 
will undoubtedly negatively impact agricultural 
yields (IPCC ). The result would be that more 
land would need to be cultivated to meet popula-
tion food needs.
Figure 10. Rural violence in the Amazon Region, 2003-2006
Source: Verissimo apud CPT 2004, 2005, 2006 e 2007.
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A key concept in mitigating forced migration 
caused by environmental change should be the 
reduction of vulnerability and adaptation policies. 
The Amazon region must undergo a total shift in 
its socioeconomic model, which even under cur-
rent conditions leads to displacement, land con-
centration, environmental degradation, and social 
conflict. State policy should aim to improve peo-
ple’s ability to cope with environmental change 
rather than simply encourage deeper expansion 
into the frontier. However, current State capacity 
in the Brazilian Amazon is weak. Many regions on 
the frontier lack even the most basic public ser-
vices. In many regions, especially those inner to 
the forest (far from infrastructure access), people 
must travel days by small boat to access hospitals 
or other public facilities. For most, the Army is the 
only form of contact residents have with public of-
ficials of any sort. In such a context, institutional 
capacity for planning or law enforcement is very 
low. The State must act to establish its writ and to 
develop comprehensive systems of public admin-
istration, including banking, education, health, 
housing, sanitation, and land ownership. At the 
same time, it should not ignore existing local and 
regional civil society organizations, which have 
played key roles in the region’s recent history.
Programs that comprise economic and social 
changes should be implemented if the Brazilian 
State wants to reduce the already existing social 
instability in the Amazon region and its high vul-
nerability in a context of climate change. This re-
quires for instance more interaction between Envi-
ronment and other ministries such as Energy and 
Agriculture, eschewing conflict of agendas such 
as those that were exemplified in Belo Monte dam 
project. Institutional capacity is a structural prob-
lem and depends in a large sense on the presence 
of public sector in remote areas. 
In the most stressed communities, it is a chal-
lenge to reconcile forest conservation with immedi-
ate employment needs and income generation. For-
est management systems need to be strengthened, 
combined with mechanisms for the payment of en-
vironmental services. In forested areas, it is neces-
sary to halt the advancing frontier of deforestation 
with the creation of protected areas. The Amazon 
Protected Areas Programme (ARPA) is one of the 
largest forest conservation programs in the world 
and represents an important step in this direction.
In the long term, the economic model of the 
region must shift from the supremacy of primary 
activities with low value-added to an economic 
model in which forest products and services are 
valued and the income generated contribute to 
improving community’s quality of life. To do so, it 
is necessary to expand investment in science and 
technology in the region. Though NGOs and pri-
vate actors have been working in these areas, the 
idea of a “forest economy” is still largely missing 
from the Brazilian Amazon.
Large-scale infrastructure projects should also 
be revisited in terms of their social and environ-
mental impacts. Small hydroelectric stations are 
more appropriate to a region with such fragile and 
rich ecosystems and with turbulent social dynam-
ics. Mining projects, which consume more than 
half of power produced in the region, should also 
be re-evaluated, with greater consideration for en-
vironmental impacts and local economic benefits.
4. MOVING FORWARD 
The linkages between environmental change, 
migration, human security and social conflict in 
the Brazilian Amazon are multiple and complex. 
Environmental change results in resource scarci-
ties that alter social dynamics and contribute to 
social tension, instability, and violence. 
Even though social groups strongly depend on 
the natural environment, manifest violence could 
arise not only because of scarcity of resources, but 
because of incompatibility of different social struc-
tures materialized in different patterns of resource 
use. Ecological scarcities contribute to other po-
litical, social, and economic conditions that more 
directly precipitate violence. These shift in condi-
tions occur due to continuous flows of environ-
mental migration, which are mostly intra-regional.
Frontier expansion, having been initiated by the 
State, now reproduces itself, through boom-and-
bust cycles that attract migrants and then drive 
them deeper into the forest, in search of resources. 
Ironically, the State, having initiated this pattern, 
now finds itself unable to control the process. 
Therefore, the route to a solution begins with the 
State asserting itself in the Brazilian Amazon. But 
recent suggestions and initiatives based on the role 
of civil society and private sector are also promis-
ing in shifting Amazonian economic and social 
model. It is necessary in order to reduce current 
insecurities, and long-term vulnerabilities caused 
by climate change. ?
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This case focuses on an environmental and 
human disaster that took place in the Hilly 
Region (Região Serrana) of the State of Rio de 
Janeiro in Brazil in January . With this event 
as a backdrop, it also explores larger issues of 
environmental disaster, social vulnerability 
and internal migration in Brazil, including the 
current debate over settlement and risk in envi-
ronmentally-protected areas. Finally, this case 
covers issues of disaster prevention in the short- 
and long-term, as well as linkages between expo-
sure to environmental risk and internal migra-
tion patterns in Brazil.
This case is particularly of interest because it 
is a rapid-onset disaster and displacement event 
with linkages to slow-onset migration from other 
parts of the country. This context links the case 
with the previous two cases, on the Northeast 
Semi-Arid Region and the Amazon Frontier. Fur-
thermore, though this case studies the floods 
and landslides of , these sorts of phenomena 
are common in the Brazilian Southeast, and are 
likely to be repeated in coming years.
1. CONTEXT AND VULNERABILITIES
.. The January  
floods and landslides
On January -, , the area known as Hilly 
Region (Região Serrana) of the State of Rio de 
Janeiro in Brazil, comprising the municipalities 
of São José do Vale do Rio Preto, Nova Friburgo, 
Teresópolis, Petrópolis, Bom Jardim, Sumidouro 
and Areal, was the scene of a major catastrophe: 
storms leading to landslides and floods caused the 
death of  people (Shäffer et al. ).
The disaster began with heavy rains in the final 
days of December , which saturated the soil. 
Then, on January -, it rained for  consecu-
tive hours, as cold fronts from the south collided 
with warm, humid air from the Amazon. Meteor-
ologists note that the rainfall overnight on Janu-
ary - matched expected totals for the entire 
month of January in the region (Vieira, ). 
The‘Hilly Region of the State of Rio de Janeiro 
comprises four ‘micro-regions’: the ‘hilly micro-re-
gion’ or microrregião serrana (composed of the mu-
nicipalities of Petrópolis, São José do Vale do Rio 
Preto and Teresópolis), and the micro-regions ‘Nova 
Friburgo’, ‘Santa Maria Madalena’ and Cantagalo. 
The population of the Hilly Region amounted 
to , inhabitants (approximately % of the 
total population of the State of Rio de Janeiro), ac-
cording to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE)  Census. The region is char-
acterized by steep hills and valleys, and very little 
topsoil, so heavy rain frequently causes mudslides. 
Moreover, as river valleys and floodplains become 
developed and covered with infrastructure or as-
phalt, they reduce water absorption and increase 
runoff, increasing the likelihood of rapid flooding.
Region-wide, it was estimated that , peo-
ple were made homeless by the disaster. Another 
, were temporarily dislodged (forced to aban-
don their homes because of the risk). One month 
after the disaster, there were still  people regis-
tered as ‘missing’ (Shäffer et al. ). 
. According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics, “IBGE”  census, the total population 
(urban and rural alike) of each of the Municipalities 
where the disaster took place are: Petropolis: , 
inhabitants; Teresopolis: , inhab.; São José do 
Vale do Rio Preto: , inhab.; Areal: , inhab.; 
Sumidouro: , inhab.; Nova Friburgo: , 
inhab.; Bom Jardim: , inhab.
8.3. CASE 3: ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN 
DISASTER IN THE HILLY REGIONS OF THE STATE 
OF RIO DE JANEIRO (JANUARY 2011)
Eva Gutjahr
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Episodes of intense rain leading to environmen-
tal and human disasters are not rare in the State of 
Rio de Janeiro or in Brazil, especially in its highly 
urbanized Southeast region. In , , , 
 and  (to cite only the most dramatic ex-
amples), tragedies of this kind have marked the 
summer rainy season (December to March) in the 
region. Nationwide, , people were estimated 
to have been dislodged or made homeless by rains 
in January  (Mota, ). Moreover, % of hu-
man deaths due to natural disaster in Brazil are 
associated with flooding; another % are due to 
landslides (Globo Rural On line, ).
.. Lack of prevention 
and preparedness
Since November , public authorities in the 
State of Rio had information regarding the vulner-
abilities of the region to flooding and landslides. 
The State Government of Rio had commissioned 
a team of researchers from the Federal University 
of Rio de Janeiro, under the coordination of geog-
rapher Ana Luiza Coelho Netto, which produced 
a map of vulnerable areas of the state, especially 
those that had suffered from natural disasters 
between the years  and  (Coelho Netto, 
). Their analysis pointed out huge vulnerabil-
ities caused by irregular patterns of urbanization 
and settlement. 
For example, the Netto study showed that most 
of the population in the municipality of Nova 
Friburgo lived in “areas of risk”, while Petrópolis 
and Teresópolis presented “several different risk 
factors”, because their communities were located 
on mountainsides and along river valleys consid-
ered to be most vulnerable to landslides and flood-
ing. In spite of this study, the government respond-
ed with no preventive measures.
Strikingly, the Government of the State of Rio 
spent  times more on rescue measures ( mil-
lion Euros) than on disaster prevention (. mil-
lion Euros) in . Similarly, in , the Brazil-
ian Federal Government spent  times more on 
reconstruction than on prevention, having ‘invest-
ed’  million Euros in emergency measures for 
people and areas that had been victims to flooding 
and landslides, and to the reconstruction of trans-
portation routes (Spinelli, ).
.. Deficient alert systems
On January , the National Institute of Metere-
ology (Inmet) and the Centre for Weather Fore-
cast and Climate Studies (CPTEC/INPE) released 
an alert bulletin informing the National Civil 
Defense of “meteorological conditions favorable 
to the occurrence of moderate to heavy rain” in the 
Hilly Region. The National Civil Defense trans-
mitted this information to the Civil Defense of the 
State of Rio de Janeiro. However, this last body 
did not warn the population, as it followed the 
recommendation of another institute, the Mete-
orological Service of the State of Rio (Simerj). 
The decision not to warn the population was 
mainly due to the fact that Simerj used a different 
weather forecasting model, which predicted only 
“moderate rain.”
On January , the National Institute of Meteor-
ology (Inmet) released another alert bulletin again 
warning of “meteorological conditions favorable 
to the occurrence of moderate to heavy rain”. The 
National Civil Defense transmitted this informa-
tion to the Fire Brigades in the City of Rio de Ja-
neiro and to the State Office of ‘Public Order’, who 
passed on the message (through e-mail) to all the 
municipalities in the State of Rio. Nonetheless, the 
population was once again not warned. The ex-
ception was the municipality of Areal, where the 
mayor, worried about the intensity of the storm, 
took the initiative, recording a message of “high 
alert” via a car driven through the town’s streets, 
equipped with a loudspeaker.  people were 
preventatively resettled, and Areal was the sole 
municipality registering no deaths in the disaster 
(Oliveira, ).
It should also be noted that none of the smaller 
municipalities in Rio state possess public alert sys-
tems. Only the City of Rio has a system for detect-
ing extreme weather events; it then distributes 
information to community leaders in highly vul-
nerable areas, such as favelas, via mobile phone 
(Agencia O Globo, ).
In July , six months after the disaster, mu-
nicipalities of the Hilly Region considered imple-
menting alert-systems similar to those in the City 
of Rio, including warning sirens when rain levels 
exceed  millimeters per hour. If bad conditions 
persist, inhabitants are urged to leave areas of risk, 
such as floodplains. These systems should be in-
tegrated with existing river level monitoring sys-
tems, installed in Nova Friburgo the month after 
the disaster. Critically, these systems can function 
even in the event of a power outage, whereas tra-
ditional media (TV and radio) are power-depend-
ent and thus failed in the January  disaster. 
Moreover, as the storms also knocked out phone 
service, affected municipalities have wisely invest-
ed in amateur radios, which can play an important 
role not only in early warning, but also in rescue 
activities in isolated areas (Carlyle, a).
. Jornal Nacional, TV Globo. //.
STUDY 07/20111 0 2 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2010 
.. Protected areas and 
social vulnerability
The Rio flooding and landslide disaster was 
due not only to climatic factors, but also to the 
patterns of settlement in risk areas. Many people 
living in the most vulnerable areas are low-
income, including many migrants and their fami-
lies (including, as was detailed in the first case, a 
large number of migrants from the Northeast of 
the country seeking a better life in the wealthy 
and industrialized south) (Hogan, ).
Some of these vulnerable settlements lie in 
protected areas, including public “Conservation 
Units” and “Areas of Permanent Protection”. Ac-
cording to specific environmental legislation, hu-
man settlement is illegal in these areas. Moreover, 
illegal settlements contribute to deforestation of 
hills and occupation of valleys, thus increasing 
the risk of erosion, flooding, and landslides. Many 
communities damaged in the Rio floods were il-
legally located in protected areas. For example, in 
Nova Friburgo, , of the town’s , homes 
were in such areas (Agencia O Globo, ).
For many poor families, the only housing op-
tions lie in these protected areas. Because of their 
risk, lack of infrastructure, and irregular legal sta-
tus, real estate values are lower, bolstering acces-
sibility for the poor.
Previous case studies of flooding disaster in Bra-
zil have shown a similar relationship between en-
vironmentally protected areas, social vulnerabil-
ity and environmental risk: for example, the  
floods in the State of Santa Catarina (South of 
Brazil) studied by Hermann (Hermann, ). 
Hermann found linkages between natural protect-
ed areas, unsafe settlement, and socioeconomic 
vulnerability. Such problems were exacerbated 
by a lack of infrastructure, including poor waste 
. ‘APP’ following to the Brazilian ‘Forest Code’ articles  
and , and Federal Laws nº /, / and 
/. The Brazilian Forest Code determines that 
all river sources, river borders, top of hills and moun-
tains, as well as areas presenting a declivity superior 
to  degrees are ‘Permanent Protected Areas’ (APP), 
and as such they should not be occupied by any type 
of settlement or neither be submitted to deforestation. 
These areas are subject to regulations no matter if they 
are localized in urban or rural areas. Legislation also 
establishes that deforestation is forbidden in APP areas 
of declivity between  and  degrees. This last case 
is related to protection from erosion, areas of declivity 
being the most erosion-prone. Areas that are now being 
appointed as lacking legal protection are those local-
ized at the bottom of high declivity mountains and hills, 
which are the most vulnerable to landslides and are not 
under specific protection legislation.
. Herrmann, M. L. P. (Org.) Atlas de desastres naturais do 
Estado de Santa Catarina. Florianópolis: IOESC, . 
Cited in: Schäffer et all.; 
management and sanitation. Besides, the migrant 
(or descendent of a migrant) status is also directly 
related to social vulnerability (Hogan, ). In 
short, vulnerability is self-replicating, as vulnera-
ble people were forced to inhabit environmentally 
risky areas that exacerbated their vulnerability 
to disasters (Fonseca Alves, A. P. & Gama Torres, 
).
.. Natural and socio-
economic characteristics
% of the population from the Hilly Region live 
in the Municipalities of Petrópolis (%), Nova 
Friburgo (%) and Teresópolis (%). The 
concentration of population in these cities is due 
to the historic settlement pattern of the area and 
their proximity with the city of Rio de Janeiro, the 
State’s most important economic centre. 
These three cities also have the highest Gross 
Domestic Product and are the largest suppliers 
of services in the Hilly Region. Although some of 
the rural activities that characterized the region 
in the past persist, the Hilly Region’s economy has 
diversified to include industry, commerce and ser-
vices, information technology, and rural tourism. 
“Rural Tourism” and “Green Tourism” are among 
the most important economic activities in the re-
gion, known for its hilly landscape and temperate 
climate. Other important economic activities are 
the beverage industry, the wooden furniture in-
dustry and activities in the mechanical and textile 
sectors. The textile sector has been particularly 
fast-growing in the municipalities around Nova 
Friburgo, and textiles have come to characterize 
the economy of the region, according to a study 
by the Rio branch of the Brazilian Support Service 
to the Micro and Small Enterprise - “SEBRAERJ.” 
(SEBRAERJ, ). The sector accounts for % of 
the national textile sector, providing , jobs 
in the region, and produces more than  million 
articles of clothing per year (Mariano, ).
2. IMPACTS OF FLOODINGS 
AND LANDSLIDSES
.. Damages and migration
Most of the population of the Hilly Region 
displaced by the floods and landslides went to 
. Petrópolis and Teresópolis have also become known as 
‘imperial cities’, having hosted the Portuguese royal fam-
ily during the th and th centuries. Petrópolis was the 
official capital of the State between  and . 
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public shelters offered at the municipal level (in 
schools, churches and sports stadiums), or were 
hosted by family or friends living in the same city. 
Though official figures show , people were 
made homeless and , dislodged (Shäffer et 
al. ), it is still difficult to find data showing 
displacement and migration patterns in and out of 
the affected area.
In the aftermath of the landslides, a lack of 
workers was one of the main reported problems, 
particularly in the textile sector, even one month 
after the disaster (Gandra, ). On January , 
the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio 
the Janeiro (FIRJAN) reported that, of  com-
panies consulted, .% suffered some kind of 
impact, and that economic losses were estimated 
at . million Euros, mostly related to loss of 
production time, raw materials and stock. Of the 
 affected companies affected, .% registered 
absences among blue-collar workers and .% re-
ported absences of administrators, implying that 
poorer, less-educated workers were most severely 
affected by the disaster.
Nova Friburgo, where .% of companies suf-
fered some impact, was the most economically 
damaged. Second came Teresopolis (.%) and 
third Petropolis (.%). Among all companies 
in the region, .% reported missing workers, 
while .% reported power outages, and tel-
ephone lines were down in .% of businesses. 
Meanwhile, .% of companies were affected by 
flooding in their vicinity and .% suffered flood-
ing within their industrial plants. The return to 
normal activities was postponed by internal and 
external infrastructure problems, as .% had 
difficulties shipping their wares, and .% en-
countered trouble bringing in raw materials due to 
transportation outages. 
After the incident, industries pledged not to dis-
miss personnel, so people who left their jobs prob-
ably did so voluntarily (Gandra, ). According 
to the president of the Council for the Develop-
ment of the Textile Sector of Nova Friburgo and 
the Region”, Nelci Layola, most of the workers 
who left had migrated elsewhere within the state, 
in search of work (ibid.). However, such assertions 
are hard to verify in the absence of precise labor 
migration data. It is also possible that some left 
the state altogether, fearing economic stagnation 
. From the  companies consulted  are located in 
Nova Friburgo,  in Petrópolis,  in Teresópolis,  in 
Areal,  in Sumidouro and one in São José do Vale do 
Rio Preto.  companies are in the transformation sec-
tor and  in civil construction. Micro-entreprises are the 
most representative group, accounting for ,% of the 
total. Source: Sistema FIRJAN. % das empresas da 
Região Serrana foram afetadas pelas chuvas. ...
brought about by the difficult economic conditions 
following the floods (ibid). In addition, for those 
employed in farming rather than factory work, the 
disaster had more serious ramifications on com-
munities, and may have forced families to migrate 
elsewhere in search of new livelihoods (Carlyle, 
b). 
.. Health and 
sanitation impacts
Within a month of the disaster, there were 
 registered cases of leptospirosis in the Region, 
 in Nova Friburgo and  in Teresópolis. Lepto-
spirosis is a potentially deadly disease transmitted 
by a bacteria found in rat urine. Proliferation 
risks tend to increase during episodes of flooding 
and its aftermath, with the accumulation of mud 
and debris and increased human contact with 
contaminated water. In the following days after 
the episode, the State Undersecretary of Health 
distributed  textbooks about the disease and 
visited  shelters to raise awareness about the 
risks of the disease among displaced people. 
Other diseases related to the disaster were hepa-
titis, diarrhea, tetanus and infections. One week 
after the incident there were  registered cases 
of diarrhea; meanwhile, , affected people 
had been vaccinated against tetanus (Caruso, 
).
Six months after the incident, the Ministry of 
Health reported an investment of . million Eu-
ros in the construction of basic health units in  cit-
ies of the Hilly Region (Carlyle, c). 
.. Migration for 
reconstruction purposes
Despite the difficult conditions, the public and 
private sectors have launched initiatives to attract 
or retain workers in the Hilly Region, especially 
for reconstruction purposes (Portal Brazil, ). 
These initiatives can be seen as state-support 
efforts to encourage return migration in the 
wake of the disaster. As part of these efforts, the 
Ministry of Employment and State Secretary of 
Employment are promoting continuing educa-
tion classes in civil engineering for , workers 
in the  most-affected municipalities. The idea 
is to contribute to reconstruction of the region, 
bolster the regional economy, and employ people 
living in shelters (ibid.). However, investment in 
reconstruction will also likely draw migrants from 
. Notícias R.” Sobe para  o número de casos confirma-
dos leptospirose na região serrana”. //.
. Id.
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other parts of Brazil, who may come in search 
of new work opportunities. Such patterns echo 
other internal population movements in Brazil 
(described in cases  and ), as people move from 
region to region in search of a better life.
However, historically, as all three cases have 
demonstrated, internal migrants in Brazil have 
found insufficient public services and basic in-
frastructure in their new homes. These shortages 
often force migrants to occupy environmentally 
vulnerable land. It remains to be seen if these po-
tential “reconstruction migrants” to the Hilly Re-
gion suffer the same fate. 
3. POLICY RESPONSES
.. Mitigation and 
Reconstruction
Three months after the flooding and land-
slides,  families in Nova Friburgo were still 
living in shelters and receiving food offered 
by the municipality and donors. Though dona-
tions had begun to dwindle, many families were 
still stuck, with no place to go. As the weeks 
went by, many chose to return home, despite 
the risks, rather than to remain in the shelters 
indefinitely.
The main public and private measures direct-
ed to the victims of the disaster in the Hilly Re-
gions of Rio were: 
. The ‘Bolsa-família’ allowance given to 
, people.
. A credit line provided to the commercial 
sector, by the Ministry of Social Integration.
. The plan for the construction of , ‘so-
cial’ houses to the victims whose houses have 
been either destroyed or expropriated for rea-
sons of risk, and the construction of another 
, houses by a pool of construction compa-
nies on land donated by the State Government.
. A ‘lottery’ game by the National Lottery had 
been created, with proceeds reverted to the dis-
aster victims.
. The option to access , Euros of the FGTS 
(Retirement Fund) for workers in the region.
. An extension of two months on the pay-
ment of home and vehicle taxes.
. The implementation of a ‘Reconstruc-
tion Program for the State of Rio de Janeiro’, 
by the National Bank for Social Development 
(BNDES), with a total funding of  million 
Euros to finance, under special conditions, 
companies and entrepreneurs in the affected 
municipalities.
. An emergency credit line implemented by 
the National Program for the Strengthening of 
Family Agriculture, with a funding of , mil-
lion Euros, directed to the reconstruction of 
productive infrastructure, irrigation systems, 
and agricultural inputs.
. ‘Social security’ allowance of  Euros to 
cover rent expenses for dislodged families.
But such benefits were only available to those 
who had sufficient identification. However, 
many families had lost their documents in the 
disaster, and requests for new documents flood-
ed issuing agencies. And the fund of  Eu-
ros allowance to cover monthly rent expenses 
failed to account for a lack of available housing 
options in the region (Castro, ).
International financial support included:
. A credit of  million Euros by the World 
Bank for the reconstruction of houses, expro-
priation of land, resettlement and demolitions.
. A credit of  million Euros by the Inter-
American Development Bank for the rebuilding 
of roads in the State of Rio de Janeiro.
.. Long-term initiatives
National long-term initiatives included:
. The Federal Program PAC  (Growth Accelera-
tion Program) planned an investment of  billion 
Euros for construction of drainage systems in all 
vulnerable regions in Brazil.
. The Federal Program, ‘My House My Life’ 
(Minha Casa, Minha Vida) planned to invest 
 million Euros for relocating families living in 
vulnerable and disaster prone areas.
. The BNDES (National Bank for Social Devel-
opment) will financially support a study to iden-
tify areas of risk in the whole country to support 
national risk management plans.
. The Federal Government also announced its 
willingness to invest in continuing education and 
equipment to municipal Civil Defense Forces, the 
institution responsible for the reduction of disas-
ters including prevention, preparation for emer-
gencies, responses to events and reconstruction.
. In March  the government launched the 
‘National Monitoring and Alert of Natural Disas-
ters System’ (Sistema Nacional de Monitoramento 
e Alerta de Desastres Naturais).
. The creation of a “Civil Defense Payment 
Card” from May  onwards. The objective of 
the card is to improve transparency and efficiency 
in the transfer of funds for rescue, assistance and 
rehabilitation in events of disaster. It is also sup-
posed to serve as a tool to accountability, monitor-
ing the use of resources.
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CONSIDERATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Few public official documents have been prepared 
related to the January  disaster. Nonetheless, 
starting in November , Rio State authorities 
had information on vulnerabilities to flooding in 
their state (Coelho Netto, ).
Two public official documents were prepared in 
the aftermath of the event. The first is an inspec-
tion report produced by the Brazilian Ministry of 
Environment and the Rio State Office of Biodiver-
sity and Forests, “Areas of permanent protection, 
conservation units & areas of risk, How are they 
related?” (February, ) (Shäffer et al. ). It is 
noteworthy that this report relates only to the en-
vironmental and legal—but not social—context. 
It notes the occupation and settlement of natural 
protected areas, but fails to refer to the social vul-
nerability of the populations in such settlements. 
It emphasizes the need for enforcement and im-
proved monitoring and control of irregular occu-
pation in such protected areas, but makes no rec-
ommendations regarding social policy. The team 
did not include a social scientist or urban planner 
and thus, it did not develop an integrated ap-
proach in its analysis, with no discussion of the hu-
man, sociological, or historical context. The team 
also failed to explore ways that the environmental 
sector could engage with other public sectors on 
these issues. 
The second official document is the report “Di-
agnosis of the mega-disaster in the Hilly Region” 
prepared by the Geological Service of the State of 
Rio de Janeiro (). This report was produced 
one month following the disaster and consists 
mainly of an analysis of the geology of the area. 
It relates to the Civil Defense’s rescue response 
but says nothing regarding disaster risk reduction 
efforts.
The Hilly Region floods have also triggered an 
interesting public debate about questions of re-
sponsibility for the disaster. Many victims were 
perceived as having occupied the area voluntar-
ily, and thus chose to place themselves at higher 
risk. Alternatively, the media has run stories of 
a wealthy family who lost its home in the disas-
ter, obscuring the fact that the disaster hit hard-
est among the poor. Others point out that public 
authorities are responsible for preparedness, and 
thus should be blamed for what happened, rather 
than blaming “nature” or the victims themselves.
The overlap of environmental and social factors 
makes this issue a challenge for public authorities, 
as inter-sectoral cooperation is essential. Moreo-
ver, the disaster is a challenge for academic and 
analysts, as one must include environmental, 
geographic, sociological, economic and historical 
information, rather than adhering to traditional 
disciplines. Lastly, such analysis requires sophis-
ticated technology and highly trained operators—
neither of which may be ubiquitous, even in a large 
country such as Brazil.
Regarding public sector capacity, a few sugges-
tions emerge from this case. First, early warning 
systems clearly failed, as a result of miscommuni-
cations between various meteorological and civil 
defense agencies. These communication break-
downs and the resulting confusion likely cost lives. 
Second, it is essential that various public sectors be 
more harmonized, particularly at the local level. 
Third, adaptation, mitigation, and rescue practic-
es are all essential, but disaster prevention is both 
vastly important and vastly overlooked. The state 
must consider investment in significant infrastruc-
ture to prevent future extreme weather events 
from turning into deadly disasters. 
Lastly, this case study has shown the links be-
tween internal migration and residence in envi-
ronmentally-sensitive areas. In Rio, as in many 
other parts of the country, massive infrastructure 
projects have attracted migrant labor to cities un-
prepared to deal with the new arrivals. The result 
. The Conolly family, including, Erick Conolly, CEO of 
the ‘Icatu holding’ and his daughter Daniela Conolly, a 
famous Brazilian stylist. Seven members of this family 
died in the disaster, as they were hosted in the farm-house 
of the even more wealthy ‘Gouvêa Vieira’ family, one of its 
owner being a deputy of the State of Rio. In: Lage ().
. Articles report to , civil construction workers only 
for the hydro-elecritc of Santo Antônio, % originary 
Table 1. Sequence of events in the 15 affected Municipalities of the “Hilly Region” of Rio de Janeiro
Date Events Consequences
Last days of December 2010 8 to 10 days of intense rain soil overly wet
10th and 11th January 2011 32 hours of uninterrupted rain soil overly wet
11th to 12th January 2011 4,5 hours of very intense rain landslides and floods
12th January 2011
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has been unplanned urbanization, often in areas 
of environmental risk. Thus, it would be wise for 
future large-scale projects in Brazil to include 
not only the classic Environmental Impact As-
sessments, but also “Social Impact Assessments”, 
which would establish if the community in ques-
tion is – or should be - equipped to deal with the 
inflow of labor associated with the project. As this 
case shows, such analysis would be a critical part 
of any disaster prevention system, by preventing 
the establishment of irregular settlements in envi-
ronmentally-sensitive areas that can so easily turn 
into disaster areas.
BRAZIL’S CASE STUDIES: 
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The three cases we have presented here illus-
trate different aspects of Brazilian environmental 
migration. From historical and current examples 
of slow onset migration to a very recent event of 
disaster-related displacement, we intended to 
analyze a diverse range of causes of this process, 
which may affect and create social instabilities at 
the local and regional levels.
Although we have studied regions with different 
social and ecological conditions, and our data vary 
in sources and scope, all three cases yield similar 
considerations. First, both long-lasting migration 
and short-term displacements were clearly (and 
generally, negatively) correlated with environ-
mental changes. Indeed, the environment was rel-
evant in the three examples, but the impacts were 
not solely the result of nature. Negative outcomes, 
such as economic disruption and population dis-
placement, are highly dependent on the social and 
political contexts. In each case, a lack of urban and 
regional planning and the dominance of extrac-
tive and patronage-based development models in-
creased social vulnerability to these negative out-
comes of environmental change.
Vulnerability is a key concept in these cases and 
is the consequence of structural problems which 
can only be tackled through public policies and 
transformation of current socioeconomic systems. 
from the State of Rondônia, and %, , workers origi-
nary from other States. Strikes and uprisings have taken 
place over the year  because of critic working con-
ditions. “Superexploração dos trabalhadores na usina 
hidrelétrica do Rio Madeira”, PSB Nacional, //.
The historical drought process in the Northeast 
has negative impacts on people’s lives, but these 
effects become deeper and more insidious when 
associated with the region’s patronage system, 
which creates vicious cycles and halts develop-
ment. Thus, drought (and its negative impacts) 
has more or less become “institutionalized”.
The Amazonian case is the result of decades 
of destructive economic and demographic poli-
cies, founded on the idea that the forest should 
be cleared in order to assure national security 
and progress. To date, the region’s development 
has been based on low value-added resource ex-
ploitation, a process that has led to ecological ca-
tastrophe and a cycle of voracious expansion into 
frontier zones. Combined with a total lack of state 
services and authority, this development pattern 
has resulted in high rates of violence, continuous 
environmental degradation, and economic disrup-
tion, as well as large-scale voluntary and involun-
tary migration.
Structural problems are also present in the Hilly 
Region of Rio de Janeiro, where migration flows, 
the occupation of risky areas, deforestation, and 
absence of flood prevention measures produce 
glaring vulnerabilities each rainy season. The dis-
aster displaced thousands of families, and recon-
struction itself may bring new migrants to the area. 
Climate change is expected to exacerbate severe 
droughts, desertification, and flooding: the three 
environmental changes covered in these cases. 
Brazil’s ability to adapt to climate change will be 
hindered by these socially-rooted structural factors 
in each of the regions in this chapter. Moreover, 
having made massive infrastructure investments 
in the three areas, it will be difficult for Brazil to 
change course quickly in the face of global envi-
ronmental change. 
Public policy is the only comprehensive way to 
tackle these challenges. Each case in this chap-
ter has set forth policy recommendations. More 
broadly, urban and regional planning, deploying 
basic services and functions of the state, and for-
mulating infrastructure projects consistent with 
on-the-ground realities are all crucial strategies 
for dealing with migration and instability in the 
face of environmental change. Moreover, while the 
State must have a central role, it must also work 
alongside private and civil society actors. Building 
capacity to deal with environmental change is not 
a peripheral concern, but is central to Brazilians’ 
quality of life and human security. ?
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Numerous disasters marred , displacing more than  million people world-wide. At the same time, slow-onset changes in many coun-tries significantly increased environmental risks for millions more. In this book, 
we set out to describe “The State of Environmental 
Migration.” Yet our case studies have demonstrated 
an immense diversity of environment-migration 
circumstances and linkages: there is no simple 
prototype for an “environmental migrant.”
Yet we can grasp common threads from the 
case studies presented here. In nearly every case, 
environmental migrants desired intensely to re-
turn home, or at a minimum, to return to a state 
of normalcy and security. Moreover, there is no 
such thing as a “perfect response.” The complex 
circumstances and intense pressure took its toll 
on every country, regardless of national wealth or 
geographic location. However, policy does matter. 
Planning for environmental change, by reducing 
social vulnerabilities, reducing risks, and prepar-
ing for disaster response, can save lives and im-
prove human welfare. On the other hand, ignor-
ing potential hazards, or refusing to consider the 
adaptive actions taken by local people (up to and 
including migration) is a recipe for disaster.
 With the advent of human-cause global warm-
ing, environmental change and related migration 
have rocketed to the top of the global agenda, at-
tracting attention from actors as diverse as global 
financial institutions, environmentalists, heads-of-
state, humanitarians, and the world’s most pow-
erful militaries. Yet the phenomena in question 
remain poorly understood and frequently carica-
tured. We hope that this volume’s case studies have 
provided nuance and empirical evidence to the on-
going global debate and policymaking process. 
CONCLUSION
François Gemenne, Pauline Brücker and Joshua Glasser
With an issue as complex, novel, and politically-
charged as climate change, it may not be possible 
to consider every nuance or bit of local evidence 
in establishing a framework for action. Yet we can 
do better. We can move past the deterministic mi-
gration paradigms that color today’s debate, to a 
more detailed understanding of how populations 
use (or refuse to use) migration as a tool for adap-
tation. We can move past a view of environmental 
events as “acts of God,” to a more sophisticated 
understanding of the complex ecological rela-
tionships that precede disastrous calamities.  And 
we can move past our current, response-oriented 
approach to disaster, to a more holistic approach 
that places emphasis on disaster risk reduction 
and coordinated planning for displacement.
This volume also shows that environment-mi-
gration linkages are not strictly the problem of 
small island states: though not all will be equally 
affected, no community can afford to ignore these 
issues. Encouragingly, the charter of the Green 
Climate Fund (established at the  Cancun Cli-
mate Negotiations) recognized that policies and 
programs migration and displacement should be 
entitled to the Fund’s support; we hope that other 
local, national, and international financing bod-
ies will follow suit and that all parties will work to 
put financial resources behind such declarations 
of principle.
As the world prepares for climate change, a 
number of enormous issues remain to be resolved. 
Yet environment-migration linkages must be ad-
dressed: the problem is simply too massive and 
complex to escape the attention of actors from the 
local to the global. Moreover, it is crucial that such 
issues be addressed from an empirically-robust, 
evidence-based framework. By putting forward a 
series of case studies from recent world events, we 
hope that this volume can contribute to the essen-
















This volume is intended to be the first of an annual series, which will aim to provide the reader with regularly-updated qualitative assessments on the changing nature and dynamics of 
environmental migration throughout the world. The 
idea for it stemmed from the course «Environment 
and Migration», taught at the Paris School of 
International Affairs (PSIA) of Sciences Po. The 
course, which is thought to be the first of its kind in 
the world, examines the complex relationship between 
environmental change and migration flows. For their 
final assignment, students were asked to select and 
analyse a case of environmental migration, be it a 
sudden and violent natural disaster or a slow-onset 
environmental degradation. The best of these papers 
have been selected and edited, and are presented in 
this volume. Most of them constitute the first detailed 
analyses of the migration flows that were induced by 
some of the most dramatic events of 2010, paving the 
way for future scholarly works.
